Showing papers on "Normal modal logic published in 1968"

An Introduction to Modal Logic

Abstract: This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: An Introduction to Modal Logic and A Companion to Modal Logic. A New Introduction to Modal Logic is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes readers from the most basic systems of modal propositional logic right up to systems of modal predicate with identity. It covers both technical developments such as completeness and incompleteness, and finite and infinite models, and their philosophical applications, especially in the area of modal predicate logic.

Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic

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On a Proposed System of Epistemic Logic

Abstract: In this note familiarity is assumed with the papers in the symposium-"The Logic of Knowledge and Belief-which appeared in the first issue of Nou's. Familiarity is also assumed with the subject of that symposium, i.e., Hintikka's classic work Knowledge and Belief. I do not look on this note as a rebuttal to Professor Hintikka's charitable and illuminating reply to my contribution to the Nous symposium. My intent is to raise certain questions concerning the system of epistemic logic outlined in Hintikka's paper "Individuals, Possible Worlds, and Epistemic Logic." This system differs in some respects from that of the book Knowledge and Belief. I shall refer to the latter system as KB and the former as IPE. Some of the respects in which IPE differs from KB may be put in the following manner, I believe:

A Contribution to Modal Logic

Abstract: A proposition is presented by a complete, self-contained statement which, taken as a whole, will be true or false: The cat is on the mat, for example. When such a proposition is itself made subject to some further qualification of such a kind that the entire resulting complex is itself once again a proposition, then this qualification is said to represent a modality to which the original proposition is subjected. The classical modalities, treated by logicians at least since the time of Aristotle (b. 384 B.C.)1, revolve around the notion of truth itself: It is necessarily true (or: false) that p. It is actually true (or: false) that p. It is possibly true (or: false) that p.