Nyaya

About: Nyaya is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 121 publications have been published within this topic receiving 928 citations. The topic is also known as: Nyâya.

Buddhism as Philosophy : An Introduction

Abstract: Contents: Preface Buddhism as philosophy? Early Buddhism: basic teachings Non-self: empty persons Buddhist ethics A Nyaya interlude Abhidharma: the metaphysics of empty persons The rise of Mahayana Yogacara: impressions-only and the denial of physical objects Madhyamaka: the doctrine of emptiness The school of Dinnaga: Buddhist epistemology. Index.

Does indian epistemology concern justified true belief

Abstract: Of the various topics which are taken up in classical Indian philosophy, prdmanyavdda, equated with epistemology in the critical literature, strikes the Western philosopher of today as being most akin to something of deep concern to him. On the basis of the translations of the Sanskrit literature provided in the best contemporary expositions of Indian thought, questions about the nature of knowledge and truth appear to be clearly broached in Indian texts, and the intricacies of some of the analyses to be found in those texts rival the intricacies of analysis as practiced by the best of recent and living Anglo-American professional philosophers. In my opinion the most outstanding exposition of Indian thinking on the topic of prâmânyavâda is to be found in the work of Jitendranath Mohanty, and most notably in his ground-breaking book, Gangesa's Theory of Truth.1 In his Introduction to a translation of the (Jnapti) Prâmânya section of Gangesa's Tattvacintdmani Mohanty first disambiguates a number of key terms and lays out in exemplary fashion the issues which appear to separate the two sides in the classical polemic concerning whether the awareness of prâmânya is "intrinsic" (svatah) or "extrinsic" (paratah). This review distinguishes the positions not only of the many important Indian systems involved — Mimamsâ, Advaita and Nyaya — but also succinctly identifies the positions of subschools within these as well as the opinions of individual philosophers found in their writings. This Introduction is followed by a faithful translation of Gangesa's chapter with copious explanatory remarks without which the Tattvaeintâmani, extremely laconic in its style, could not be understood by anyone not initiated into Sanskrit and Navyanyaya. The entire volume is a tour de force, a subtle, critical illumination of the most intricate kind of materials calling for that rare combination, brilliance as Indologist and philosopher rolled into one. Though the paper that now follows takes issue with some of Mohanty's conclusions, this in no way should be thought to mitigate against what I have just said about the book. It is only because of rare efforts such as his that it becomes possible to push further into important matters and argue issues in a fashion that promises to provide general insights.

There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyaya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa

Abstract: In the lead article of the fiftieth anniversary issue of Philosophy East and West ( January 2000), Arindam Chakrabarti elaborates seven reasons why NyaÅya should jettison ``indeterminate perception'' and view all perception as determinate, that is to say, as having an entity (a) as qualified by a qualifier (F) as object (Fa). In his notes, Chakrabarti invites a reply ``so that,'' as he says, ``I may know why immaculate perception is needed by NyaÅya after all.'' The following is a response that shows not so much why indeterminate perception is needed by NyaÅya but why it is identified as a causal factor necessary to the arising of some (not all) determinate perception defined as ``perception of an entity as qualified.'' Here I follow GanÇgesÂa UpaÅdhyaÅya, the fourteenth-century founder (with the help of a few less well known predecessors and contemporaries) of ``New Logic,'' Navya NyaÅya. GanÇgesÂa devotes an entire section (about one eighteenth) of the perception chapter of his monumental TattvacintaÅman Ç i ( Jewel of Reflection about Epistemology) to nirvikalpaka pratyaks Ç a,1 and he is a chief target of Chakrabarti's chastisement.2 Now, first of all, I want to follow GanÇgesÂa's ground rules. The NaiyaÅyika is not concerned with strategies about how to look good in debates (with Buddhists or anyone else). His attitude is truth-seeking, not eristic, and thus no reply will be given to Chakrabarti's agonizing about how best to show ourselves in controversies with (in particular, Buddhist) adversaries (and Wilfrid Sellars). GanÇgesÂa's reflections are vaÅdaÐand the section is rightly titled nirvikalpaka-vaÅda, vaÅda being ``inquiries among friends''Ðdirected to uncovering real causal factors, not to winning a debate or countering sophisms. Deception, or counter-deception, is sometimes appropriateÐ for instance, to protect a student or other judge from fallacies advanced by people of bad character. But not here. So I will lay out GanÇgesÂa's argument for identifying nirvikalpaka pratyaks Ç a, and then run through Chakrabarti's list of reasons for rejecting it with an eye to the objection's salience to GanÇgesÂa's project. In other words, Chakrabarti's objections will be taken up with an eye to the truth as it appears to a NaiyaÅyika, not with an eye to how our team should best present itself to outsiders. I have little to say about Chakrabarti's complaints about appearancesÐin fact, I find them delightful. Don't let him fool you. There's no greater NaiyaÅyika enthusiast than Chakrabarti himself, and he knows how to distill a controversy to show the wisdom

Reply to Stephen Phillips

Abstract: Much as I am honored by Stephen Phillips' detailed defense, in the face of my methodological "refutation," of the NyAya thesis that a raw perception of the qualifier is a necessary causal factor for some (not all) determinate perception of an entity as qualified, I am not fully convinced that my deeper qualms about the very idea of immaculate perception unimpregnated by predicative structure have all been adequately addressed. Instead of a detailed response, which I intend to undertake elsewhere, I wish to underscore the central worry behind my fifth (which Phillips calls "good") and seventh (which Phillips calls "weak") objections. When I claimed that perception is introduced, taxonomically, as a variety of veridical awareness, I had in mind the opening line of Ganrgesa's section on the definition of perception:

A Note on Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Perception

Abstract: Some ten years ago an interesting discussion took place in the pages of this journal. It began with an article by Arindam Chakrabarti (2000) whose title betrays its inten tion: "Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyaya." There followed a response by Stephen H. Phillips (2001), "There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyaya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa," which in turn was commented upon in Chakrabarti's "Reply to Stephen Phillips" (2001). This discussion, as is clear from the titles, concerns the need and even possibility of nirvikalpaka perception. What Chakrabarti tries to do is "to show why we can eas ily do without nirvikalpaka perception inside the Nyaya epistemology" (2000, p. 3). Indeed, his project is "of purging Nyaya of indeterminate perception" (ibid.). These and other remarks show that Chakrabarti's intention is not to destroy Nyaya episte mology by showing its incoherence or impossibility. He is not just playing around with the idea whether there is a need for nirvikalpaka perception in a system that he considers otherwise inadequate. No, his reflections, as I understand them, clearly cover the issue whether there really is such a thing as nirvikalpaka perception. And his answer is no: there is no such thing as nirvikalpaka perception. In this comment I will not continue the philosophical debate of Chakrabarti and Phillips. I will, however, consider the question whether there is such a thing as nirvi kalpaka perception. Subsequently I will take up the question whether savikalpaka perception as conceived of in Nyaya is capable of doing its job all on its own, with out nirvikalpaka perception. A good point of departure for a discussion of the existence, or possibility, of nir vikalpaka perception is an Indian philosophical text different from Nyaya, namely the Patanjala Yogasastra. This text does not merely state that nirvikalpaka perception is philosophically possible or even necessary, but goes to the extent of claiming that a state can be reached in which there is a place only for such perception. The rele vant discussion starts at YS 1.9: sabdajnananupatJ vastusunyo vikalpah, "Vikalpa re sults from knowledge of words and is devoid of objective referent." This definition seems to justify the rendering "conceptual construct" for vikalpa, at least provision ally. The same term occurs again in YS 1.42: tatra sabdarthajnanavikalpaih samklrna savitarka samapattih, "The meditational attainment with vitarka is mixed with con ceptual constructs regarding words, things and cognitions."1 It is understood in the immediately following sutra, YS 1.43: smrtiparisuddhau svarupasunyevarthama tranirbhasa nirvitarka, "When the memory is purified, [the meditational attainment] without vitarka, which is as it were empty of itself and in which only the object shines forth [comes about]." Given that YS 1.43 follows YS 1.42, it is clear that the