Showing papers on "Ontology (information science) published in 1974"
111 citations
28 citations
TL;DR: For example, this article argued that any comprehensive world-view constitutes an ideology, on this view: such a world view will be defined by a class rationalizing the acceptance of the privileges it obtains from the status quo.
Abstract: serves. By ideology, a class rationalizes the acceptance of the privileges it obtains from the status quo. It is particularly significant that in Marx’s own usage, the term is one of opprobrium and implies self-deception. Neither Sorel’s concept of ’social myths’ nor Pareto’s concept of ’derivations’ carries quite the same overtones of class warfare, or indeed self-deception.,I shall use the word ’ideology’ in the widest sense. Any comprehensive world-view constitutes an ideology, on this view: such a world-view will
13 citations
12 citations
TL;DR: T* is a logistic system designed to represent the original ontological context behind RusselΓs paradox of predication, and Russell's argument applied to the modified Russell property shows that the principle that properties which are indiscernible are co-extensive is disprovable in T*,.
Abstract: T* is a logistic system designed to represent the original ontological context behind RusselΓs paradox of predication. It encompasses standard second order logic, hereafter referred to as T, but goes beyond it by allowing predicate variables to occupy subject positions in its formulas. Because of a violation of the restrictions imposed for the proper substitution of a formula for a predicate variable, RusselΓs argument fails in T*. Indeed, not only is T* consistent but it is also a conservative extension ofT. Nevertheless, T* is not without its oddities. E.g., although \"the Russell property\" of being a property which does not possess itself does not exist in the ontology of T*, the modified Russell property of being an individual which is indiscernible (in the sense of having all properties in common) with a property which that individual does not possess does exist in this ontology. Instead of leading to a contradiction, Russell's argument applied to the modified Russell property shows that the principle that properties which are indiscernible are co-extensive is disprovable in T*, i.e., according to the ontology of T*, there are properties which are indiscernible (in the sense indicated above) but which nevertheless are not co-extensive. It has been suggested that one way of understanding this result is to construe occurrences of predicates in subject positions as referring, not to the properties which occurrences of the same predicates in predicate positions designate, but instead, to individual objects associated with these
8 citations
7 citations
7 citations
TL;DR: In this article, Howard suggested that the major and minor premises of the hypothetico-deductive model were the same as those of the Bousma-Flint dispute.
Abstract: While I am grateful to Mr. Howard for the careful attention he gave to my paper, ’Ideals of Order: History and Sociology’, I cannot, in the end, accept his suggestion concerning the nature of the dispute between Flint and Bousma. Howard thinks that ’they are concerned (though perhaps without quite realizing it) with the major and minor premises respectively of the hypothetico-deductive model rather than operating from two entirely differ-
TL;DR: Maritain's theory of the sign and its relation to the relation of art to beauty is discussed in this paper. But the work of art as transcendental is not discussed.
Abstract: I: Introduction.- II: Beauty.- The Objectivity of Beauty.- The Relation of Art to Beauty.- The Work of Fine Art as Transcendental.- III: Signs.- Fine Art and Representation.- Maritain's Theory of the Sign.- IV: Poetic Intuition.- Intuitive Knowledge in General.- Poetic Knowledge in General.- What It Is That Is Grasped By Poetic Intuition.- The Termination of Poetic Intuition in a Work Made.- V: Conclusion - Maritain and some Contemporary Views.