Showing papers on "Ontology (information science) published in 1977"

Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik

Abstract: »Die gesellschaftliche Totalität führt kein Eigenleben oberhalb des von ihr Zusammengefaßten, aus dem sie selbst besteht. Sie produziert und reproduziert sich durch ihre einzelnen Momente hindurch ... So wenig jenes Ganze vom Leben, von der Kooperation und dem Antagonismus seiner Elemente abzusondern ist, so wenig kann irgendein Element auch bloß in seinem Funktionieren verstanden werden ohne Einsicht in das Ganze, das an der Bewegung des einzelnen selbst sein Wesen hat. System und Einzelheit sind reziprok und nur in ihrer Reziprozität zu erkennen[]« Adorno begreift Gesellschaft in Kategorien, die ihre Herkunft aus der Logik Hegels nicht verleugnen. Er begreift Gesellschaft als Totalität in dem streng dialektischen Sinne, der es verbietet, das Ganze organisch aufzufassen nach dem Satze: es sei mehr als die Summe ihrer Teile; ebensowenig aber ist Totalität eine Klasse, die sich umfangslogisch bestimmen ließe durch ein Zusammennehmen aller unter ihr befassten Elemente. Insofern fällt der dialektische Begriff des Ganzen nicht unter die berechtigte Kritik an den logischen Grundlagen jener Gestalttheorien[], die auf ihrem Gebiete Untersuchungen nach den formalen Regeln analytischer Kunst überhaupt perhorreszieren; und überschreitet dabei doch die Grenzen formaler Logik, in deren Schattenreich Dialektik selber nicht anders scheinen kann denn als Schimäre.

A world of dispositions

Abstract: Perhaps the fundamental concepts of physical ontology are those of objects and events; for it is widely assumed that the world itself is amenable to being characterized successfully by means of an event ontology or an object ontology, where the outstanding difficulty is simply one of finding the right sort of fit. Although these pathways have seemed promising, they have not been without their own distinctive difficulties, for despite an area of agreement concerning suitable criteria for the individuation of objects, substantial disagreement abounds regarding appropriate standards for the differentiation of events.1 This matter is consequential for both perspectives, moreover, since whether objects are to be constructed from events or events from objects, neither view presumes either category alone provides a sufficient foundation for an adequate ontology.2 The problems which they share have resisted successful explication, nevertheless.

The Ontology of Social Roles

Abstract: Since Durkheim expressed his views on the matter, there has emerged a considerable body of literature devoted to the question of whether the subject-matter of the social sciences can be explained in terms of the actions and psychology of individual persons taken collectively, or whether these phenomena are irreducibly emergent. Some methodological individualists have held that an explanatory reduction is possible and perspicuous. This paper is divided into two parts. In Part I, the prospects for such a reduction are examined once again, and an alternative proposal for the construal of events and institutions at the social level is sketched which is ultimately materialistic without conceding reductionism in the intended sense. I then explore the implications which such a nonreductionist stance has for the way in which we should understand the

Quantifiers in ontology

Abstract: This paper is a reaction to G Kung's and J T Canty's ‘Substitutional Quantification and Leśniewskian quantifiers'Theoria 36 (1970), 165–182 I reject their arguments that quantifiers in Ontology cannot be referentially interpreted but I grant that there is what can be called objectual — referential interpretation of quantifiers and that because of the unrestricted quantification in Ontology the quantifiers in Ontology should not be given a so-called objectual-referential interpretation I explain why I am in agreement with Kung and Canty's recommendation that Ontology's quantifiers not be substitutionally interpreted even if Leśniewski intended them to be so interpreted A notion of an interpretation which is referential but yet which does not interpret ∃ as an assertor of existence of objects in a domain is developed It is then shown that a first order version of Ontology is satisfied by those special kind of referential interpretations which read ∃ as ‘Something’ as epposed to ‘Something existing’