Showing papers on "Opportunism published in 2017"

Antecedents of trust in the sharing economy : A systematic review

Abstract: Users and potential users of the sharing economy need to place a considerable amount of trust in both the person and the platform with which they are dealing. The consequences of transaction partners’ opportunism may be severe, for example damage to goods or endangered personal safety. Trust is, therefore, a key factor in overcoming uncertainty and mitigating risk. However, there is no thorough overview of how trust is developed in this context. To understand how the trust of users in the sharing economy is influenced, we performed a systematic literature review. After screening, 45 articles were included in a qualitative synthesis in which the results were grouped according to a well-established trust typology. The results show various antecedents of trust in the sharing economy (e.g. reputation, trust in the platform, and interaction experience) related to multiple entities (i.e. seller, buyer, platform, interpersonal, and transaction). Trust in this economy is often reduced to the use of reputation systems alone. However, our study suggests that trust is much more complex than that and extends beyond reputation. Furthermore, our review clearly shows that research on trust in the sharing economy is still scarce and thus more research is needed to understand how trust is established in this context. Our review is the first that brings together antecedents of trust in online peer-to-peer transactions and integrates these findings within an existing framework. Additionally, the study suggests directions for future research in order to advance the understanding of trust in the sharing economy.

Power, Governance, and Value in Collaboration: Differences between Buyer and Supplier Perspectives

Abstract: Early research on buyer–supplier relationships was based on two cornerstones: relational governance mechanisms and superior value creation for the whole supply chain. Relational governance mechanisms, based on trust and informal safeguards, can lead to higher value creation, while lack of trust and opportunism can be controlled by contractual governance mechanisms. To date, however, few studies have investigated the role of power asymmetry in collaboration and how the total value is distributed between buyer and supplier. The amount each partner appropriates depends on their relative power in the relationship, which has further implications in governance and relationship continuation, yet that has not been thoroughly explored in the literature. To fill this gap, this study investigates the influence of power asymmetry on governance and value appropriation in collaborative relationships, from both the buyers’ and suppliers’ perspectives. This article contributes to the buyer–supplier literature by exploring the gains of both the stronger and weaker partners in the dyad. Based on in-depth case studies with buyers and suppliers of the personal care and cosmetics (PC&C), and food and beverage (F&B) industries in Brazil, we found insights concerning the influence of power asymmetry and interdependence on governance mechanisms, as well as the complementarity of value appropriation inside and outside the dyad. We also propose a framework to represent the interplay between perceived justice and power asymmetry in long-term relationships.

On the Same Page? How Asymmetric Buyer–Supplier Relationships Affect Opportunism and Performance

Abstract: Research on buyer–supplier relationships (BSRs) has often focused on only one side of the relationship and, thus, has tended to overlook asymmetries. Yet, a buyer (supplier) may often deal with a bigger supplier (buyer) or one that has higher levels of trust, respect, and reciprocity. Therefore, we examined how two types of asymmetries—size and relational capital—affect perceived opportunism and performance. We used dyadic data from 106 buyers and their matched suppliers gathered from a survey and an archival database. The results demonstrate that the degree and direction of both asymmetries affect the BSR. Our results also reveal that an imbalance of relational capital in a firm's favor may have the opposite effect from that intended. In other words, the firm's counterpart perceives more, rather than less, firm opportunism. The results also suggest that a buyer observes lower benefits in the presence of size asymmetry, whereas the supplier's perception of benefits is unaffected. Thus, our research represents a significant step forward in understanding BSRs and asymmetries by (i) bringing attention to two key asymmetries inherent in BSRs and (ii) showing that these asymmetries are not unidirectional in their influence on perceived opportunism and performance.

Strategic interaction in alliances

Abstract: Research summary: This article studies strategic interactions between firms that form alliances to exploit synergistic benefits Firms cooperate to create value, but they can also compete to capture value Fundamental questions rarely addressed by strategy scholars relate to how the configuration of control over resources influences firms' strategies, the potential for termination, and the emergence of cooperation and trust The formal results reveal crucial aspects of the interorganizational rent-generating process and yield testable implications With greater synergistic benefits, firms invest more, but they also compete more intensively to capture more value With symmetric control, more value gets created, which limits the potential for termination, but also exacerbates the competition for value; from a relational perspective, this form of control augments the calculative rationale of cooperation and trust Managerial summary: When forming an alliance to exploit synergies, firms engage in a complicated strategic interaction that is part cooperation and part competition What happens when partner firms cooperate and invest to create value while competing and using costly adversarial tactics to capture value? The analysis reveals that with greater synergistic benefits, firms invest more in value creation, but the fear of opportunism pushes them to waste more resources on value capture tactics The balance between value creation and value capture, and the possibility that the alliance is terminated depend on the configuration of control over resources The analysis further reveals under what conditions there can be trust between the partners, such that they focus on value creation and avoid wasting resources in the competition for value Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Trust, guanxi, and cooperation: a study on partner opportunism in Chinese joint-venture manufacturing

Abstract: Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual model for examining the effects of trust (competence trust, goodwill trust) and cooperation on partner opportunism and for exploring the moderating effects of guanxi on the relationships among trust, cooperation and opportunism in joint ventures. Design/methodology/approach The sample for this paper comprises 981 manufacturing joint ventures from various industrial sectors. A total of 354 valid questionnaires were collected, representing a 36 per cent response rate. The conceptual model is tested with structural equation modeling adopting AMOS software. Findings The empirical findings indicate that both competence trust and goodwill trust reduce partner opportunism in a joint venture through fostering cooperation. Competence trust also exerts significant influence on preventing opportunism, whereas opportunistic behavior is not greatly affected by goodwill trust. Additionally, the results reveal that guanxi helps strengthen the negative relationship between cooperation and opportunism. Originality value This paper makes a threefold contribution: First, it investigates empirically the direct influence of two types of trust on partner opportunism. Second, it tests indirect influence of trust on partner opportunism through the path of cooperation. Third, it explores the moderating effects of guanxi in relationships on trust, cooperation and partner opportunism. Implications offers suggestions for management practice to reduce partner opportunism in joint-venture manufacturing.

An empirical analysis of intellectual property rights sharing in software development outsourcing

Abstract: Software development outsourcing (SDO) contracts are plagued with ex post opportunism and underinvestment problems. Property rights theory (PRT) argues that appropriate property rights allocation between vendors and clients can reduce opportunism and incentivize relation-specific investments. We conduct an in-depth content analysis of 171 real SDO contracts and empirically examine how project attributes and contract parties' bargaining power affect the allocation of intellectual property rights (IPR). We find that clients retained more IPR when software development was modularized whereas they shared more IPR with vendors in contracts that incorporated greater use of a vendor's proprietary software. Greater levels of task complexity were associated with more IPR sharing with vendors. We also find that the responsiveness of IPR to project attributes varied across the different types of intellectual assets. For example, vendors were more likely to obtain redeployment rights of know-how if they were contracted for novel software development projects. However, clients were less likely to cede ownership of data and confidential information embedded in software customization projects. We control for a variety of firm and transaction characteristics and the results we obtain here are robust to concerns of endogeneity bias.

The influences of suppliers on buyer market competitiveness: an opportunism perspective

Abstract: Purpose This paper aims to propose an integrated model based on buyer and supplier opportunism to show the mechanism through which current and competing suppliers influence buyer market competitiveness. Design/methodology/approach Questionnaires were distributed to purchasing staff in listed electronics firms in Taiwan to collect empirical data. Structural equation modeling was used to analyze these data and examine the fitness of the proposed model. Findings The findings show that current and competing suppliers influence buyer market competitiveness through supplier opportunistic behaviors and buyer commitment. The alternative attractiveness of competing suppliers affects buyer market competitiveness through the influence of asset specificity. Supplier opportunism negatively and indirectly influences buyer market competitiveness through buyer commitment. Nevertheless, buyer opportunism does not influence buyer commitment and market competitiveness. Research limitations/implications The investigation focused on only one industry in one country. Future research could investigate other industries and countries to increase the generalizability of the findings. Practical implications The results suggest that buyers can focus on utilizing the pressure of alternative suppliers to improve market competitiveness through increased specific investments by the current supplier. Originality/value On the basis of buyer–supplier opportunism, this study shows the mechanism through which the asset specificity of current suppliers and alternative attractiveness influence buyer market competitiveness.

Differential Effects of Bilateral Norms on SMEs’ Export Relationships: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract: Prior research has established the pivotal role of bilateral norms in relationship marketing, identifying them as effective relational governance mechanisms that firms can use to manage their international alliances with overseas intermediaries. Unfortunately, few studies have examined differential effects of specific norms on positive and negative behaviors, let alone norms’ effectiveness in the harsh export context of resource-constrained small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). To address these gaps, the authors explicate the effects of three norms (continuity expectations, equity, and cooperation) on both dysfunctional and productive behaviors of foreign distributors. Using two consecutive data collections, the results indicate that norms curb importer opportunism and help improve importer role performance and that continuity expectations and cooperation increase the chances of the survival of export ventures. The study further scrutinizes relational norms’ effects on opportunism in the cont...

Impact of Contextual Variables on Effectiveness of Partnership Governance Mechanisms in Megaprojects: Case of Guanxi

Abstract: Governance mechanisms are crucial to the success of joint-venture (JV) megaprojects. Although both contractual and relational governance mechanisms are studied to maximize cooperation and minimize opportunism, the relative effectiveness of each mechanism remains unclear, particular in JV megaprojects. Based on the transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory, this paper presents a case study of Chinese JV megaprojects to explore the impact of governance mechanisms in promoting cooperation and restraining opportunism. Specifically, this paper investigates how guanxi, as a contextual variable, affects effectiveness of different governance mechanisms when dealing with cooperation and opportunism in JV megaprojects. The analysis is based on data collected from 377 respondents. The findings suggest that guanxi plays an important role in affecting the effectiveness of partnership governance mechanisms in megaprojects. In the low guanxi scenario, both contractual and relational governance me...

When will firms share information and collaborate to achieve innovation?: A review of collaboration strategies

Abstract: Purpose This paper aims to provide academics and practitioners working with collaboration of technology information and innovation with a review of key interfirm-collaboration topics, such as the determinants of innovation activity, innovation, imitation, the impact of competition, collaboration versus competition and a review of game theoretic approaches. Design/methodology/approach This paper is a comprehensive review of extant literature, conducted and analyzed systematically. Findings This paper highlights that when firms absorb collaboration opportunities that involves information, there are critical elements for success, which need to be considered, including economies of scale, knowledge sharing, market size and volatility, strategic partner selection, intellectual property rights, spillover effects, collaboration costs, trust and commitment, opportunism and overall collaboration strategy. Originality/value This paper contributes to existing information literature by emphasizing various game theoretic approaches, which highlight how collaboration costs are shared when collaboration occurs. In conclusion, ten managerial implications are offered about collaboration of information technological innovation.

Improving performance and curtailing opportunism: the role of contractual issue inclusiveness and obligatoriness in channel relationships

Abstract: Purpose The purpose of this study is to enhance the understanding of the role of contracts in channel relationships. Treating contracts as a multidimensional construct, this study examines the effects of contractual issue inclusiveness and contractual obligatoriness on performance and opportunism, as well as the moderating effects of relational norms on the above relationships. Design/methodology/approach Based on the data of 206 samples collected from distributors of house furnishing, computer and computer components, moderated regression is used to test the hypotheses. Findings The empirical test generally supports the conceptual model and provides three findings. First, contractual issue inclusiveness is more profound in enhancing relationship performance than contractual obligatoriness, and contractual obligatoriness is more statistically powerful in mitigating opportunism than contractual issue inclusiveness. Second, relational norms can enhance the positive effect of contractual issue inclusiveness but not contractual obligatoriness on performance. Third, relational norms can strengthen the negative effect of contractual obligatoriness but not contractual issue inclusiveness on opportunism. Research limitations/implications First, this study investigates only contractual issue inclusiveness and contractual obligatoriness, and future studies should consider other dimensions of contracts. Second, the influence of external environment is not considered in the model. Third, data from Chinese distributors limit the generalization of conclusions. Finally, data come only from buyers, and suppliers’ viewpoints are not included. Practical implications The results provide a framework for managers to use contracts and relational norms. Managers should pay attention to the alignment between contractual dimensions and firm objectives because various dimensions of contracts have different impacts on channel relationships. Originality/value Prior research has documented contracts’ role in coordinating channel relationships but has not achieved consistent conclusions on contracts’ effectiveness. Furthermore, extant research indicates that channel members will use contracts and relational norms simultaneously but has conflicting views on the combined effects of these two control mechanisms. The study contributes by addressing these issues.

Curbing electronic shopper perceived opportunism and encouraging trust

Abstract: Purpose Consumers can face a situation of information asymmetry in electronic shopping (ES). The purpose of this paper to examine the relationships between: relational variables such as satisfaction, trust and perceived opportunism; and website cues (cognitive signals such as security and personalization, and experiential signals, such as design and entertainment). Design/methodology/approach The paper opted for the structural equation methodology to analyze data collected from 447 Spanish e-shoppers. Findings Results show different factors that relate to satisfaction, trust and perceived opportunism in ES. Satisfactory experience with ES and entertainment emerge as the most relevant factors to achieve trust and prevent perceived opportunism in e-commerce. Originality/value The five contributions of this study are: the introduction of variables from several theoretical approaches to the study of an agency problem in e-commerce; the study of different ways to gain buyer trust and reduce perceived opportunism in an electronic shopper-vendor relationship; the application of signaling theory as part of the process of helping the principal (e-shopper) to solve their shopping problem in a context of information asymmetry; the analysis of the impact of external cues from e-vendor/site, which allows for a comparison between internal experiences and external quality signals; and the study of entertainment as an important hedonic variable in order to have satisfied and confident e-shoppers.

Contractual governance as a source of institutionalised waste in construction: a review, implications, and road map for future research directions

Abstract: Purpose The construction industry has been subject to substantial criticism for its short-term “hit-and-run” relationships which are focussed on win-lose situations. Despite the wide recognition of these problems the industry persistently resists the radical demanded of it. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to investigate why this might be the case by reviewing the governance problem confronting clients and decision makers in construction procurement, as conceptualised in transaction cost economics (TCE). Second, to critically analyse and question the efficiency and effectiveness of various safeguarding approaches, which are taken for granted and commonly practiced in construction, from a lean perspective. Design/methodology/approach The analysis of this paper is based on an in-depth critical review of 76 construction procurement and contractual-related articles, ranging from 1994 to 2016, using theories of Lean construction and TCE as an analytical lens. Findings Findings reveal that clients and decision makers often tend to safeguard their project-specific assets, against opportunism and exploitation, through the deployment of formal contractual arrangements and governance structures. These arrangements and structures typically dominate the management of the project delivery often to the detriment of the project itself; but because there is a belief that interests are safeguarded, clients and decision makers feel they have taken the best course of action. This goes a long way to explaining the coherence of the current construction model. Research limitations/implications To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to demonstrate the usefulness of using principles of Lean construction in association with TCE when analysing construction-procurement-related issues. In particular, the use of a “lean” lens helps to expose the impact of procurement governance arrangements on process flow. The study also provides a potential research agenda that can lead to the development of prescriptive conceptual frameworks for causal analysis of institutionalised waste in construction. Practical implications The paper attempts to expose to clients and decision makers the amount of waste (and unnecessary cost) they embed by adhering to prevailing unfit-for-purpose contractual governance approaches. It also helps decision makers to consider alternative procurement arrangements and organisational techniques that could be of value and support collaborative ways of working. Originality/value The study contributes to the overall understanding of waste in construction by providing insight into various imperfect procurement and contractual arrangements, which are taken for granted and impede efficiency and improvement efforts in construction. The findings presented provide a theoretical anchor and rationale for developing alternative approaches to the design and delivery of capital projects.

Vertical Integration and Relational Contracts: Evidence from the Costa Rica Coffee Chain

Abstract: This paper compares integrated firms, long-term relationships and markets, and how they adapt to shocks in the Costa Rican coffee chain. The industry is characterised by significant uncertainty. Supply failures responses to unanticipated increases in reference prices reveal that integration and relationships reduce opportunism. Trade volumes responses to weather-induced increases in supply reveal that relationships provide demand assurance, although less than integration does. This benefit of integration is offset by costs when trading outside of the integrated chain. The evidence supports models in which firms boundaries alter temptations to renege on relational contracts and, consequently, the allocation of resources.

Interorganizational Trust and Technology Complexity: Evidence for New Technology‐Based Firms

Abstract: Integrating the transaction cost economics and relational perspectives, this paper puts forward that technology complexity within new technology‐based firms negatively influences the level of inter...

Foreign direct investment, political risk and the limited access order

Abstract: The common explanations for political risk in foreign investment focus on the opportunism of host-country governments. However, when governments are too weak to regulate and effectively control them, domestic business elites may also cause political risk. In the literature on political risk, the host state is mostly modelled as a single, cohesive actor and elites outside of the government are not taken into account. By contrast, this paper conceptualises political risk as a lack of government assertiveness vis-a-vis domestic business elites, drawing on the limited access order (LAO) concept developed by Douglass North and his co-authors. It presents the case of Swedish Tele2’s investment in Russia. The mobile telecommunications provider was highly successful in Russia until it became a threat to the business interests of three Russian oligarchs. Regulatory agencies in Russia lacked the necessary authority to provide a level playing field in the telecommunications industry. They did not intervene w...

Organizational Structure and Earnings Quality of Private and Public Firms

Abstract: We compare the earnings quality of private versus public firms. Prior evidence is mixed and inconclusive as to which is greater. The research question is important, because it examines whether market demand for high quality reporting or managerial opportunism dominates in determining public firms’ quality. We focus on organizational structure, because public and private firms significantly differ along this dimension: public companies are structured as business groups, whereas private firms can be business groups, subsidiaries, or stand-alone entities Based on a comprehensive sample of 11 European Union countries from 2004–2014, we show that stand-alone firms manipulate earnings downward to reduce taxable income, especially in countries with book-tax alignment, and that this causes them to have low earnings quality. However, we find that private business groups have higher earnings quality than public business groups. Our results imply that opportunism trumps demand in determining public firms’ earnings quality and reconcile the inconclusive results in the literature, which are driven by not separating stand-alone from business groups in the analysis.

Sustaining relationships after opportunism and misunderstanding: the role of formalization and socialization

Abstract: This study compares the effects of governance mechanisms on relationship continuity in the aftermath of exchange interruptions in interfirm relationships. We propose that cooperative relationships can be renewed by matching governance mechanisms (formalization or socialization) to specific types of exchange interruptions (opportunism and misunderstanding). Using data collected from two types of senior managers in 304 buyer firms in China (a total of 608 senior managers), we found that the effects of formalization and socialization on relationship continuity are contingent on exchange interruption type. Socialization is more effective than formalization in renewing relationships when the level of opportunism is high, while formalization works better than socialization when the level of misunderstanding is high. Based on our findings, we encourage firms to diagnose exchange interruption types and then choose a proper governance structure.