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Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.


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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors conceptualized trust in terms of trustworthiness based on skills, integrity, and benevolent attitudes of the partner as perceived by the focal firm, and examined the managerial perceptions related to all significant ongoing social exchanges between alliance partners.
Abstract: Strategic alliances have become a major corporate strategy in many high-tech industries such as electronics, telecommunication, pharmaceutical, and machine tools industries (Gulati et al., 2000; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). Strategic alliances allow firms to develop new competencies quickly, and rapidly expand in geographically disperse locations offering the greatest levels of opportunity and flexibility (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000). While alliances are becoming an attractive option, many strategic alliances have been unstable, ineffective and poorly performing (Arino and Doz, 2000). The potential for conflict and a clash of interest between alliance partners is inherent, because either party can opportunistically use the alliance to learn the other's business or technological secrets (Doz, 1996; Khanna et al., 1998). Previous alliance research has focused on this issue of partner opportunism and has adopted a transaction cost economics view (Pisano, 1989; Williamson, 1991) to argue that high transaction costs resulting from opportunistic behavior can be alleviated through appropriate contractual controls or equity-based ownership controls (Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1989). These views, however, neglect the fact that the cost of deterring opportunism is very high and excessive controls may increase coordination costs (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) and intensify power conflicts between alliance partners (Provan and Skinner, 1989; Steensma and Lyles, 2000; Yan and Gray, 1994). The challenges posed by alliances have encouraged scholars to look beyond the issue of partner opportunism and explore the evolutionary collaborative processes (Arino and Doz, 2000) and, specifically, the role of social ties such as trust in enhancing alliance performance (Doz, 1996; Lazaric, 1998; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). While some researchers have examined the relationship between interfirm trust and alliance performance (Inkpen and Curall, 1998; Luo, 2002; Sako, 2000; Zaheer et al., 1998), others have argued that several factors such as risk and uncertainty, cultural diversity of partners, and resource dependence (Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998; Luo, 2002) affect the relationship between trust and alliance performance. Thus, there is a need for research into the role of other social exchanges such as reciprocal resource commitments and relational influence between partners that will ensure collaboration and alliance success (Das and Teng, 1998; Gundlach et al., 1995; Steensma and Lyles, 2000; Subramani and Venkatraman, 2003). Because reciprocity and mutual influence between partners are tangible norms and manifest as mutual control and power sharing or joint decision making, they can very well supplement trust in collaboration (Das and Teng, 1998; Dekker, 2004; Provan and Gassenheimer, 1994; Steensma and Lyles, 2000). In addition, there is a need to understand why a partner will have a greater or lesser amount of trust for another party. That is, what are the specific attributes of the partners that enhance trust in the alliance? In this study, we conceptualize trust in terms of trustworthiness based on skills, integrity, and benevolent attitudes of the partner as perceived by the focal firm, and examine the managerial perceptions related to all significant ongoing social exchanges between alliance partners. Since most conflicts occur in the routine aspects of the interaction, successful alliance management is essentially a social process. From the focal firms' perspective, we examine the relationships between social exchanges (reciprocity, trust, and mutual influence) and alliance success in terms of perceived alliance performance and partner's propensity to continue the alliance. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES Social Exchanges and Alliance Coordination "Social exchange" is a condition in which the actions of one party provide the rewards and incentives for the actions of another party and vice versa in repeated interactions (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961). …

30 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose that the concept of strategic deviance suggests why franchisors accept deviant behavior resulting from vertical and horizontal agency problems in multi-agent contracts, and address opportunistic behaviors by company managers and franchisees through self-enforced social control and social comparison mechanisms.
Abstract: Drawing on various theoretical perspectives, we propose that franchisors cannot assess and control opportunism absent comparative information provided by owning and operating some of their outlets and by franchising others. Moving beyond dyadic perspectives, we propose that the concept of strategic deviance suggests why franchisors accept deviant behavior resulting from vertical and horizontal agency problems in multiagent contracts. A plural form provides efficiency and quality benchmark information that curbs even greater levels of shirking and free-riding behaviors and enhances system performance. Opportunistic behaviors by company managers and franchisees are addressed through self-enforced social control and social comparison mechanisms.

30 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the impact of non-GMO products on the transactions along the supply chain of the poultry industry of France and Italy, using data collected from interviews with the main actors at five stages of the supply-chain from the retailer up to animal feed and crop production.
Abstract: Purpose Following a negative attitude of consumers toward genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and the spaces left by the labeling legislation on GMOs of different countries, some retailers and processors introduced their own non-GMO standards, with the intention of avoiding the presence of GMOs in their products. This paper aims to understand how the implementation of these new retailer-driven standards affects governance structures along the supply chain and the determinants of such change focusing on transaction cost approach (TCA) vs resource-based view (RBV). Design/methodology/approach The non-GMO introduction is investigated as a case study in the poultry industry of France and Italy. The case relies on data primarily collected from interviews with the main actors at five stages of the supply chain from the retailer up to animal feed and crop production. Findings Findings indicate that the introduction of non-GMO products had different impacts on the transactions along the supply chain, generally leading to more integrated relationships. Theoretical relevance depends on the observed transaction and the type of governance structure considered. Interestingly, only RBV explains the shift toward hierarchical governance when this is observed. Originality/value This paper contributes to the empirical literature highlighting the upstream effects caused by the adoption of new standards. On the theoretical side, building on Conner and Prahalad’s (1996) seminal work and leveraging on the concepts of opportunism, “potential” superior knowledge and strategic importance of an activity, this research suggests a comparative framework for identifying governance structures and their determinants under TCA and RBV.

30 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors investigated how guanxi, as a contextual variable, affects effectiveness of different governance mechanisms when dealing with cooperation and opportunism in JV megaprojects.
Abstract: Governance mechanisms are crucial to the success of joint-venture (JV) megaprojects. Although both contractual and relational governance mechanisms are studied to maximize cooperation and minimize opportunism, the relative effectiveness of each mechanism remains unclear, particular in JV megaprojects. Based on the transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory, this paper presents a case study of Chinese JV megaprojects to explore the impact of governance mechanisms in promoting cooperation and restraining opportunism. Specifically, this paper investigates how guanxi, as a contextual variable, affects effectiveness of different governance mechanisms when dealing with cooperation and opportunism in JV megaprojects. The analysis is based on data collected from 377 respondents. The findings suggest that guanxi plays an important role in affecting the effectiveness of partnership governance mechanisms in megaprojects. In the low guanxi scenario, both contractual and relational governance me...

30 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202398
2022182
202168
202097
201991
201871