Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.

Governance Mechanisms of Opportunism: Integrating from Transaction Cost Analysis and Relational Exchange Theory

Abstract: This study explores, from the perspectives of transaction cost analysis and relational exchange theory, the governance mechanisms that a manufacturer uses to manage a supplier's opportunism. Through this study, how the manufacturer can employ the mechanisms of selection, asset specificity, and relational norms respectively and simultaneously to mitigate the supplier's opportunism is understood. The results indicate that the manufacturer can employ the aforementioned mechanisms respectively to reduce the supplier's opportunism. When high relational norms exist between exchange partners, from the perspective of relational exchange theory, the moderate selection and asset specificity the manufacturer implements are best to restrain the supplier's opportunism.

Employment as a Relational Contract

Abstract: Employment scholarship focuses too much on laws and not enough on norms. Yet norms capture the complete terms of employment more accurately than most legal contracts. Virtually every aspect of the employment relation that falls outside the realm of contract lawyers - corporate culture, office politics, trust, future planning, and the complex social matrix of organizational life - are the exclusive domain of norms. Bundled together, work norms form a contract, a relational contract, which is more important to the parties in most situations than any formal written agreement. Whereas scholars have frequently examined legal aspects of employment contracts, employment at will, and wrongful discharge, little attention has been paid to systematically developing an enforceable theory of employment norms. This article fills this scholarly gap by defining employment as a relational contract forged by the behavior of the parties. Part I of this article defines employment as a relational contract. Part II establishes the sources of relational contract at work. Part III presents two case studies that show maintenance of relational contract is critical for the successful organization. Part IV devises an opportunism-based enforceable theory of relational contract in the employment context.

Earnings Quality and Corporate Social Disclosure: The Moderating Role of State and Foreign Ownership in Vietnamese Listed Firms

Abstract: By investigating the effect of earnings quality (EQ) on corporate social disclosure (CSD) in the context of Vietnam, this study tests whether firms uphold managerial opportunism based on the agency...

Toward a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime

Abstract: In this article, the authors consider the impact of the institutional and market environment in which Canadian business operates on the structure of corporate and securities law. The authors argue that the linkages between markets and law have been neglected by scholars, judges, and regulators concerned with Canadian corporate and securities law, resulting in the adoption of approaches that are ill-suited to the Canadian environment. Canadian capital markets, for instance, are characterized by high levels of share ownership concentration, thin trading problems, intensive inter-corporate linkages, and possibly lower levels of efficiency. In sum, these factors make the problems occasioned by separated ownership and control (the Berle and Means corporation) much less acute in Canada than the problems of majority shareholder opportunism. These factors also suggest that regulatory initiatives should be structured in a way that distinguishes between the problems of large, intensively traded companies and smaller, thinly traded companies populated by retail investors. The authors consider these issues in the context of three case studies: the private agreement exception, poison pills, and a self-interested transaction.

Opportunism in labour contracting: An application of the ‘organisational failures’ framework

Abstract: The ‘Markets and Hierarchies’ framework provides a basis for the analysis of employment relations. However, it fails to take the possibility of bilateral opportunism into account and in consequence exaggerates the ease of obtaining consummate cooperation. Once bilateral opportunism is admitted, the resolution of contractual problems becomes indeterminate, depending upon the preference and relative power of the parties. These preferences can be modelled,analysis of technological change issues reveals that such a model has some explanatory power. The implication of this approach is that the removal of opportunism implies relatively organisational surgery.