Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.

Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements

Abstract: Economic theory has made considerable progress in explaining why sovereign countries cooperate in trade. Central to most theories of trade cooperation are issues of self-enforcement: The threat of reprisal by an aggrieved party maintains the initial balance of concessions and prevents opportunism. However, economic scholarship has been less coherent in explaining why countries choose to settle and enforce their trade disputes with the help of an impartial third party, a "trade court". Typically, economists focusing on the purpose of trade agreements have assumed away the very reasons why institutions are needed, since under standard assumptions, neither defection from the rules nor disputes are expected to occur. This paper is a step towards the formulation of a coherent economic theory of dispute settlement. It challenges traditional models of enforcement (primarily concerned with acts of punishment) for being insufficient in explaining the existence of dispute settlement institutions. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the economics of dispute settlement institutions and demonstrate to what extent the literatures of trade cooperation and dispute institutions are (and should be) interlinked. On the basis of these theories, we show that dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements may assume a variety of roles, including that of an information repository and disseminator, an honest broker, an arbitrator and calculator of damages, an active information gatherer or an adjudicator.

Information assets in interorganizational governance: exploring the property rights perspective

Abstract: Empirical research in interorganizational governance has been motivated primarily by transaction cost economics (TCE) and its focus on proprietary electronic linkages, asset specific investments, and consequent holdup problems. Where many early interorganizational systems were characterized by nonredeployable assets, recent instances are distinguished by open standards and a higher degree of redeployable technology. Hence, interorganizational research has reached out to alternative theories that embrace social and procedural interdependence in addition to technological links. The principal theoretical alternative to TCE that addresses social interdependence is social networking theory. Where both TCE and networking have relative merits as explanatory frameworks, they are antithetical in their purest forms and most often mutually exclusive in application. However, both perspectives confront analytical boundaries that may be overcome through answers and dimensions provided by the other. Hence, a synthesis between these competing theoretical viewpoints is sought. The property rights perspective of information, one that retains TCE's predictive ability and networking's contextual focus, is introduced and critically evaluated as an alternative framework that may enable such a synthesis. A positive case study is analyzed which explores the theory's utility in illuminating interorganizational systems with disaggregate physical and information assets, technical, procedural, and social interdependence. The case concludes with a critical evaluation of the perspective's merits as a positive explanatory framework of interorganizational governance, finding that the predictive utility is greatest where information is inalienable and opportunism is high.

Curbing electronic shopper perceived opportunism and encouraging trust

Abstract: Purpose Consumers can face a situation of information asymmetry in electronic shopping (ES). The purpose of this paper to examine the relationships between: relational variables such as satisfaction, trust and perceived opportunism; and website cues (cognitive signals such as security and personalization, and experiential signals, such as design and entertainment). Design/methodology/approach The paper opted for the structural equation methodology to analyze data collected from 447 Spanish e-shoppers. Findings Results show different factors that relate to satisfaction, trust and perceived opportunism in ES. Satisfactory experience with ES and entertainment emerge as the most relevant factors to achieve trust and prevent perceived opportunism in e-commerce. Originality/value The five contributions of this study are: the introduction of variables from several theoretical approaches to the study of an agency problem in e-commerce; the study of different ways to gain buyer trust and reduce perceived opportunism in an electronic shopper-vendor relationship; the application of signaling theory as part of the process of helping the principal (e-shopper) to solve their shopping problem in a context of information asymmetry; the analysis of the impact of external cues from e-vendor/site, which allows for a comparison between internal experiences and external quality signals; and the study of entertainment as an important hedonic variable in order to have satisfied and confident e-shoppers.

Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm

Abstract: This article reexamines economic theories of the firm from a legal perspective. Focusing on the importance of agency authority, it recommends a revision in economic theories of the firm which emphasize agency and transactions costs, contracts, property rights, and employment. A theory of the firm is advanced which encompasses various economic principles under a legal umbrella. From a legal perspective, this theory of the firm suggests a solution to a problem that economic theories have in defining the boundaries of firms. The structure of firms is described as involving both consumer markets for goods and services and organizational metamarkets. The costs of agents and principals, among other important factors, determine which firms survive over time. The article also recommends that a theory of the firm should include the costs of opportunism or sharking by principals or quasi-principals through the misuse of power and authority within firms, as well as the more commonly recognized agency costs of shirking. It concludes with examples of the implications of this analysis of the firm for the regulation of opportunism in the law of enterprise organization. In particular, it suggests that recognizing the costs of sharking as well as shirking supports judicial review of compliance with fiduciary duties in four different areas: oppression of minority shareholders, executive compensation, noncontractual harm to creditors, and financial reengineering of capital structure.