Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.

Is a Manipulator's Externality Paradoxical? The Relationship Between Machiavellianism, Economic Opportunism, and Economic Locus of Control

Abstract: Machiavellianism and economic opportunism are defecting strategies founded on manipulating information in order to maximize gain or power. This study investigated their relationship with economic internality. We hypothesized that individuals inclined to adopt defecting strategies would tend to have external economic locus of control (ELOC). A Greek sample of 175 participants completed the ELOC and Mach IV questionnaires and a scale of economic opportunism. Machiavellianism and opportunism were both positively correlated with the ELOC Chance factor. Opportunism was negatively correlated with the ELOC Internal factor. The findings confirmed the hypothesis and showed that this kind of defector overestimates the role of chance, uncertainty, and hazard as sources of economic reinforcements.

Elusive Counter-Cyclicality and Deliberate Opportunism? Fiscal Policy from Plans to Final Outcomes

Abstract: Drawing on the European Commission’s Autumn forecasts, I estimate fiscal reaction functions with four different information sets, ranging from budget plans to final outcomes. I also analyse deviations from plans during budget implementation. In a panel of 15 EU countries from 1987 to 2006, moving from plans to final data generally weakens the counter-cyclicality of budget balances and expenditures (though not of revenues), and reinforces electoral effects. Deviations from plans play a negligible role in the former finding, as they are often acyclical;but have a major role in the latter, as they display a clear opportunistic pattern.

Incentives for Innovation and Centralized versus Delegated Capital Budgeting

Abstract: We study a setting wherein a divisional manager undertakes personally costly effort to improve the profitability of an investment project. The manager’s choice of innovation effort is subject to a holdup problem because of the ex post opportunism on the part of headquarters. We analyze and contrast the performance of centralized and delegated forms of investment decision-making. We find that delegation improves the manager’s innovation incentives. We identify conditions for each of the two organizational forms to emerge as the optimal choice, and relate these conditions to characteristics of firms’ investment opportunity sets.

The efficacy of trust for the governance of uncertainty and opportunism in megaprojects: The moderating role of contractual control

Abstract: The low success rate of megaprojects stems from the opportunism triggered by uncertainty. Developing trust between participants is an effective means to reduce uncertainty, but this process is inevitably affected by contracts. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of uncertainty on participants’ opportunism in megaprojects and the effect of trust on reducing uncertainty. At the same time, the moderating effects of contractual control are tested.,This research classifies trust into competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust and categorizes uncertainty into environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. Partial least squares structural equation modeling is used to test the hypotheses based on data collected from 172 respondents.,The results show a positive correlation between the two types of uncertainty and opportunism. For the governance of uncertainty, competence-based trust can reduce environmental uncertainty, but it is ineffective for behavioral uncertainty, and goodwill-based trust has a significant effect on both types of uncertainty. The test of moderating effects shows that contractual control strengthens the effect of competence-based trust but weakens the effect of goodwill-based trust, which means that contractual control complements competence-based trust and substitutes for goodwill-based trust.,This research enriches the theory of megaproject management. First, it validates the role of competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust in reducing the different types of uncertainty in megaprojects. Second, this study clarifies the substitution or complementarity between contractual control and different dimensions of trust in the context of high uncertainty, which provides a comprehensive answer to prior research inconsistencies on contractual control and trust.,For practice, this research provides some implications for megaproject management. First, project managers should recognize that the match between trust and project uncertainty is key to the success of megaproject governance. For example, some megaprojects involve many organizations, and there are many difficulties in behavioral supervision and performance appraisal. Therefore, developing goodwill-based trust between participants through positive interactions is an effective means to reduce the behavioral uncertainty of all participants and to curb opportunistic behaviors.,This research validated the role of competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust in reducing the different types of uncertainty in megaprojects. Furthermore, it clarifies the substitution or complementarity between contractual control and different dimensions of trust in the context of high uncertainty, which provides a comprehensive answer to prior research inconsistencies on contractual control and trust.

The role of agent negotiation behaviors in buyer-supplier relationships

Abstract: Opportunism and relationship continuance are behaviors that express themselves in several different buyer-supplier contexts (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Morgan et al., 2007; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). How firms manage supplier relationships (e.g., choosing and monitoring suppliers, developing and dissolving relationships) is increasingly critical to firms' operational efficiency, product development, profitability and long-term prosperity, and is becoming a strategic issue in today's business landscape (Chatain and Zemsky, 2007; Dwyer et al., 1987; Good and Evans, 2001; Lee et al., 2007; McIvor et al., 2006). Over the last decade and a half, there have been a number of studies investigating the phenomena of opportunism and relationship continuance (e.g., Heide and John, 1992; Noordewier et al., 1990), but the vast majority of them view the issue from the perspective of the firms, the buyer-supplier dyad (e.g., Morgan et al., 2007; Paulraj and Chen, 2005). To our knowledge, very little work has been done to investigate what role the actual decision-making agents play in influencing opportunism and relationship continuance decisions in the buyer-supplier contexts. These agents may engage in dynamic processes embedded in their exchange relationships such as information exchange and conflict resolutions. Therefore, the agents' behaviors in these processes could make or break the relationships between firms whom the agents represent. This study departs from the extant buyer-supplier relationship literature by empirically investigating the effects of agents' negotiation characteristics on opportunism and relationship continuance decisions in buyer-supplier relationships. The specific purpose of the study investigates the question, "How do agents' assertiveness and cooperativeness influence the opportunism and the tendency to continue in a buyer-supplier relationship, after controlling for firm-level factors including dependence and relational norms?" This article is structured as follows. The next section entails a survey of the literature and develops corresponding hypotheses, followed by a description of the experimental design and reporting of the results. The Discussion section contains both general and managerial implications based on our results, and the article concludes with the Limitations and Conclusion section. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES Relational Norms and Dependence Relational norms may be described as the values shared among exchange partners regarding what is deemed appropriate behavior in a relationship (e.g., Heide and John, 1992).. When buyer-supplier relationships are characterized by high relational norms, exchange parties are more committed (Gundlach et al., 1995) and exhibit a long-term orientation (Ganesan, 1994), thus lowering future negotiation costs (Artz and Norman, 2002). Over the last two decades, closer supply chain relationships exhibited by high relational norms such as trust, collaboration, long-term relationship, and increased information-sharing have evolved in many industries to help firms respond to changes (Droge and Germain, 2000; Hoetker et al., 2007; Monczka et al., 1998; Sengun and Wasti, 2007; Whipple and Frankel, 2000). Relationships with low relational norms are characterized by distributive (Walton and McKersie, 1965) or aggressive (Ganesan, 1993) bargaining behaviors. The use of legal contracts governs these relationships, and aggressive bargaining tactics are used to resolve disagreements. In short, high relational norm relationships may be characterized as partnerial or cooperative, while low relational norm relationships tend to be "arm's length" or competitive. In the socio-economic literature, Hirschman (1970) and Helper and Sako (1995) use a continuum of firm relationship styles to explain differences between adversarial and partnerial firm relations. The adversarial form of buyer-supplier relationship is called an exit relationship since in the presence of relationship stressors, the tendency to exit the relationship agreement is high. …