Topic
Opportunism
About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.
Papers published on a yearly basis
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the extent to which it is meaningful to speak of 'contractual' theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysis can be extended beyond the employment contract to encompass ownership of assets by the firm.
Abstract: Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theory of the firm are either restricted to special cases or are derived from the capabilities or resource-based perspective. However, a more general opportunism-independent approach can be developed, based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is nevertheless contractual in nature. This depends on 'direction', that is, deriving economic value by permitting one set of actors to direct the activities of another, and of non-human factors of production. Direction helps to explain not only firm boundaries and organisation, but also the existence of firms, without appealing to opportunism or moral hazard. The paper also considers the extent to which it is meaningful to speak of 'contractual' theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysis can be extended beyond the employment contract to encompass ownership of assets by the firm. © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.
18 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the role of English in Moldova and propose a weak form of linguistic dominance based on the notion of opportunism, based on Phillipson's (1992) concept of linguistic imperialism and Kachru's three concentric circles of world Englishes.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of English in Moldova. Building on Phillipson's (1992) concept of linguistic imperialism and Kachru's (1985) three concentric circles of world Englishes, it will propose a weak form of linguistic dominance based on the notion of opportunism. This model is supported by data from a recent study of language attitude and use in Moldova. The data come from a survey based on a self–report questionnaire completed by 65 Moldovans. Results indicate that English is learned for facilitative reasons when it is accessible. The role of English is significantly weakened by the presence of three competing local identities (Moldovan, Romanian, and Russian) and residual integrative motivation to learn French. Thus, despite its growing role as a language of international communication, English in Moldova reflects opportunism more than imperialism.
18 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a simple two-stage game theoretic model was developed to show how trust and cooperation can emerge in a one-shot interaction, even in the absence of a supporting incentive mechanism.
Abstract: Even when there is a potential danger of opportunism, economic agents often initiate contracts or engage in trust. Considering a world with two types of agents, opportunists and non-opportunists, interacting under incomplete information, this article develops a simple two-stage game theoretic model to show how trust and cooperation can emerge in a one-shot interaction, even in the absence of a supporting incentive mechanism. Two classic paradigms are considered: the prisoner's dilemma and the game of chicken. In the context of the prisoner's dilemma, trust depends on the exogenous probability of having a non-opportunist partner, while in the game of chicken trust is purely a function of the payoffs. Contrary to intuition, a high ratio of non-opportunistic agents in the population does not favor contract initiation in the game of chicken and a strong presence of opportunists does not act as an impediment to respecting commitments.
18 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) was employed to interview professional purchasers in the Netherlands about their personal opportunistic behavior, which resulted in rich descriptions of 29 critical incidents of opportunistic buyer behavior, extracting first-hand information.
18 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of governance mechanisms on relationship continuity in the aftermath of exchange interruptions in interfirm relationships are compared, and the authors suggest that cooperative relationships can be renewed by matching governance mechanisms (formalization or socialization) to specific types of exchange interruption (opportunism and misunderstanding) using data collected from two types of senior managers in 304 buyer firms in China.
Abstract: This study compares the effects of governance mechanisms on relationship continuity in the aftermath of exchange interruptions in interfirm relationships. We propose that cooperative relationships can be renewed by matching governance mechanisms (formalization or socialization) to specific types of exchange interruptions (opportunism and misunderstanding). Using data collected from two types of senior managers in 304 buyer firms in China (a total of 608 senior managers), we found that the effects of formalization and socialization on relationship continuity are contingent on exchange interruption type. Socialization is more effective than formalization in renewing relationships when the level of opportunism is high, while formalization works better than socialization when the level of misunderstanding is high. Based on our findings, we encourage firms to diagnose exchange interruption types and then choose a proper governance structure.
18 citations