Topic
Opportunism
About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the role of formal and relational contracts in managing alliance risks that arise in co-opetitive collaborations, and find that the firms mitigate alliance risks primarily through the use of relational contracts (informal self-enforcing agreements).
17 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors revisited the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear and characterized the equilibrium under secret contracts and compared it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for general forms of demand and retail competition.
Abstract: This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for general forms of demand and retail competition. Market distortions are more severe under secret contracts if and only if retailers' instruments are strategic complements. We also investigate the effect of opportunism on firms' profits. Our results remain robust whether retailers hold passive or wary beliefs. We derive some implications for the antitrust analysis of information exchange between firms.
17 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the evolution of supply relations of Italtel, the leading Italian firm in the telecommunication equipment industry, and suggest that the changes in ItaltEL's supply relations indicate the gradual and still in part incomplete transition towards the organized vertical market.
17 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a conceptual model of the power roots and drivers of infidelity in exporter-importer (E-I) working relationships is proposed, based on data collected from 262 Greek export manufacturers, which confirm that the exercise of coercive power in the E-I working relationship by the exporter has positive effects on distance, opportunism, and uncertainty.
17 citations
TL;DR: The tournament model is a widely used mechanism to control opportunistic behavior by associates in law firms as mentioned in this paper, however, this mechanism can only operate in certain economic (and social) circumstances, and when those circumstances do not exist, the model breaks down, and with it the ability of controlling opportunism in the absence of some alternative mechanism.
Abstract: The tournament model is a widely used mechanism to control opportunistic behavior by associates in law firms. However, this mechanism can only operate in certain economic (and social) circumstances. When those circumstances do not exist, the model breaks down, and with it the ability to control opportunism in the absence of some alternative mechanism. Prior research has not investigated whether the utilization of a tournament model prevents the opportunistic behaviors identified as grabbing, leaving, and shirking. In order to test the limits of the tournament model, it is necessary to find particular historical moments when the economic environment radically challenges assumptions/premises of the model. The dot-com bubble in Silicon Valley provides precisely such a time and place. This article demonstrates limits to the applicability of tournament theory. Those limits are to be found in the economic environment in circumstances in which: (1) exogenous reward structures offer many multiples of internal rewards; (2) demonstrably high short-term rewards outside the firm starkly contrast with the delayed longterm rewards inside the firm; (3) the managerial strata reduce their emphasis on long-term recruiting of potential partners in favor of short-term productivity by young associates; and (4) firms develop departmental leverage ratios in excess of their capacity to monitor, mentor, and train recruits.
17 citations