Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.

A stochastic evolutionary game perspective on the stability of strategic alliances against external opportunism

Abstract: This paper applies stochastic evolutionary game theory to analyzing the stability of cooperation among members against external opportunism in a multi-firm alliance. The authors first review the pros and cons of pertinent traditional models, and then a stochastic game model on decisions is proposed, where a coordination parameter, a time variable, a punishment effect and bounded rationality are considered. The Gauss white noise is introduced to reflect the random disturbance in the process. Several sufficient criteria on stability are developed, which enable us to investigate “if-then”type scenarios and project the impact of different strategies.

Against Economic (Mis)Conceptions of the Individual: Constructing Financial Agency in the Credit Crisis

Abstract: This paper draws upon the work of Lacan and Callon to interrogate and disrupt the foundational belief of neo classical economics in the rationality and autonomy of the individual. Lacan’s account of the ego’s foundation in the ‘imaginary’ explains how the self may be grasped as if it were indeed autonomous and rational, but also what is ‘fictional’ about this image. Following Lacan, the credit crisis is explored in terms of the narcissism, paranoia and contempt for the law that in practice characterised the conduct of what economics celebrates as the rational individual. The paper then draws upon Callon’s notion of performativity to explore the ways in which economics, and in particular its assumptions about incentives, came to make a reality of the fiction of the ‘rational’ individual. We suggest that widely adopted incentive pay practices, designed in line with agency assumptions, produced the very self interested opportunism that they assumed ex ante.

Precursors and outcomes of satisfaction in business relationships : a replication study

Abstract: This study examines the proposition that in business-supplier relationships, trust and commitment generate satisfaction; these in turn influence transaction cost outcomes of specific investments, opportunism and formalisation. Data were collected from 223 large companies in South Africa using a structured questionnaire. The findings show that trust and commitment relate positively to satisfaction. They also show that satisfaction, empowered by trust and commitment, relates positively to formalisation, negatively to opportunism, and had no significant influence on willingness to invest in specific assets. These results support the argument that business managers should devote resources to creating satisfactory supplier relationships based on trust and commitment. The findings contribute to an enhanced understanding of the causes and outcomes of satisfaction in business relationships in the South African context, and help to validate findings reported in other countries.

The moderating effect of virtual integration on intergenerational governance and relationship performance in international customer–supplier relationships

Abstract: With the growing trend of digital technology in global supply chains, how to manage global supply chain relationships under digital transformation becomes a critical issue. However, academic research in this area is sparse. This study develops and tests a theoretical framework of the moderating effect of virtual integration on interorganziational governance in international customer supplier relationships.,We chose to examine the specific cross-border relationships between Taiwanese suppliers and their international OEMs because Taiwanese suppliers tend to be smaller than their international OEM customers, and thus their relationships usually show power asymmetry. Furthermore, the Taiwanese electronics industry offers a valuable empirical context because its industry members have served as pioneers in information technology development, have championed cross-border relationships with US and European industry leaders and are actively participating in the world economy,Our empirical findings indicate that virtual integration will strengthen the effect contractual governance on relationship performance. However, the moderating effect of virtual integration on relational governance is not significant. The paper discusses the theoretical and managerial implications in the end.,This study contributes to interorganizational governance literature in international contexts. Previous work on international relationship management has focused much on MNE buyers' perspectives and paid little attention to the suppliers' perspectives. This study extends this stream of research by empirically examining how suppliers can govern their MNEs' customers via different governance mechanisms. The findings extend literature on virtual integration and show that virtual integration can complement detailed contract and safeguard opportunism, which in turn, enhance relationship performance in international customer–supplier relationships.

Accounting for the alignment of interest and commitment in interfirm transactional relationships

Abstract: Control in interfirm transactional relationships has, inter alia, the purpose of mitigating potential opportunistic behaviour. For an individual actor the power-base to exercise control over the (output of) the behaviour of another actor in the relationship is a contractual arrangement. From a contractual perspective control systems are designed, thus providing contractual instruments to align interests and to prevent future opportunistic behaviour from occurring. Transaction cost economics proves to be a powerful tool for designing these instruments, which from this theoretical perspective are based on 'credible commitments' and 'credible exit threats'. The paper argues that the design and potential use of these instruments are efficient in the presence of the legitimate mistrust for which they have to compensate. However, given fundamental uncertainty, these designs do not suffice in attenuating opportunism and have to be complemented by trust building. Drawing on insights from cognitive social psychology and sociology, the paper clarifies that in self-regulating processes of rational interaction guided by a principle of enlightened self-interest, trust is built via mutual relational signalling. Partners voluntarily and deliberately signal to each other that they are trustworthy. The paper argues and gives evidence that instrumental control system design embedded in an institutional environment and atmosphere is a necessary flank for a trust building process to work properly. The (interrelated) roles of accounting in a contractual realm as well as in self-regulating processes of relational signalling are examined.