scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Topic

Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.


Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors rely on transaction cost economics and the contingency stream of organization theory to answer two related questions: First, when contracting for complex services, do governments design contracts for flexibility? Second, is the contingency perspective relevant to understanding contract design? Examining 130 professional service contracts awarded by state government agencies in the US, they find that task complexity and task unpredictability, two dimensions of task uncertainty increase the probability of flexible governance.
Abstract: We rely on transaction cost economics and the contingency stream of organization theory to answer two related questions. First, when contracting for complex services, do governments design contracts for flexibility? Second, is the contingency perspective relevant to understanding contract design? Examining 130 professional service contracts awarded by state government agencies in the US, we find that task complexity and task unpredictability, two dimensions of task uncertainty increase the probability of flexible governance. This research highlights for managers the important fact that the potential for opportunism and task complexity are different sources of uncertainty that pose different challenges and call for different governance solutions. The study enriches our understanding of transaction costs by probing the conditions under which task uncertainty matters most (and least) and further shows the utility of integrating transaction cost economics with contingency theory to better understand contract governance.

12 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, a comprehensive analysis of the economics of dispute settlement institutions is performed and it is shown that the literatures of trade cooperation and dispute institutions are (and should be) interlinked.
Abstract: Economic theory has made considerable progress in explaining why sovereign countries cooperate in trade. Central to most theories of trade cooperation are issues of self-enforcement: The threat of reprisal by an aggrieved party maintains the initial balance of concessions and prevents opportunism. However, economic scholarship has been less coherent in explaining why countries choose to settle and enforce their trade disputes with the help of an impartial third party, a “trade court”. Typically, economists focusing on the purpose of trade agreements have assumed away the very reasons why institutions are needed, since under standard assumptions, neither defection from the rules nor disputes are expected to occur. This paper is a step towards the formulation of a coherent economic theory of dispute settlement. It challenges traditional models of enforcement (primarily concerned with acts of punishment) for being insufficient in explaining the existence of dispute settlement institutions. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the economics of dispute settlement institutions and demonstrate to what extent the literatures of trade cooperation and dispute institutions are (and should be) interlinked. On the basis of these theories, we show that dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements may assume a variety of roles, including that of an information repository and disseminator, an honest broker, an arbitrator and calculator of damages, an active information gatherer or an adjudicator.

12 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the independent and interactive effects of influence strategies and fairness perception on the resellers' opportunism tendency and found that distributive and procedural fairness perceptions moderate the relationship between influence strategies.

12 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the concept of (mal)adaptation opportunism, a situation in which projects undertaken in the name of climate change adaptation are overrun by interests other than the stated or intended objectives of the CCA project.
Abstract: This paper introduces the terminology of (mal)adaptation opportunism – a situation in which projects undertaken in the name of climate change adaptation (CCA) are overrun by interests other than the stated or intended objectives of the CCA project. A goal of CCA projects is to reduce poverty and promote social justice. The case of the threat of displacement of the community of Kewunor by the Trasacco Estate Development Company (TEDC), after the construction of the Ada Sea Defense System (AdSDS) of Ghana as a CCA, is illustrative of this concept of (mal)adaptation opportunism. Through a narrative presentation of eight different accounts concerning this issue, I demonstrate how (mal)adaptation opportunism arises and is often motivated by economic interests. This case illustrates how economic interests can take over not only CCA projects but also their maladaptive effects.

12 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the impact of supplier relationship quality on curtailing opportunism and promoting cooperation between the exchange partners and investigated the contingent impact of contract specificity on the relationships and assessed the performance implications of relationship quality for both buyer and its major supplier.
Abstract: This study aims to examine the impact of supplier relationship quality on curtailing opportunism and promoting cooperation between the exchange partners. It also investigates the contingent impact of contract specificity on the relationships and assesses performance implications of relationship quality for both buyer and its major supplier in the exchange.,Confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis were performed based on data collected from manufacturers in a survey. The hypotheses were tested using path analysis.,The findings of this study indicate a pivotal role of supplier relationship quality in suppressing opportunism and enhancing cooperation between exchange parties, which lead to dyadic performance. Furthermore, the effect of supplier relationship quality is strengthened by contract specificity.,This study adds value to the existing streams of studies in several ways. First, informed by the nexus of relational capital theory and transaction cost economics, the authors emphasize the pivotal role of relationship quality in curtailing opportunism and fostering cooperation and the moderating effect of contract specificity on the above linkages. Second, this study provides empirical evidence of the mechanism of the effect of contract specificity on opportunism and cooperation.

12 citations


Network Information
Related Topics (5)
Empirical research
51.3K papers, 1.9M citations
81% related
Entrepreneurship
71.7K papers, 1.7M citations
79% related
Corporate governance
118.5K papers, 2.7M citations
78% related
Globalization
81.8K papers, 1.7M citations
77% related
Organizational learning
32.6K papers, 1.6M citations
76% related
Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202398
2022182
202168
202097
201991
201871