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Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper developed a behavioral decision model to highlight entrepreneurs' decision-making behind venture opportunism, finding that opportunism can present to entrepreneurs and their new ventures a risky and uncertain environment.
Abstract: We develop a behavioral–decision model to highlight entrepreneurs’ decision making behind venture opportunism. We find that opportunism can present to entrepreneurs and their new ventures a risky y...

9 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The functional theory of equity as anti-opportunism in fiduciary law as mentioned in this paper has been proposed as a safety valve aimed at countering opportunism in the context of private law.
Abstract: Fiduciary law is both celebrated as unbound by rules and deplored as unprincipled. Moralists see in fiduciary law a fixed and mandatory system, even as legal economists and contractarians have cast fiduciary law as the ultimate set of defaults to fill in incomplete contracts. Like general equity, out of which it grew, modern fiduciary law suffers from the hard times the theory of equity has fallen into, and for the same reasons. This chapter argues that a functional theory of equity – of equity as a safety valve aimed at countering opportunism – captures the character of fiduciary law. Fiduciary relationships, in which someone undertakes to act on another’s behalf by using discretion, carry more than the usual potential for opportunism. In the equitable solutions to opportunism based on proxies and presumptions, fiduciary law gets its main features. Like equity but in a more sweeping and often more categorical way, fiduciary law sets the presumption against the fiduciary when certain proxies are triggered. Thus, in situations of undisclosed conflict of interest the presumption of opportunism arises even without regard to the substance of the deal. For self-dealing likewise the presumption arises in an almost indefeasible way. Like equity generally, fiduciary law features a constrained residuum of open-endedness to deal with new and creative ways of being opportunistic. The theory of equity as targeting potential opportunism unifies the best aspects of traditional and modern theories of fiduciary law, and helps explain why fiduciary law has become so disparate and contested after the fusion of law and equity. Cut off from the special rationales of equity, fiduciary law itself threatens to become too expansive or too narrow and hidebound – like equity generally. Finally, the functional theory of equity as anti-opportunism helps explain the similarity of fiduciary law to another much misunderstood area of private law – unjust enrichment – and the relation between the two. The chapter concludes with some remarks about fiduciary law within the overall architecture of private law.

9 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the role of ex post producer opportunism on the optimal design of vertical restraints and shows that the alleged room for franchisor opportunism that seems quite important in franchising contracts can be seen as an insurance device when part of the goal of the contract is to provide a stable payoff to the franchisee.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of ex post producer opportunism on the optimal design of vertical restraints It considers vertical contracts as starting points of ex post renegotiation It shows that the alleged room for franchisor opportunism that seems quite important in franchising contracts can be seen as an insurance device when part of the goal of the contract is to provide a stable payoff to the franchisee This conclusion holds for various opportunistic strategies: direct eviction of initial retailers, excessive entry of new retailers on the market, or resale price maintenance used to encourage "voluntary" exit of initial retailers

9 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined how, when and why joint liability works as a control mechanism to reduce opportunism among tea supplier groups in China and demonstrated how and under what conditions the joint-liability mechanism is linked with the reduction of multi-suppliers' opportunism.
Abstract: Purpose Grounded in agency and clan theories, this study aims to examine how, when and why joint liability works as a control mechanism to reduce opportunism among tea supplier groups in China. Design/methodology/approach Survey data from 82 supplier groups (three respondents per group) were collected. Findings Joint liability is related positively to peer monitoring (as mediator) and negatively to opportunism, whereas the mediated relationship is moderated positively by group leaders’ perceived legitimate authority and negatively by reciprocity and shared norms. Social implications Opportunism is operationalized as the use of illegal pesticides, the violation of manufacturer–supplier contractual agreements and joint liability, as suppliers’ liability of having the whole group’s seasonal production is rejected by the manufacturer if a single act of opportunism is detected in the group. Originality/value Our study demonstrates how and under what conditions the joint-liability mechanism is linked with the reduction of multi-suppliers’ opportunism. We pave the way for future applications of the control mechanism to fields related to inter-organizational governance. Most importantly, we apply Ouchi’s clan theory (1979, 1980) to conceptualize manufacturer–supplier and supplier–supplier relationships in China and provide first-hand evidence to validate its applicability and generalizability to the context. The study also offers insights on network influences in inter-organizational relationships (Gu et al., 2010; Wathne and Heide, 2004) and confirms the important roles of network factors in inter-organizational relationships. In particular, peer monitoring operates as a mediator and normative factors operate as facilitators (moderators) for the joint liability to work as a mechanism to control opportunism in this relationship context.

9 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the extent to which competence and goodwill trust interact with contract specificity in mitigating supplier opportunism and improving relational stability, and find that the interaction between contract specificity and trust with respect to decreasing supplier opportunisms and promoting relational stability positively affected restaurant performance.
Abstract: This study was designed to offer empirical evidence about the significant impacts of supplier opportunism and relational stability upon restaurant performance. This study aims to investigate the extent to which competence and goodwill trust interact with contract specificity in mitigating supplier opportunism and improving relational stability.,This study obtained a data set using 324 account executives representing a US restaurant product supplier. These same account executives were also contacted to obtain data from general managers of their largest restaurant accounts. Structural equation modeling was used to assess the hypothesized relationships. Additionally, a two-step hierarchical regression analysis was used to test how contract specificity and trust interact upon supplier opportunism and relational stability.,Results revealed that contract specificity, competence and goodwill trust significantly reduced supplier opportunism and improved relational stability, which positively affected restaurant performance. Additionally, the interaction between contract specificity and goodwill trust significantly reduced the level of supplier opportunism, supporting the complementary role of goodwill trust for contract specificity. When goodwill trust interacted with contract specificity, it was found to significantly improve relational stability.,These results offer empirical evidence pertaining to the significant impacts of supplier opportunism and relational stability upon restaurant performance. Findings can be used to develop effective governance strategies to manage restaurant-supplier transactions.,Although the interaction between contract specificity and trust with respect to decreasing supplier opportunism and promoting relational stability has been a subject of debate in the supply chain management research literature, to date, no relevant research addressing this topic exists within the context of restaurant management. In this study, trust was particularly assessed based upon its two distinct roles (competence and goodwill) involving their interaction with contract specificity upon supplier opportunism and relational stability. The findings regarding those different roles of the two types of trust provide new insights into the existing knowledge about the use of both formal and informal governance specific to the restaurant industry.

9 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202398
2022182
202168
202097
201991
201871