Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.

Strategic Alliances Outcomes in Supply Chain Environments: Malaysian Case Studies

Abstract: In this study, findings of three case studies conducted on the strategic alliance key issues are reported. Interviews were conducted to explore the feasibility of the authors’ conceptual framework and subsequently its validation. This paper aims to provide an in-depth understanding of the nature, formation and survival of strategic alliances. It was found that the intention to seek complementary resources and skills affect the intensity of integration between strategic alliance partners. While environment impacts the nature of the alliances, it moderates the firm decision in asset specificity (AS) investment. Although AS reduces perceived opportunism, we found that it is not a common practice in our case companies. Collaborative relationships that exhibit high levels of communication, trust and commitment tend to have high level of reciprocal interdependence, and thus better overall performance.

Corporate governance and top managers: potential sources of sustainable competitive advantage

Abstract: Theorists in various fields have viewed corporate success differently depending on their ideological persuasions. This paper attempts to critically review and synthetize the previously fragmented literature around two main approaches. The first is grounded in traditional economic theory and industrial organization tradition. The second is rooted in a resource and competency-based view of the firm. Both approaches are centered on techno-economic factors of sustainable competitive advantage. Little attention, if any, has been given to top managers’ loyalty, high commitment and proactiveness as drivers of competitive advantage. Those top managers’ attributes are taken for granted whereas it is mostly alleged that top managers are self-serving, riskavoider, and not committed to long-term organizational goals. Such practices might have been tolerable until recently, but are untenable under the tremendous pressure of globalization. Using non parametric tests on a Canadian sample, we found evidence of top manager opportunism. However, firms surveyed exhibit various corporate governance safeguards that seem to constrain top managers’ misconduct. Along this line, we found that owner-controlled firms are likely to outperform manager-controlled firms.

Revisiting the Relationship Between Contract Governance and Contractors’ Opportunistic Behavior in Construction Projects

Abstract: Contracts are crucial for curbing opportunism, a common phenomenon in construction projects. This article differentiates among the contractual mechanisms of obligatoriness, monitoring, and coordination, and studies the relationships between the complexity of the above functions and different types of opportunistic behavior. Using data from 262 clients (i.e., the parties issuing contracts) in the Chinese construction industry, this article reveals that contractual obligatoriness has a negative effect on strong-form opportunistic behavior. At the same time, contractual monitoring and coordination have positive and negative effects, respectively, on weak-form opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, we find that goodwill trust mediates contractual coordination's effect on weak-form opportunistic behavior. This article contributes to both the contract management literature and the interorganizational relationship governance literature by providing more nuanced findings that speak to the debate surrounding the relationship between contractual governance and opportunistic behavior, elaborate the mediation mechanism, and provide insights into the contractual function view.

Information Networks as a Safeguard from Opportunism in Industrial Supplier-Buyer Relationships

Abstract: The network idea has been gaining growing attention in the last decades. We analyse the applicability of networks as a mechanism that protects suppliers from buyers’ opportunism. So-called information networks can function as a safeguard for dependent suppliers by reducing information asymmetries among the networking parties and by developing group norms. To confirm this hypothesis, we conduct an empirical study. The results show that information networks can provide protection for a dependent supplier if information about a buyer’s unfair behaviour is credible, and if as a result this buyer suffers a considerable loss of reputation.

Rogues and Deviants: a game-theoretic perspective on opportunism in strategic alliances

Abstract: This research examines how relational factors, such as monitoring, relative alliance identity (RAI), and trust, influence opportunism and, consequently, alliance performance. The authors suggest th...