Topic
Opportunism
About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.
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01 Dec 2008TL;DR: This article draws on theories of transaction cost and social exchange to develop a model examining outsourcing relationship governance mechanisms, and important determinants of contractual and relational governance and the effectiveness of the control mechanisms on relational outcomes, opportunism and commitment are examined.
Abstract: Organizations are under increasing pressure to exhibit the value of their outsourcing. However, previous IS outsourcing research studies failed to provide evidence on how IT client-provider relationships should be managed to ensure outsourcing success. This article draws on theories of transaction cost and social exchange to develop a model examining outsourcing relationship governance mechanisms. Important determinants of contractual and relational governance and the effectiveness of the control mechanisms on relational outcomes, opportunism and commitment, are examined. This research agenda may theoretically extend IS outsourcing research by incorporating a framework to explore outsourcing relationship management and to practically explain software outsourcing phenomenon.
8 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that it is wrong to assume that courts must make a dichotomous choice always to prefer extrinsic evidence or always to exclude it, and they identify a number of factors that may help to resolve which methodology will achieve those goals in different factual settings.
Abstract: The problem of contract interpretation presents courts with significant questions about the nature and methodology of judicial intervention into privately arranged affairs. The court often assumes an active role in interpreting the words of a written contract in part because words have more than one meaning or because a contract is incomplete. When a court chooses amongst variable meanings, or interprets contracts to craft limitations on parties' behavior when express limits do not exist, its choice must be then justified using a framework explored in this essay. Traditionally, commentators have advocated one of two general approaches to supply the methodology to govern judicial choices of contract meaning. The first restricts interpretation to the words used in the contract and the other accepts extrinsic evidence about what one or both of the parties to the contract intended that the words would mean or objective evidence of the meaning supplied by context or evidence of how ordinary commercial parties in a trade used the term or behaved in the current contract. This essay argues that it is the wrong to think that courts must make a dichotomous choice always to prefer extrinsic evidence or always to exclude it. Sometimes the appropriate interpretive methodology should explicitly forego extrinsic evidence while at other times it should embrace extrinsic evidence. The choice between the two methodologies should depend upon an assessment in each case about which interpretive methodology is most likely to (1) curb opportunistic behavior; (2) implement the parties' actual intentions, and (3) achieve these overall goals, in each case in a cost-effective way and thereby maximize gains from trade. The essay identifies a number of factors that may help to resolve which methodology will achieve those goals in different factual settings.
8 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop and test a framework wherein internationalizing entrepreneurs pair affordable loss logics (ALL) with real options reasoning (ROR) to generate value-creating opportunities while substantively forestalling the unfavorable impacts of trade partner opportunism.
8 citations
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8 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed an over-the-counter option mechanism for public-private project financing, which reduces entry barriers by streamlining incomplete long-term contracts and avoiding contractual problems related to bounded rationality and opportunism.
Abstract: Opportunism, either governmental or private, is a powerful deterrent against public-private project financing, especially when considering the scale of the investment in infrastructure. The parties can, however, secure themselves against opportunism of the counter-party by exchanging an exit (put) option for the private investor and a bail-out (call) option for the public agent on the private investor’s shares. These over-the-counter options combine the stability of long-term contracts and the flexibility of short-term contracts. The exit/bail-out option mechanism reduces entry barriers by streamlining incomplete long-term contracts and avoiding contractual problems related to bounded rationality and opportunism.
8 citations