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Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how the interplay between drivers (relationship-specific investments and behavioral uncertainty) and deterrents (inter-firm social capital) of opportunism affect partner opportunism in buyer-supplier exchanges.
Abstract: Fostering and maintaining buyer–supplier relationships is a fundamental premise of many channel initiatives. Indeed, these relationships may culminate in significant performance enhancements and competitive advantage. Yet these relationships may also result in competitively harmful events such as partner opportunism. Despite this potential competitive erosion, there is a lack of studies examining the interplay between the drivers and deterrents of opportunism. By building on transaction cost economics and social capital theory, we examine, via a sample of 400 manufacturing firms in China, how the interplay between drivers (relationship-specific investments and behavioral uncertainty) and deterrents (inter-firm social capital) of opportunism affect partner opportunism in buyer–supplier exchanges. The significance of this interplay between the drivers and deterrents sheds new light on how a firm can leverage social capital to curb the harmful effects of opportunism.

156 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the effects of contractual and relational governance on provider opportunism, incorporating the moderating influence of a "shift parameter" (national culture) and found that contractual governance is more effective in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures.
Abstract: To address concerns of opportunism, outsourcing firms are encouraged to deploy contractual and relational governance. The individual and collective effects of these mechanisms have been previously examined but not in specific contexts. This study examines the effects of contractual and relational governance on provider opportunism, incorporating the moderating influence of a “shift parameter”—national culture. Our results reveal that contractual governance is more effective in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures. Relational governance is more effective in collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance societies. The individualism–collectivism dimension also moderates the joint effect of these mechanisms. While the mechanisms are generally complementary in mitigating opportunism, a singular focus on either contractual or relational can be just as effective under situations of high individualism and collectivism, respectively.

153 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This work examines factors using transaction cost theory’s three stages: contact costs, contract costs, and control costs to identify the mitigation approaches that reduce transaction costs for small firms.
Abstract: It seems surprising that small firms engage in offshore outsourcing given that they lack the resources that large firms possess to overcome the difficulties involved. We examine these factors using transaction cost theory’s three stages: contact costs, contract costs, and control costs. Then, using our field data from small client firms (in the United States and the United Kingdom), intermediaries, and offshore vendors, we analyze the mitigation approaches that reduce transaction costs for small firms. We identify nine such approaches: three for client firms and six for suppliers. For the small client firm, they are liaisons of knowledge flows, gaining experience, and overcoming opportunism; and, for the service providers, they are onshore presence, reducing contact costs, simplifying contracting, providing control channels, expert intermediaries, and standardization of services.

152 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the benefits of generous refunds as part of overall complaint management service policy was emphasized. But recent empirical evidence suggests that many retailers have concerns about......,
Abstract: Previous research emphasizes the benefits of generous refunds as part of overall complaint management service policy, yet recent empirical evidence suggests that many retailers have concerns about ...

150 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a transaction costs-cum-positive political theory approach is developed, with a focus on the role of institutions and their implications for regulatory commitment, to understand the roles institutions play in society.
Abstract: The thrust of this paper is that to understand the roles institutions play in society, a deep analysis of opportunism and its implications is necessary. For that purpose, a transactions costs-cum-positive political theory approach is developed, with a focus on the role of institutions and their implications for regulatory commitment. A major issue is restraining political opportunism. Countries that have succeeded in developing a healthy private sector are those that have developed institutions that restrain governmental decision-making. But such restraining is itself a political choice. Countries with electoral and legislative systems that bring about decentralized government have stronger chances of developing equilibria where government discretion is restrained. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

150 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202398
2022182
202168
202097
201991
201871