Topic
Opportunism
About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used experimental data from variants of public good games to test for household efficiency among married couples in rural Uganda and found that women contribute less to this household common pool than men and opportunism is widespread.
96 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a comparative analysis of different ways to sell products selling formats when buyers incur evaluation costs is presented, and it is found that the use of many common selling formats can be explained in terms of their ability to alleviate this problem.
Abstract: The paper offers a comparative analysis of different ways to sell products selling formats when buyers incur evaluation costs. Since these costs are sunk at the moment of trade, buyers may refrain from incurring them for fear of later opportunism on the part of sellers. It is found that the use of many common selling formats can be explained in terms of their ability to alleviate this problem. Specifically, I explain price advertising, seller colocation, and bargaining. The theory explains much of the divergence in retail trading institutions and leads to several testable predictions.
96 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the relationship between the formal versus informal nature of opportunism and the formal and informal characteristics of contractual governance and derive implications for research on the role of contractual mechanisms in dealing with interorganizational opportunism.
Abstract: This study investigates contracting mechanisms in situations of opportunistic disputes between organizations. The authors specifically explore the relationships between the formal versus informal nature of opportunism and the formal versus informal nature of contractual governance. They use a unique data set of 102 buyer–supplier disputes to explore in depth different types of opportunism – that is, strong form versus weak form opportunism – and different types of contracting mechanisms – that is, the controlling and coordinating functions of formal contracts and the cooperative and competitive sides of relational contracts. The authors’ detailed empirical analysis suggests distinct relationships between the different contracting mechanisms, the different types of opportunism, and the level of legal fees necessary to deal with the dispute. From these findings the authors derive implications for research on the role of contractual mechanisms in dealing with interorganizational opportunism.
94 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used a sample of 202 Hong Kong Chinese importers to investigate the harmful effect of exporters' opportunism on importers' long-term orientation through the intervening role of key behavioral constructs.
Abstract: Notwithstanding the extensive literature on opportunism in buyer–seller relationships, scant empirical attention has been given to this issue in both international and Chinese contexts. Using a sample of 202 Hong Kong Chinese importers, this article highlights the harmful effect of Western exporters' opportunism on importers' long-term orientation through the intervening role of key behavioral constructs. The study confirms almost all hypothesized associations between the constructs examined, indicating that an exporter's opportunistic behavior reduces trust and generates conflict. In turn, low trust reduces commitment, and conflict impedes communication. Low levels of both commitment and communication reduce importers' satisfaction, which inhibits their long-term orientation. The importer's proactive initiation of the relationship moderates the link between opportunism and trust but not that of opportunism with conflict. The study also confirms the moderating role of importer dependence and expo...
94 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the articulation of transaction cost economics and management control issues through the use of the work of early institutional economist John R. Commons, and incorporate institutional change as important to considerations of the viability of alternative forms of governance including various management control practices.
Abstract: Transaction cost economics (TCE) has been proposed as a useful approach for examining management control (MC) issues. The purpose of this paper is to explore the articulation of TCE and MC through the use of the work of early institutional economist John R. Commons. In keeping with Commons’ work, we incorporate institutional change as important to considerations of the viability of alternative forms of governance including various management control practices. Also consistent with Commons’ work, our paper elaborates upon the significance of the concepts of “asset specificity” and “opportunism” through an illustrative analysis of contemporary efforts to de-regulate the utilities industry in the State of California, and the related role of Enron Corporation in those de-regulatory efforts. This context provides a rich backdrop to highlight the joint articulation of TCE and MC issues.
93 citations