Topic
Opportunism
About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the M-form hypothesis in a laboratory experiment using M-and U-form organizations under incentives based on corporate profit and divisional profits and found that there was greater opportunism under U-and M-forms than under both.
Abstract: Opportunism is one central premise of the M-form hypothesis. This premise is investigated in a laboratory experiment using M-form and U-form organizations under incentives based on corporate profit and divisional profits. There was greater opportunism under U-form organization than under the M-form, and under divisional profit than under corporate profit incentives. Additionally, a misguided altruism lead a number of individuals to misrepresent information. The M-form yields higher performance than the U-form. Also, corporate profit incentives yield higher total profit than divisional profit incentives. The results partially explain why empirical studies do not strongly support the M-form hypothesis.
50 citations
TL;DR: The authors compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production: revenue-sharing and leader-determined shares, and find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding.
Abstract: We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.
50 citations
TL;DR: In this article, Li et al. proposed that opportunism and trust coexist and work together to affect project success in China's construction industry, using primary data collected from 225 owners, contractors, designers, and supervisors.
Abstract: Project success is the ultimate goal for all projects, and doubts often arise about what actually determines project success. On the basis of the transaction cost exchange (TCE) and relational exchange theory (RET), this study proposes that opportunism and trust coexist and work together to affect project success. External uncertainty, complexity, and cooperation duration are the variables that are considered in the specific construction context. Using primary data collected from 225 owners, contractors, designers, and supervisors in China’s construction industry, the empirical analysis shows that the negative opportunism and the positive trust counteract each other and affect the project success. Their relationships are influenced by the level of external uncertainty, but not by the level of complexity. In particular, the results also demonstrate that opportunism affects project performance through a mediating process, and the effects of opportunism and trust differ under varying cooperation dura...
50 citations
TL;DR: This study analyzes two extreme outsourcing situations and concludes that the strategic alliance between the firm and its suppliers was supported by governance mechanisms that paved the way to a successful and harmonious relationship.
Abstract: This study analyzes two extreme outsourcing situations. In the first case, contractual problems derailed the original agreement and precipitated a disastrous divorce. In the second case, the strategic alliance between the firm and its suppliers was supported by governance mechanisms that paved the way to a successful and harmonious relationship. Agency theory provides a conceptual background for analyzing the cases. Lessons are drawn from the experiences of the firms studied, and recommendations are made for the design of outsourcing contracts that curb contractual opportunism.
50 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors select four perspectives that address complexity, governance, the agency-structure nexus, and how learning occurs or may be blocked by institutional features: transactional theory, purposeful opportunism, experimental governance and the joint decision trap.
Abstract: The European Union may well be a learning organization, yet there is still confusion about the nature of learning, its causal structure and the normative implications. In this contribution we select four perspectives that address complexity, governance, the agency–structure nexus, and how learning occurs or may be blocked by institutional features. They are transactional theory, purposeful opportunism, experimental governance and the joint decision trap. We use the four cases to investigate how history and disciplinary traditions inform theory; the core causal arguments about learning; the normative implications of the analysis; the types of learning that are theoretically predicted; the meta-theoretical aspects and the lessons for better theories of the policy process and political scientists more generally.
49 citations