Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.

Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity Under Ex Post Opportunism

Abstract: Opportunism is a central construct in exchange theory. Economists contend that despite the firm's best efforts to erect governance structures that reduce opportunism and preserve outcomes, there is always some opportunism that remains once the transaction is in place. Despite this, there are few studies that systematically investigate thesafeguarding efficacy of relationship attributes in the presence of such ex post opportunism. In this research, we develop a theoretical framework and provide a longitudinal test of the ability of various relationship safeguards to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations given varying levels of ex post opportunism in the relationship. Our survey results from over 300 buyers and suppliers indicates that given lower levels of opportunism, bilateral idiosyncratic investments and interpersonal trust enhance performance outcomes and future expectations, while goal congruence has no discernable effect. However, at higher levels of opportunism, goal congruence becomes a more powerful safeguard, while interpersonal trust becomes less effective. Bilateral idiosyncratic investments continue to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations even at higher levels of opportunism. Implications for the long-term management of interorganizational alliances are discussed.

Uncertainty, Opportunism, and Governance: The Effects of Volatility and Ambiguity on Formal and Relational Contracting

Abstract: Comparing the effectiveness of contractual and relational governance in constraining opportunism under conditions of volatility and ambiguity, we hypothesize that relational contracts will be robus...

The firm as a nexus of treaties

Abstract: Part 1 Knowledge - its acquisition, sharing and/or asymmetry: the participatory generation of information rents and the theory of the firm, Masahiko Aoki common knowledge and the co-ordination of economic activities, Jacques Cremer profit sharing, information and employment, Matti Pohjola. Part 2 Vertical integration and the strategic management of the enterprise: what is vertical integration?, Michael H.Riordan vertical integration, transaction costs and "learning by using", Kurt Lundgren the firm as a nexus of internal and external contracts, Torger Reve. Part 3 Issues of labour organization: the viability of worker ownership - an economic perspective on the political structure of the firm, Henry Hansmann intellectual skill and the role of employees as constituent members of large firms in contemporary Japan, Kazuo Koike the implicit contract for corporate law firm associates - "ex post" opportunism and "ex ante" bonding, Robert H.Mooking. Part 4 Finance and the political structure of the firm: capital structure as a mechanism of control - a comparison of financial systems, Erik Berglof long-term contracts in financial markets, Hakan Lindgren the principle of external accountability in competitive markets, Herbert Gintis union militancy and plant designs, Kar Ove Moene can transaction cost economics explain trade associations?, Marc Schneiberg and J.Rogers Hollingsworth.

Specific Investments in Marketing Relationships: Expropriation and Bonding Effects:

Abstract: Specific investments, which are tailored to a particular company or value-chain partner, are important components of firms’ marketing strategies. At the same time, extant theory suggests that such investments pose considerable risk, because they put the receiver in a position to opportunistically exploit the investor. In this article, the authors examine this “expropriation” scenario but also consider whether specific investments, because of their specialized nature, may actually “bond” the receiver and reduce opportunism under certain conditions. These conditions involve a focal relationship’s time horizon (i.e., its extendedness) and particular norms. The key theoretical argument is that the effect of specific investments on opportunism will shift in a nonmonotonic fashion over the range of these relationship conditions. The authors test their research hypotheses empirically through parallel analyses on each side of 198 matched buyer–supplier dyads. The empirical tests provide general support f...

Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment

Abstract: An input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts. Efficient commitment, however, would require complete contracts. The authors study instead bilateral contracting, without commitment regarding others' terms. Each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another's contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm's expense. The authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third-party opportunism, even with symmetric firms. To reassure firms, crude forms of commitment may be adopted. This could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.