Topic
Opportunism
About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.
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01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: Transact cost economics as mentioned in this paper is an alternative mode of governance with the main purpose of which is to economize on transaction costs, and it originates with path-breaking contributions by Karl Llewellyn (1931) on contract law; John R. Commons (1932) on the need to come to terms with the three conditions of conflict, mutuality and order; Ronald Coase (1937) on need to make provision for positive transaction costs; and Chester Barnard (1938), on the neglected importance of coordinated adaptation.
Abstract: Hierarchies and markets are herein described as alternative modes of governance, the main purpose of which is to economize on transaction costs. It originates with path-breaking contributions by Karl Llewellyn (1931) on contract law; John R. Commons (1932) on the need to come to terms with the three conditions of conflict, mutuality and order; Ronald Coase (1937) on the need to make provision for positive transaction costs; and Chester Barnard (1938) on the neglected importance of coordinated adaptation. These fundamental ideas were joined and operationalized in the 1970s as Transaction Cost Economics took shape and has been a work in progress since. Not only does a predictive theory emerge, but a large and growing empirical research literature that is broadly supportive has taken shape. Public policy ramifications proliferate.
45 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation (TCR), a framework to analyze the interaction between governments and investors fundamentally, but not exclusively, in utility industries.
Abstract: This paper discusses the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation (TCR), a framework to analyze the interaction between governments and investors fundamentally, but not exclusively, in utility industries. TCR sees regulation as the governance structure of these interactions, and thus, as in standard transaction cost economics, it places emphasis in understanding the nature of the hazards inherent to these interactions. The emphasis on transactional hazards requires a microanalytical perspective, where performance assessment is undertaken within the realm of possible institutional alternative. In that sense, politics becomes fundamental to understanding regulation as the governance of public/private interactions. The paper discusses two fundamental hazards and their organizational implications: governmental and third party opportunism. Both interact to make regulatory processes and outcomes more rigid, formalistic, and prone to conflict than envisioned by relational contracting.
45 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a comprehensive model tested buyer-supplier relationship-specific factors, environmental factors, an individual-difference factor, and situational factors likely to affect a buyer's decision to use opportunistic tactics.
45 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify empirical challenges that perpetuate conceptual limitations in the study of opportunism in supply chains and provide suggestions about research designs and data sources that support an agenda that steers research to refine and develop the theory about opportunism.
Abstract: Opportunism is a core issue in supply chain management. However, assumption‐omitted testing and a focus on general opportunism as opposed to specific forms of opportunism have stubbornly limited our understanding of this construct. Grounded in a review of empirical studies of opportunism, we identify empirical challenges that perpetuate conceptual limitations in the study of opportunism in supply chains. Hence, we provide suggestions about research designs and data sources that support an agenda that steers research to refine and develop the theory about opportunism. Our call for a reinvigoration of the study of opportunism supports rigor – by discussing research design and data sources – and relevance – by identifying topics for future supply chain research.
45 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated an important type of decentralized institution, certified management standards, and theorized that firms use these institutions to reduce problems that might arise with exchange partners that lack information or fear opportunism.
Abstract: In this article, we respond to calls by previous researchers to clarify the function of decentralized institutions by analyzing the strategic motives of individual actors. We investigated an important type of decentralized institution, certified management standards, and theorized that firms use these institutions to reduce problems that might arise with exchange partners that lack information or fear opportunism. We tested this theory using the pattern of certification with the ISO 14001 management standard.
45 citations