Topic
Opportunism
About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors provided a comprehensive discussion about entrepreneur opportunism's antecedents (uncertainty, information asymmetry, asset specificity and relational exchange) and consequences (transaction cost, trust, commitment, performance, and cooperation).
Abstract: Purpose – The purpose of this paper is, first, to provide a comprehensive discussion about entrepreneur opportunism's antecedents (uncertainty, information asymmetry, asset specificity and relational exchange) and consequences (transaction cost, trust, commitment, performance, and cooperation) and, second, to construct a model by linking entrepreneurs' opportunism and its antecedents and consequences.Design/methodology/approach – The paper tests the theoretical construction empirically. In total, 200 retailers of the computer industry in Taiwan participated in the investigation. The linear regression analysis is applied to the tests of the hypotheses.Findings – The study finds that uncertainty and information asymmetry induce the generation of entrepreneurs' opportunism, while asset specificity and relational exchange can be used to lower entrepreneurs' opportunism. Entrepreneurs' opportunism incurs transaction costs and lowers trust, commitment, performance, and cooperation.Research limitations/implicati...
42 citations
TL;DR: The analysis reveals that with greater synergistic benefits, firms invest more in value creation, but the fear of opportunism pushes them to waste more resources on value capture tactics.
Abstract: Research summary: This article studies strategic interactions between firms that form alliances to exploit synergistic benefits Firms cooperate to create value, but they can also compete to capture value Fundamental questions rarely addressed by strategy scholars relate to how the configuration of control over resources influences firms' strategies, the potential for termination, and the emergence of cooperation and trust The formal results reveal crucial aspects of the interorganizational rent-generating process and yield testable implications With greater synergistic benefits, firms invest more, but they also compete more intensively to capture more value With symmetric control, more value gets created, which limits the potential for termination, but also exacerbates the competition for value; from a relational perspective, this form of control augments the calculative rationale of cooperation and trust
Managerial summary: When forming an alliance to exploit synergies, firms engage in a complicated strategic interaction that is part cooperation and part competition What happens when partner firms cooperate and invest to create value while competing and using costly adversarial tactics to capture value? The analysis reveals that with greater synergistic benefits, firms invest more in value creation, but the fear of opportunism pushes them to waste more resources on value capture tactics The balance between value creation and value capture, and the possibility that the alliance is terminated depend on the configuration of control over resources The analysis further reveals under what conditions there can be trust between the partners, such that they focus on value creation and avoid wasting resources in the competition for value Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
42 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the determinants of opportunism in supply chain relationships in emerging markets were examined based on transaction cost theory and resource dependence theory, and it was shown that external uncertainties (environmental uncertainty and legal unprotectability) influence opportunism through power.
Abstract: This study examines the determinants of opportunism in supply chain relationships in emerging markets. Drawing on transaction cost theory and resource dependence theory, we propose that external uncertainties (environmental uncertainty and legal unprotectability) influence opportunism through power (coercive and non-coercive). The results, based on 240 companies in China, indicate that environmental uncertainty enhances supplier opportunism directly and indirectly through the buyer’s use of coercive power over the supplier, while legal unprotectability enhances supplier opportunism directly, but reduces it indirectly through the buyer’s use of non-coercive power. While buyer coercive power increases supplier opportunism, buyer non-coercive power decreases it.
41 citations
01 Jan 2000
41 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors apply a range of argumentative devices to set up and negotiate his basic notions and assumptions with economists, including bounded rationality, opportunism, the primacy of markets and the action of economizing.
Abstract: Bounded rationality, opportunism, the primacy of markets and the action of economizing are building blocks of Oliver Williamson's Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). As in all intellectual exchanges, Williamson has used a range of argumentative devices to set up and negotiate his basic notions and assumptions with economists. Rhetorical analysis is applied here to study his argumentation in a certain institutional context within economics. Negotiations with the mainstream, with the competence view of the firm and within the New Institutional Economics, for instance, have had an impact on the construction of TCE and are given attention here. Difficult decisions have been made in order to forge ahead with TCE, including whether to uphold some notions (e.g. opportunism) at the cost of leaving others behind (e.g. economics of atmosphere). Rhetorical transactions like this have shaped TCE and its recognition in economics and related areas.
41 citations