Opportunism

About: Opportunism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2030 publications have been published within this topic receiving 97170 citations. The topic is also known as: opportunist.

The rhetoric of Oliver Williamson's transaction cost economics

Abstract: Bounded rationality, opportunism, the primacy of markets and the action of economizing are building blocks of Oliver Williamson's Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). As in all intellectual exchanges, Williamson has used a range of argumentative devices to set up and negotiate his basic notions and assumptions with economists. Rhetorical analysis is applied here to study his argumentation in a certain institutional context within economics. Negotiations with the mainstream, with the competence view of the firm and within the New Institutional Economics, for instance, have had an impact on the construction of TCE and are given attention here. Difficult decisions have been made in order to forge ahead with TCE, including whether to uphold some notions (e.g. opportunism) at the cost of leaving others behind (e.g. economics of atmosphere). Rhetorical transactions like this have shaped TCE and its recognition in economics and related areas.

Internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm

Abstract: The transaction cost analysis of the firm has identified asset idiosyncrasy and the risk of ex post opportunism as key determinants of organizational form Simultaneously, several writers have modeled the distribution of quasi-rents among input suppliers as a bargaining game These complementary ideas are used to formalize the notion of strategic innovation, where capital and labor attempt to redistribute firm income after specialized assets are in place, through unilateral modifications in production technology Because strategic behavior can enlarge the quasi-rent component of fifirm income, this process may persist in equilibrium Asset idiosyncrasy therefore creates room for an autonomous theory of organizational dynamics, partially insulated from events at the market level of analysis

Self‐Enforcing Union Contracts: Efficient Investment and Employment

Abstract: Unions: An Application of the Theory of Self- lead to underinvestEnforcing Contracts’’ (1983), provides a rich ment We show that set of strategies firm might employ to counter the punishments Baldunion opportunism in the context of long-lived win considers credible relation-specifi capital This work both antici- exclude tougher threats that only have the appated and in an important (dynamic) sense out- pearance of being selfflanke the collective voice view of unionism destructive If the (eg, Freeman and Medoff 1984) and the en- firm’ discount factor suing slew of union productivity effects studies is sufficientl close to (eg, Addison and Hirsch 1989) Our purpose one, union opportunism can indeed be dehere is to update Baldwin’s influentia work, re- terred Moreover, we newing it to incorporate advances in game theory show that given the that have taken hold since 1983 firm’ discount factor, Baldwin’s work has had staying power be- a shorter lifetime of cause it is a leading-edge application of the idea capital does not necessarily promote effi that long-term interests can form the foundation ciency Although, as for credible self-enforcement of contracts Her Baldwin emphasizes, it core conclusion is that the union’s temptation for does enhance the opportunistic conduct is strongest if the life of firm’ ability to punish sunk capital is long in relation to the union’s hori- union opportunism, it also creates adverse inzon Because unions represent current member- centives for the fir to ship and property rights in the unionare not trans- engage in opportunistic ferable, these tendencies are likely to prevail employment cuts

Public-Nonprofit Partnerships and North-South Green Finance:

Abstract: Environmental nongovernmental organizations working in partnership with the public and for-profit sectors are increasingly recognized as key players in international environmental politics and finance. This article examines a specific NGO partnership, the National Environmental Fund (NEF), which recently exploded in Latin America under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. This innovative institution is expected to increase economic efficiency by reducing transaction costs and fighting opportunism in North-South environmental finance. The article also highlights causes for concern and points to processes of distributional politics at work, alongside processes that may reinforce democracy.