Showing papers on "Optimal asymmetric encryption padding published in 1993"
IBM1
TL;DR: It is argued that the random oracles model—where all parties have access to a public random oracle—provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice, and yields protocols much more efficient than standard ones while retaining many of the advantages of provable security.
Abstract: We argue that the random oracle model—where all parties have access to a public random oracle—provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. In the paradigm we suggest, a practical protocol P is produced by first devising and proving correct a protocol PR for the random oracle model, and then replacing oracle accesses by the computation of an “appropriately chosen” function h. This paradigm yields protocols much more efficient than standard ones while retaining many of the advantages of provable security. We illustrate these gains for problems including encryption, signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs.
5,313 citations
4 citations
TL;DR: Two inherently different chosen-plaintext attacks are presented and it is shown that this joint authentication and encryption scheme appears to be less secure.
Abstract: In [LW91], Li and Wang proposed a joint authentication and encryption scheme based on algebraic coding theory. They claimed that their scheme is as secure as the Rao-Nam scheme [RN89]. However, in contrast with their claim, it will be shown that this joint authentication and encryption scheme appears to be less secure. In this paper two inherently different chosen-plaintext attacks are presented.
2 citations