Showing papers on "Otway–Rees protocol published in 1995"
TL;DR: Hwang and Chen examined the SLICE/AS authentification protocol and found two attacks, and again they describe a modification to the protocol that is independent of the encryption mechanism.
41 citations
TL;DR: It is claimed that using a uncertified key prudently can give performance advantages and not necessarily reduces the security of authentication protocols, as long as the validity of the key can be verified at the end of an authentication process.
Abstract: Most authentication protocols for distributed systems achieve identification and key distributions on the belief that the use of a uncertified key, i.e. the key whose freshness and authenticity cannot be immediately verified by its receiving principal while being received, should be avoided during the mid-way of an authentication process. In this paper we claim that using a uncertified key prudently can give performance advantages and not necessarily reduces the security of authentication protocols, as long as the validity of the key can be verified at the end of an authentication process. A nonce-based authentication protocol using uncertified keys is proposed. Its total number of messages is shown to be the minimal of all authentication protocols with the same formalized goals of authentication. The properties which make the protocol optimal in terms of message complexity are elaborated, and a formal logical analysis to the protocol is performed. The protocol is extended to counter the session key compromise problem and to support repeated authentication, in a more secure and flexible way without losing its optimality.
36 citations
27 Sep 1995
TL;DR: A new public-key user authentication protocol for mobile communication network is presented based on Harn, which overcomes the shortcomings of secret-key authentication protocol used in GSM and CT-2 systems, and has lower computational complexity and a higher security.
Abstract: A new public-key user authentication protocol for mobile communication network is presented based on Harn (see Electronics Letters, vol.30, no.5, p.396, 1994) proposed modified ElGa-mal signature system and Rabin cryptosystem. It overcomes the shortcomings of secret-key authentication protocol used in GSM and CT-2 systems, and a has lower computational complexity and a higher security.
12 citations
21 May 1995
TL;DR: The security of a 3-round protocol is proved and a new easy implementable construction which has a key size close to the fundamental lower bound for even extremely long messages is given.
Abstract: Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for unconditionally secure authentication of long messages. However Gehrmann showed that the proof of the security of the protocol was incorrect. Here we generalize the multiround protocol model. We prove the security of a 3-round protocol and give for this case a new easy implementable construction which has a key size close to the fundamental lower bound for even extremely long messages. Furthermore, we give a proof of a secure multiround protocol for an arbitrary number of rounds.
4 citations
TL;DR: A different approach is presented which has been accepted to be most tolerant to replays in distributed systems and a practical implementation of this replay-tolerance approach is described.
2 citations
01 Sep 1995
TL;DR: A novel notion of a fail-stop protocol is proposed, which automatically halts in response to any active attack that interferes with protocol execution, thus reducing protocol security analysis to that of passive attacks only.
Abstract: : We present a methodology to facilitate the design and analysis of secure cryptographic protocols. We advocate the general approach, and a new avenue for research, of restricting protocol designs to well-defined practices, instead of ever increasing the complexity of protocol security analysis mechanisms to deal with every newly discovered attack and the endless variations in protocol construction. In particular, we propose a novel notion of a fail-stop protocol, which automatically halts in response to any active attack that interferes with protocol execution, thus reducing protocol security analysis to that of passive attacks only. We suggest types of protocols that are fail-stop, outline some proof techniques for them, and use examples to illustrate how the notion of a fail-stop protocol can make protocol design easier and can provide a more solid basis for some available protocol analysis methods.
1 citations