Topic
Otway–Rees protocol
About: Otway–Rees protocol is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1975 publications have been published within this topic receiving 40569 citations.
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19 Jul 2013
TL;DR: This protocol can provide every bank user a safe and effective way to manage his own bank account, and also can effectively prevent the hacker attacks and bank clerk crime, so that it is absolute to guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of bank users.
Abstract: This paper describes a network identity authentication protocol of bank account system based on fingerprint identification and mixed encryption. This protocol can provide every bank user a safe and effective way to manage his own bank account, and also can effectively prevent the hacker attacks and bank clerk crime, so that it is absolute to guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of bank users.
3 citations
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15 Jun 2010TL;DR: The security of the proposed protocol is based on the no-cloning theorem, the correlations of quantum entanglement and the fact that the p-th root finding problem on braid groups is intractable even on quantum computers, as well as classical computers.
Abstract: The quantum secure direct communication is a new-style quantum communication scheme. It arouses much interest recently. The ping-pong protocol proposed by Bostroem and Felbinger is one of relatively mature quantum secure direct communication protocols, which is asymptotically secure under Eve's eavesdropping attack. But it ignores the message authentication. Being aimed at this problem, we propose a novel ping-pong protocol with authentication. The former has two operation modes, or the message mode and the control mode, which are used to send message and detect Eve's attack, respectively. But it just detects Eve's eavesdropping attack and does not authenticate the sent message in the control mode. The latter has also the above two operation modes, which employs a braid-based key agreement protocol for both the parties participating in communication to share a secret, whose size and magnitude are undecided in advance. Using the shared secret, it not only detects Eve's eavesdropping attack, but also effectively performs the message authentication in the control mode. It is also asymptotically secure under Eve's eavesdropping attack. The security of the proposed protocol is based on the no-cloning theorem, the correlations of quantum entanglement and the fact that the p-th root finding problem on braid groups is intractable even on quantum computers, as well as classical computers. In addition different from the original ping-pong protocol, the communication was initiated by the sender Alice instead of by the receiver Bob. This corresponds to the way of common communications. The present protocol not only can resist the attacks known recently, but should be experimentally feasible using today's technology.
3 citations
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12 Oct 2007TL;DR: A security protocol control apparatus includes a communication unit configured to perform a communication with a communication partner via a network, and a setting information generation unit configurable to, based on setting information for a first security protocol previously established, generate information for another security protocol that has not yet been established as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: A security protocol control apparatus includes a communication unit configured to perform a communication with a communication partner via a network, and a setting information generation unit configured to, based on setting information for a first security protocol previously established, generate, within the security protocol control apparatus, setting information for a second security protocol that has not yet been established.
3 citations
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TL;DR: It is pointed out that the 2GR protocol is still vulnerable to an impersonation attack, in which any attacker can, without stealing the verifiers, masquerade as a legitimate user.
Abstract: In 2004, Tsuji and Shimizu proposed a one-time password authentication protocol, named 2GR (Two-Gene-Relation password authentication protocol). The design goal of the 2GR protocol is to eliminate the stolen-verifier attack on SAS-2 (Simple And Secure password authentication protocol, ver.2) and the theft attack on ROSI (RObust and SImple password authentication protocol). Tsuji and Shimizu claimed that in the 2GR an attacker who has stolen the verifiers from the server cannot impersonate a legitimate user. This paper, however, will point out that the 2GR protocol is still vulnerable to an impersonation attack, in which any attacker can, without stealing the verifiers, masquerade as a legitimate user.
3 citations
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01 Jan 2007TL;DR: It is shown that the Wang-Mo protocol and the Yoon-Yoo protocol exist impersonation attack and are suitable for password-Authenticated Key Exchange in large-scale client-client communication environments.
Abstract: In large-scale client-client communication environments, Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) based on trusted server is very convenient in key management. For enhancing the efficiency and preventing various attacks, Wang and Mo proposed a three-PAKE protocol, Yoon and Yoo proposed a C2C-PAKE protocol. However, in this paper, we show that the Wang-Mo protocol and the Yoon-Yoo protocol exist impersonation attack.
3 citations