Paraconsistent logic

About: Paraconsistent logic is a(n) research topic. Over the lifetime, 1610 publication(s) have been published within this topic receiving 28842 citation(s).

A Useful Four-Valued Logic

Abstract: It is argued that a sophisticated question-answering machine that has the capability of making inferences from its data base should employ a certain four-valued logic, the motivating consideration being that minor inconsistencies in its data should not be allowed to lead (as in classical logic) to irrelevant conclusions. The actual form of the four-valued logic is ‘deduced’ from an interplay of this motivating consideration with certain ideas of Dana Scott concerning ‘approximation lattices.’

A logic for uncertain probabilities

Abstract: We first describe a metric for uncertain probabilities called opinion, and subsequently a set of logical operators that can be used for logical reasoning with uncertain propositions. This framework which is called subjective logic uses elements from the Dempster-Shafer belief theory and we show that it is compatible with binary logic and probability calculus.

A Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrosophic Logic.

Abstract: The author makes an introduction to non-standard analysis, then extends the dialectics to “neutrosophy” – which became a new branch of philosophy. This new concept helps in generalizing the intuitionistic, paraconsistent, dialetheism, fuzzy logic to “neutrosophic logic” – which is the first logic that comprises paradoxes and distinguishes between relative and absolute truth. Similarly, the fuzzy set is generalized to “neutrosophic set”. Also, the classical and imprecise probabilities are generalized to “neutrosophic probability”.

The logic of paradox

Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to suggest a new way of handling the logical paradoxes. Instead of trying to dissolve them, or explain what has gone wrong, we should accept them and learn to come to live with them. This is argued in Sections I and II. For obvious reasons this will require the abandonment, or at least modification, of 'classical' logic. A way to do this is suggested in Section III. Sections IV and V discuss some implications of this approach to paradoxes.