scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question

Showing papers on "Paraconsistent logic published in 1988"


Book
01 Jan 1988

218 citations


Proceedings Article
21 Aug 1988
TL;DR: It is shown that classical logic is inappropriate for hypothetical reasoning and an alternative logic for this purpose is developed, which is a subset of intuitionistic logic having semantic properties similar to those of Horn-clause logic.
Abstract: This paper shows that classical logic is inappropriate for hypothetical reasoning and develops an alternative logic for this purpose. The paper focuses on a form of hypothetical reasoning which appears computationally tractable. Specifically, Horn-clause logic is augmented with rules, called embedded implications, which can hypothetically add atomic formulas to a rulebase. By introducing the notion of rulebase independence, it is shown that these rules can express hypothetical queries which classical logic cannot. By adopting methods from modal logic, these rules are then shown to be intuitionistic. In particular, they form a subset of intuitionistic logic having semantic properties similar to those of Horn-clause logic.

26 citations


Book
31 Dec 1988
TL;DR: In this article, a standard system of Deontic logic is presented, where weak and strong permission is given to negation of normative expressions: Weak and Strong Permission Particularly in Law.
Abstract: I Logic.- II Normative Judgements.- III the Possibility of Deontic Logic.- IV Prolegomena for a Deontic Logic.- V A Standard System of Deontic Logic.- VI The Norm-Content of the Standard System.- VII The Negation of Normative Expressions: Weak and Strong Permission, Particularly in Law.- VIII Conditional Norms.- IX The Meaning of Logic for Normative Reasoning.- Notes.- Index of names.- Index of subjects.- A few of the used concepts.

19 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 1988
TL;DR: Paraconsistent logics have been suggested as the proper way to remove this impediment and to make explication of the logic of inconsistent scientific theories possible as mentioned in this paper, but this is not a necessary or sufficient condition for giving a philosophical alternative.
Abstract: Inconsistent representations of the world have in fact played and should play a role in scientific inquiry. However, it would seem that logical analysis of such representations is blocked by the explosive nature of deductive inference from inconsistent premisses. "Paraconsistent logics" have been suggested as the proper way to remove this impediment and to make explication of the logic of inconsistent scientific theories possible. I argue that installing paraconsistent logic as the underlying logic for scientific inquiry is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for giving a philosophical alternative, I suggest that identification of heuristic strategies, based on the network of confirming evidence for inconsistent proposals for reasoning from such proposals to their consistent replacements is the proper way to explicate their function in science.

9 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
01 Mar 1988
TL;DR: Five axioms for reasoning about a decision maker's preferences are presented and both logical deduction and a modification of dynamic programming are proposed for the problem of selecting preferred states of affairs over time.
Abstract: Logic modeling is the use of formal logic as a modeling tool for problems of interest to management science. Based on a review of the logic of preference literature this paper presents five axioms for reasoning about a decision maker's preferences. A semantics of situations is adopted for the symbols used. Both logical deduction and a modification of dynamic programming are proposed for the problem of selecting preferred states of affairs over time. Finally, a sketch of an implementation in Prolog is presented.

5 citations