Topic
Paraconsistent logic
About: Paraconsistent logic is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1610 publications have been published within this topic receiving 28842 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
3 citations
TL;DR: The logic of projective identification is explored, which is assumed plays the central role in the logic of the unconscious, and contemporary modal and relevant logics, in particular Graham Priest's logic of intentionality are explored.
3 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that Ayer's criterion of meaning can be defended from classical proofs of its triviality by the adoption of a relevant logic, an idea which is motivated because, according to Ayer, the genuinely factual statements are those which observation is.
Abstract: A. J. Ayer’s empiricist criterion of meaning was supposed to have sorted all statements into nonsense on the one hand, and tautologies or genuinely factual statements on the other. Unfortunately for Ayer, it follows from classical logic that his criterion is trivial – it classifies all statements as either tautologies or genuinely factual, but none as nonsense. However, in this paper I argue that Ayer’s criterion of meaning can be defended from classical proofs of its triviality by the adoption of a relevant logic – an idea which is motivated because, according to Ayer, the genuinely factual statements are those which observation is
3 citations
01 Jan 2019
TL;DR: The idea of proof-theoretic semantics is extended to these logics and it is argued that the meanings of the connectives in BLE are given by the fact that its rules are concerned with preservation of the availability of evidence.
Abstract: Proof-theoretic semantics provides meanings to the connectives of intuitionistic logic without the need for a semantics in the standard sense of an attribution of semantic values to formulas. Meanings are given by the inference rules that, in this case, do not express preservation of truth but rather preservation of availability of a constructive proof. Elsewhere we presented two paraconsistent systems of natural deduction: the Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE) and the Logic of Evidence and Truth (\(LET_{J}\)). The rules of BLE have been conceived to preserve a notion weaker than truth, namely, evidence, understood as reasons for believing in or accepting a given proposition. \(LET_{J}\), on the other hand, is a logic of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness that extends \(BLE\) by adding resources to recover classical logic for formulas taken as true, or false. We extend the idea of proof-theoretic semantics to these logics and argue that the meanings of the connectives in BLE are given by the fact that its rules are concerned with preservation of the availability of evidence. An analogous idea also applies to \(LET_{J}\).
3 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the Brandenburger-keisler paradox in epistemic game theory and provide models in which the paradox is solved, using non-well-founded set theory and paraconsistent logic.
Abstract: In this article, we discuss a well-known self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory, the Brandenburger-Keisler paradox. We approach the paradox from two different perspectives, non-well-founded set theory and paraconsistent logic, and provide models in which the paradox is solved.
3 citations