Topic
Paraconsistent logic
About: Paraconsistent logic is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1610 publications have been published within this topic receiving 28842 citations.
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TL;DR: By a system of law, this paper means any system of rules which has the purpose of regulating human action under certain conditions, including a nation's constitution, the traffic laws, club’s statutes, recipes in a cook-book, etc.
Abstract: By a system of law we shall mean — in this paper — any system of rules which has the purpose of regulating human action under certain conditions. Examples: A nation’s constitution, the traffic laws, club’s statutes, recipes in a cook-book, etc.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the main arguments why to be a dialetheist are discussed, and the argument proceeds by setting out basic principles of assertion and denial, and employing bivalent truth value operators.
Abstract: In the first part the paper rehearses the main arguments why to be a dialetheist (i.e. why to assume that some contradictions are true). Dialetheism, however, has been criticised as irrational or self-refutating. Therefore the second part of the paper outlines one way to make dialetheism rational assertable. True contradictions turn out to be both believable and assertable. The argument proceeds by setting out basic principles of assertion and denial, and employing bivalent truth value operators.
2 citations
2 citations
01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: The general notion of a paraconsistent logic is introduced, and an analysis of set-assignment semantics for J 3 will highlight the way in which the general framework for semantics of Chapter IV uses falsity as a default truth-value.
Abstract: A paraconsistent logic is one in which a nontrivial theory may include both a proposition and its negation. I will first introduce the general notion of a paraconsistent logic, and then analyze in detail the 3-valued paraconsistent logic J 3 . I will axiomatize J 3 , and in doing so will suggest that paraconsistent logics are inconsistent only with respect to classical semantics, not with respect to their own formal or informal semantic notions. An analysis of set-assignment semantics for J 3 will highlight the way in which the general framework for semantics of Chapter IV uses falsity as a default truth-value.
2 citations