About: Patrimonialism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 292 publications have been published within this topic receiving 14378 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers in the context of social norms and economic action in the social sciences, and propose several categories of economic action.
Abstract: List of Abbreviations Volume 1 Preface to the 1978 Re-issue Preface Introduction Part One: Conceptual Exposition I. Basic Sociological Terms II. Sociological Categories of Economic Action III. The Types of Legitimate Domination IV. Status Groups and Classes Part Two: The Economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers I. The Economy and Social Norms II. The Economic Relationships of Organized Groups III. Household, Neighborhood and Kin Group IV. Household, Enterprise and Oikos V. Ethnic Groups VI. Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion) VII. The Market: Its Impersonality and Ethic (Fragment) Volume 2 VII. Economy and Law (The Sociology of Law) IX. Political Communities X. Domination and Legitimacy XI. Bureaucracy XII. Patriarchalism and Patrimonialism XIII. Feudalism, Standestaat and Patrimonialism XIV. Charisma and Its Transformation XV. Political and Hierocratic Domination XVI. The City (Non-Legitimate Domination) Appendices Index
TL;DR: Levitsky et al. as mentioned in this paper developed a framework for studying informal institutions and integrating them into comparative institutional analysis, based on a typology of four patterns of formal-informal institutional interaction: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive.
Abstract: Mainstream comparative research on political institutions focuses primarily on formal rules. Yet in many contexts, informal institutions, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patrimonialism, shape even more strongly political behavior and outcomes. Scholars who fail to consider these informal rules of the game risk missing many of the most important incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior. In this article we develop a framework for studying informal institutions and integrating them into comparative institutional analysis. The framework is based on a typology of four patterns of formal-informal institutional interaction: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive. We then explore two issues largely ignored in the literature on this subject: the reasons and mechanisms behind the emergence of informal institutions, and the nature of their stability and change. Finally, we consider challenges in research on informal institutions, including issues of identification, measurement, and comparison.Gretchen Helmke's book Courts Under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina, will be published by Cambridge University Press. Steven Levitsky is the author of Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective and is currently writing a book on competitive authoritarian regimes in the post–Cold War era. The authors thank the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame for generously sponsoring conferences on informal institutions. The authors also gratefully acknowledge comments from Jorge Dominguez, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Dennis Galvan, Goran Hyden, Jack Knight, Lisa Martin, Hillel Soifer, Benjamin Smith, Susan Stokes, Maria Victoria Murillo, and Kurt Weyland, as well as three anonymous reviewers and the editors of Perspectives on Politics.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the RPF-led regime's private business operations centred on the holding company known successively as TriStar Investments and Crystal Ventures Ltd and conclude that Rwanda should be seen as a developmental patrimonial state.
Abstract: Academic debate on Rwanda has significant thematic gaps, and does not usually make use of a theoretically informed comparative framework. This article addresses one thematic gap – the distinctive approach of the RPF-led regime to political involvement in the private sector of the economy. It does so using the framework of a cross-national study which aims to distinguish between more and less developmental forms of neopatrimonial politics. The article analyses the RPF’s private business operations centred on the holding company known successively as TriStar Investments and Crystal Ventures Ltd. These operations are shown to involve the kind of centralized generation and management of economic rents that has distinguished the more developmental regimes of Asia and Africa. The operations of the military investment company Horizon and of the public–private consortium Rwanda Investment Group may be seen in a similar light. With some qualifications, we conclude that Rwanda should be seen as a developmental patrimonial state.
TL;DR: The use of the terms patrimonial and neopatrimonial in the context of Africa are conceptually problematical and amount to a serious misreading of Weber as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Current usages of the terms patrimonial and neopatrimonial in the context of Africa are conceptually problematical and amount to a serious misreading of Weber. His use of the term patrimonial delineated a legitimate type of authority, not a type of regime, and included notions of reciprocity and voluntary compliance between rulers and the ruled. Those reciprocities enabled subjects to check the actions of rulers, which most analyses of (neo) patrimonialism overlook. We apply these insights to a case study of Botswana and suggest that scholars reconsider the application of Weber's concepts to African states. Introduction Is "neopatrimonialism" a pathology, analogy, cause, effect - or a term for all of Africa's troubles? How is it linked to Weber's notion of patrimonial authority, and what parts of it, precisely, are "neo"? Is it an attribute of most African states only, or are its causes and consequences generalizable to other countries and regions of the world? Indeed, given its myriad uses by scholars, does the term neopatrimonialism retain any analytical utility at all? We argue that the answer to that last question is "yes" - but that the meaning and its implications can be surprising. We begin with a survey of the uses and misuses of neopatrimonialism as an idea, and of the analytical and policy consequences that may flow from its abuse. We then return to Weber to explore the core concept of patrimonial authority. Our focus - like Weber's over a century ago - is on the contrasting ways rulers may establish legitimate authority by securing consent (compliance) from their subjects. Throughout the analysis we draw a distinction between types of authority and types of regime - the latter referring to the means by which positions of power are filled in a state and the degree to which citizens are allowed to participate in that process. Larry Diamond's classification (2002), extending from liberal democracies to politically closed authoritarian regimes, embodies well our understanding of regime types. We suggest that many applications of neopatrimonialism wrongly assume a direct causal connection between types of authority and types of regime, or even treat the two as synonymous. To illustrate the fundamental difference between the two, and to illustrate the critical role of human agency in shaping both, we examine the case of Botswana, where a modern democratic state has been erected on historical foundations of patrimonial authority. We conclude by exploring some implications of our analysis, arguing that a misreading of Weber has turned African countries into examples of an imagined common pathology and caused a mistaken identification of this pathology with a type of legitimacy or authority. As deGrassi (2008) has noted, too often the term neopatrimonialism is invoked in the absence of detailed historical and ethnographic attention to particular times and places. Scholars consequently ignore variations in the interactions of power and accountability within African states that might lend themselves to insightful comparisons with countries elsewhere. Diverse Roots of Legitimacy For Weber, patrimonialism was not a synonym for corruption, "bad governance," violence, tribalism, or a weak state. It was instead a specific form of authority and source of legitimacy. Weber (1947 ) defined power (Macht) as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (152).1 While he understood such power as pervading all human interactions, he was fascinated with how certain structural positions were allocated the right to expect compliance by others - or "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (1947:152). Almost all structural subordinates retain some power to resist or subvert the desires of those in authority, but they also agree that certain individuals are entitled to their obedience. …
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: Schloen et al. as discussed by the authors conducted a societal and domestic study of the Late Bronze Age kingdom of Ugarit in its wider Near Eastern context, focusing on the interpretation of social action and households in the ancient world.
Abstract: The first two volumes on patrimonialism in Ugarit and the ancient Near East, this book opens with a lengthy introduction on the interpretation of social action and households in the ancient world. Following this foundation, Schloen embarks on a societal and domestic study of the Late Bronze Age kingdom of Ugarit in its wider Near Eastern context.
Trending Questions (6)