Topic
Preimage attack
About: Preimage attack is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 483 publications have been published within this topic receiving 13576 citations.
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TL;DR: Tan and Wong as discussed by the authors proposed the generalized FPT-ROM (GFPT-ROM) which intended to capture the chosen prefix collision attack suggested by Stevens et al. (EUROCRYPT 2007).
Abstract: Weakened random oracle models (WROMs) are variants of the random oracle model (ROM). The WROMs have the random oracle and the additional oracle which breaks some property of a hash function. Analyzing the security of cryptographic schemes in WROMs, we can specify the property of a hash function on which the security of cryptographic schemes depends. Liskov (SAC 2006) proposed WROMs and later Numayama et al. (PKC 2008) formalized them as CT-ROM, SPT-ROM, and FPT-ROM. In each model, there is the additional oracle to break collision resistance, second preimage resistance, preimage resistance respectively. Tan and Wong (ACISP 2012) proposed the generalized FPT-ROM (GFPT-ROM) which intended to capture the chosen prefix collision attack suggested by Stevens et al. (EUROCRYPT 2007). In this paper, in order to analyze the security of cryptographic schemes more precisely, we formalize GFPT-ROM and propose additional three WROMs which capture the chosen prefix collision attack and its variants. In particular, we focus on signature schemes such as RSA-FDH, its variants, and DSA, in order to understand essential roles of WROMs in their security proofs.
Proceedings Article•
01 Oct 2013TL;DR: This paper presents an attack on all the members of HaF family with negligible complexity, and shows that the improved function (without the critical transformation) is still insecure.
Abstract: HaF is a family of hash functions developed by prof. Stoklosa and his team from Institute of Control and Information Engineering of Poznan University of Technology. HaF is classical Merkle-Damgard construction with output sizes of 256, 512 or 1024 bits. In this paper we will present an attack on all the members of HaF family with negligible complexity (collision for all the members can be found without using a computer). We will also show that the improved function (without the critical transformation) is still insecure. It is possible to find a preimage for short messages. We can also create some fixed points, with a complexity of single compression function call.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This attack is a meet-in-the-middle attack that uses a range of novel techniques to split the function into two independent parts that can be computed separately and then matched in a birthday-style phase.
Abstract: In this paper, we present a preimage attack for 42 stepreduced SHA-256 with time complexity 2 and memory requirements of order 2. The same attack also applies to 42 step-reduced SHA-512 with time complexity 2 and memory requirements of order 2. Our attack is meet-in-the-middle preimage attack.