Showing papers on "Principal (commercial law) published in 2010"

Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship

Abstract: In the standard economic analysis of the principal-agent relationship, principals are assumed to hire agents because delegation confers efficiencies, as the agent either possesses special ability or has a lower opportunity cost of time or effort. The central focus of the literature on principal agent relationships has been on how to design monitoring and incentive schemes that enable these advantages to be realized despite the fact that agents typically face different incentives and possess different information than the principals who employ them (Paul R. Milgrom and John Roberts 1992; Patrick Bolton and Mathias F. Dewatripont 2005). This paper examines whether the principal-agent relationship might in some cases serve a function unrelated to efficiency. Specifically, a principal may hire an agent to take self-interested or immoral actions that the principal would be reluctant to take more directly. The principal may feel more detached, and hence less responsible, for such an action if it is delegated, while the agent may feel that he or she was "just carrying out orders" or merely fulfilling the requirement of an employment contract. Through the use of agents, therefore, accountability for morally questionable behavior can become vertically diffused, with no individual taking responsibility. While this function of agency has not been fully investigated in the economics literature, it is commonplace in popular accounts of behavior in domains as diverse as politics, business, war, and everyday social interaction. Companies are often accused of outsourcing production and other functions to outside firms that act less ethically than the company would act itself?for example, by treating workers less generously.1 Executives and stockholders of the outsourcing company may turn a blind eye toward the actions of the outside firms, remaining deliberately uninformed, or at least pretending to be. Recent press stories have noted the increasing use of "firing consultants," who often serve little role other than carrying out the act of firing employ ees2. Moreover, firm managers who act unethically may justify such behavior through their role as shareholders' agents (Tara J. Radin and Martin Calkins 2006). Within firms or other organizations, high-level decision makers are often accused of tacitly encouraging unethical or illegal behaviors, while shielding themselves from knowledge and

Rethinking Agency Theory: The View from Law

Abstract: We draw from legal theory to offer a fundamental rethinking of agency theory along three key dimensions: redefining the principal from shareholders to the corporation, redefining the status of the board from shareholders' agents to autonomous fiduciaries, and redefining the role of the board from monitors to mediating hierarchs. These dimensions contrast with classic agency theory, offering novel conceptions that can inform further theorization and empirical research in corporate governance.

Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner

Abstract: The ESIL Conference at which this article was originally presented as the Keynote Speech was devoted to the topic of " International Law in a Heterogeneous World " . The article attempts to demonstrate that heterogeneity does not exclude the universality of international law, as long as the law retains - and further develops - its capacity to accommodate an ever larger measure of such heterogeneity. After developing three different conceptions, or levels, of what the term ' universality ' of international law is intended to capture, the article focuses on international rules, (particularly judicial) mechanisms, and international institutions which serve the purpose of reconciling heterogeneous values and expectations by means of international law. The article links a critical evaluation of these ways and means with the dif- ferent notions of universality by inquiring how they cope with the principal challenges faced by these notions. In so doing, it engages a number of topics which have become immensely popular in contemporary international legal writing, here conceived as challenges to univer- sality: the so-called ' fragmentation ' of international law; in close connection with this fi rst buzzword the challenges posed by what is called the ' proliferation ' of international courts and tribunals; and, fi nally, certain recent problems faced by individuals who fi nd themselves at the fault lines of emerging multi-level international governance. The article concludes that these challenges have not prevented international law from forming a (by and large coher- ent) legal system. Most concerns about the dangers of fragmentation appear overstated. As for the ' proliferation ' of international judicial institutions, the debate on fragmentation has made international judges even more aware of the responsibility they bear for a coherent con- struction of international law. They have managed to develop a set of tools for coping with the * Judge at the International Court of Justice. This article was originally presented as the Keynote Speech at

Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties

Abstract: 1 Prologue 2 Points of Departure I. Form of Analysis II. Subject Matter of Analysis A. Historical Analogies B. Modern Approach i. Genesis and Gestation ii. Justification 1 3 Peculiarly Fiduciary Duties I. Duty to Perform the Task Undertaken II. Duties of Care and Skill III. Conflict and Profit Principles IV. Good Faith V. Proper Purposes Doctrine VI. Fiduciary Powers VII. Duty to Act in Good Faith in the Principal's Best Interests 4 Fiduciary Loyalty I. Introduction II. Subsidiary Prophylactic Protection A. Protective Function B. Prophylaxis C. Subsidiarity III. Remedies A. Rescission and Profit-Stripping i. Rescission ii. Accounts of Profits and Constructive Trusts iii. Connection with Fiduciary Protection B. Compensation for Loss i. Availability ii. Causation and Loss iii. Connection with Fiduciary Protection IV. Critics 5 Fiduciary Doctrine and Morality I. General Observations II. The Argument from History III. The Profit Principle A. Existence of the Profit Principle B. Relationship to the Conflict Principle IV. The Fair-Dealing Rule A. The Self-Dealing Rule B. The Fair-Dealing Rule i. References to 'Fairness' ii. Non-Critical Relevance of 'Fairness' iii. Fairness as Evidence of Full Disclosure iv. Relationship to the Self-Dealing Rule and Conflict Principle V. The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine 6 Conflicts between Inconsistent Duties I. Origins II. Content and Function A. Potential Conflicts B. Actual Conflicts C. Inhibition i. Pattern of Liability ii. Function III. Remedies A. Stopping Further Action B. Rescission of Resultant Transaction C. Forfeiture of Fees and Other Profits i. Fees Paid by the Non-claimant Principal ii. Fees Paid by the Claimant Principal D. Equitable Compensation i. Availability and Function ii. Identifying Loss iii. Contributory Fault 7 Implications I. Scope of Fiduciary Duties II. The Vital Nature of Non-fiduciary Duties A. Consequence of the Protective Function B. Potential Counter-examples i. Preventing Circumvention of Fiduciary Protection ii. Solicitors Cases iii. Negotiations towards Joint Ventures iv. Bare Trusts III. Proscriptive Duties IV. Authorisation V. Critiques of Fiduciary Doctrine 8 Conceptual Affinities I. Contract and Fiduciary Doctrine II. Torts and Fiduciary Doctrine A. Fiduciary Doctrine and Negligence B. Surrogacy for Tort Law Generally i. Cause of Action Surrogacy ii. Civil Wrongs III. Undue Influence and Confidence A. Undue Influence B. Confidence 9 The Incidence of Fiduciary Duties I. Academic Commentators A. Acting on Behalf of Another B. Discretion and Power C. Reasonable Expectations D. Limited Access II. Turning Theory into Practice A. Judicial Applications B. Relevant Considerations 10 Epilogue

A Case for Percentage Commission Contracts: The Impact of a “Race” Among Agents

Abstract: In standard principal-agent problems, the issue at hand is how to align the interests of the agent with those of her principal. A commonly used contract involves the principal paying the agent a percentage of the sale price as commission. With respect to real estate brokerage contracts, it has been argued that percentage commission contracts fail to provide sufficient incentives to the agent. This paper re-evaluates the standard solution to a one seller, one agent agency problem by introducing more than one agent. It is shown that percentage commission contracts can induce first-best effort levels from agents. The result is due to the negative externalities created by the winner-takes-all race among agents. The optimal commission rates in this model are inconsistent, however, with the observed uniformity in commission rates across markets in the USA.

Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety

Abstract: This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because it induces the efficient agent to supply the level of safety effort equivalent to the first best solution. The counterpart is the perception of an informational rent by the efficient agent. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal.

‘Sports Law’: Implications for the Development of International, Comparative, and National Law and Global Dispute Resolution

Abstract: In this article we observe that legal regulation of national and international sports competition has become extremely complex and has entered a new era, which provides fertile ground for the creation and evolution of broader legal jurisprudence with potentially widespread influence and application. Our principal aim is to draw these developments to the attention of legal scholars and attorneys not necessarily familiar with sports law. Specifically, the evolving law of sports is having a significant influence on the development of international and national laws, is establishing a body of substantive legal doctrine ripe for analysis from a comparative law perspective, and has important implications for global dispute resolution. For example, the global processes used to establish an international sports anti-doping code and to resolve a broad range of Olympic and international sports disputes (which is rapidly creating a body of private international law) provide paradigms of international cooperation and global law-making. In addition, judicial resolution of sports-related cases may develop jurisprudence with new applications and influence. Our objective is to generate greater awareness of the importance of sports, not only as a worldwide cultural phenomenon and a significant part of the 21st century global economy, but as a rich source of international and national public and private laws that provide models for establishing, implementing, and enforcing global legal norms.

Disobedience and Authority

Abstract: This article presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We extend the concept of real authority by observing that not only does the principal have to be informed to give an order but also the worker must be willing to follow the order. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they have no better information than the principal. The allocation of authority thus depends on external market conditions as well as the information and agency problems emphasized in the literature. We explore the implications of this insight for hiring policies and managerial styles. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Incentive Contracts with Enforcement Costs

Abstract: Legal enforcement of contracts is expensive and therefore parties will typically negotiate to avoid these costs. However, if negotiation takes place under asymmetric information, enforcement will occur in some states. We study a simple principal-agent model with risk neutrality and limited liability and assume costly, nonautomatic enforcement and private information by the principal. We show that the form of the contract systematically affects the likelihood of proceeding to court. In order to reduce the probability of enforcement, an optimal incentive contract must be one step. In addition, the principal may leave the agent with some surplus and effort will typically deviate from the productively efficient level. (JEL D82, D86, K40) The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model

Abstract: Over the past several decades, the federal procurement system in the United States has grown remarkably, and now totals over $500 billion annually. Over that same period, the rules governing federal procurement have been buffeted by broad efforts at reform. At no point, however, have we ever had an overarching theory - a model or prism - through which to assess the procurement system or its reform. Agency theory provides one such theoretical model. Long established in economics and the other social sciences, the principal-agent model (agency theory) provides a model to explain successes (and failures) in organizational structures, and also to understand the procurement system and its rules. The theory builds upon the classic principal-agent model. A principal enlists an agent to carry out the principal’s goals, presumably because the agent enjoys some comparative advantage in performing the goals. Inevitably, however, the agent’s interests diverge from the principal’s; if the agent’s goals diverge sufficiently, the agent may be said to have a conflict of interest. This article employs agency theory to assess classic constructs of procurement law, such as Steven Schooner's desiderata, and argues that the theory can be used to solve future puzzles in procurement policy, and to predict where procurement policies are likely to fail - and to succeed.

Menuju Teori Stewardship Manajemen

Abstract: Agency theory assumes that there are two parties involved in the existence of the company, namely the principal and agent. In the analogy in this case, principals are shareholders while the agent is a manager of the company concerned. In agency theory, the assumptions used are self serving, meaning that both principal and agent, will attempt to fulfill their interests (maximum utility). Stewardship theory comes from a different model of human behavior that is applied within an organization. Both models of behavior are self-serving behavior model and the model pro-organizational behavior. Agency theory developed on the basis of the assumption of self-serving, while the stewardship theory is more based on the assumption that a manager will act in accordance with what is to be achieved by a company (pro-organizational behavior). The selection pattern of the relationship between principal and agent may be analogous, such as game theory analysis. In this election both agents and principals face the state of "Prisoner's dilemma". Where both agents mapun principals can not maximize utility at the expense of each other party utilities. This will lead to demotivation in other parties, which ultimately will affect the company's overall performance. The right choice, it is good or agent prinscipal choose to have a separate agency or stewardship relationships separate. Each of these options will have an impact on the potential cost minimization and maximization of potential performance. Key words : agency theory, stewardship theory, corporate performance

Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation

Abstract: We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifiable performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties the pure threat of using the legal system may suffice to make the principal implement first-best effort. As is shown in the paper, this .finding is rather robust. In particular, it holds for situations where the agent is protected by limited liability, where the parties have different technologies in the litigation contest, or where the agent is risk averse.

Joint Criminal Enterprise

Abstract: The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is in disarray. Despite repeated judicial scrutiny at the highest level, the doctrine's scope, proper doctrinal basis and function in relation to other modes of complicity remain uncertain. This article examines the doctrine's elements and underlying principles. It argues that while joint criminal enterprise is largely used to make individuals liable for offences committed by their associates in excess of the common criminal purpose, its proper function is to police the limits of associate liability and thus to exculpate rather than inculpate. The doctrine governs not only instances of accessorial liability; it also applies where the parties involved are joint principal offenders. As this puts into question the prevalent view that joint criminal enterprise is a form of secondary participation that results in accessorial liability, the article concludes that it is best seen as a doctrine sui generis.

How are the interests of incapacitated research participants protected through legislation? An Italian study on legal agency for dementia patients.

Abstract: BACKGROUND Patients with dementia may have limited capacity to give informed consent to participate in clinical research. One possible way to safeguard the patients' interests in research is the involvement of a proxy in the recruitment process. In Italy, the system of proxy is determined by the courts. In this study we evaluate the timing for appointment of a legal proxy in Italy and identify predictive variables of appointment. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS Subjects were recruited among the outpatients seeking medical advice for cognitive complaints at the Centre for Research and Treatment of Cognitive Dysfunctions, University of Milan, "Luigi Sacco" Hospital. The Centre was participating to the AdCare Study, a no-profit randomised clinical trial coordinated by the Italian National Institute of Health. The requirement that informed consent be given by a legal representative dramatically slowed down the recruitment process in AdCare, which was prematurely interrupted. The Centre for Research and Treatment of Cognitive Dysfunctions collected data on the timing required to appoint the legal representatives. Patients diagnosed with dementia and their caregivers were provided information on the Italian law on legal agency (law 6/2004). At each scheduled check-up the caregiver was asked whether she/he had applied to appoint a legal proxy for the patient and the time interval between the presentation of the law, the registration of the application at the law court chancellery and the sentence of appointment was registered. The study involved 169 demented patients. Seventy-eight patients (46.2%) applied to appoint a legal proxy. These subjects were usually younger, had been suffering from dementia for a longer time, had less than two children and made more use of memantine. The mean interval time between the presentation of the law and the patients' application to the law court chancellery was two months. The mean interval time between the patient's application to the law court chancellery and the sentence of appointment was four months. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE In Italy the requirement that legal representatives be appointed by the courts slows down subjects' participation in research. Other procedures for legal agency of the incapacitated patients may be adopted, taking as examples other EU countries' systems.

Autopoiesis and General Anti-Avoidance Rules

Abstract: Autopoiesis is a post-modern, essentially positivist theory that tries to describe the true nature of law. Its principal tenets are the ideas of self-reproductive growth from reasoning that is self-referential and recursive, relative autonomy from, and “operative closure” against, other social systems, together with “cognitive openness” to “irritation” and to “noise” from outside the closed circle of the law. The authors are skeptical about the ability of autopoiesis theory to illuminate the nature of law in general, but see it as shedding useful light on income tax law, particularly the quality that income tax law shows in inventing legal structures that have no reality beyond the world of fiscal affairs. The authors argue that the general anti-avoidance rule punctures the autonomy and closure of income tax law, to allow the substantive norms of the economic and business system free play, or relatively free play, within tax cases. That is, while income tax law is in general a good example of legal autopoiesis, this observation is incorrect when a general anti-avoidance rule is in play. Two implications for accounting are (a) that the operative closure of law results in a disconnection between income tax law and accountancy, and (b) that a general anti-avoidance rule may repair this disconnection in cases where accountancy records are governed by substance rather than form.

The cost of moral hazard and limited liability in the principal-agent problem

Abstract: In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal hires an agent to perform a task. The principal cares about the task's output but has no control over it. The agent can perform the task at different effort intensities, and that choice affects the task's output. To provide an incentive to the agent to work hard and since his effort intensity cannot be observed, the principal ties the agent's compensation to the task's output. If both the principal and the agent are risk-neutral and no further constraints are imposed, it is well-known that the outcome of the game maximizes social welfare. In this paper we quantify the potential social-welfare loss due to the existence of limited liability, which takes the form of a minimum wage constraint. To do so we rely on the worst-case welfare loss--commonly referred to as the Price of Anarchy--which quantifies the (in)efficiency of a system when its players act selfishly (i.e., they play a Nash equilibrium) versus choosing a socially-optimal solution. Our main result establishes that under the monotone likelihood-ratio property and limited liability constraints, the worst-case welfare loss in the principal-agent model is exactly equal to the number of efforts available.

Adakah perilaku oportunistik dalam aplikasi agency theory di sektor publik

Abstract: Implementation of regional autonomy in Indonesia based on Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999. The implementation of regional autonomy opportunities application research agency theory in public budgeting. The legislature is a principal party to the executive but also as agent for Voters. The occurrence of asymmetry of information between the executive and legislative branches to be not of much value when the legislature uses discretionary power in budgeting. Agents have more information about the actual performance, motivation, and purpose, potentially creating moral hazard and adverse selection. Principals themselves must pay (costs) to monitor agency performance and determine the structure of incentives and efficient monitoring. The existence of information asymmetry between executive-legislative and legislative-voter lead the opening of space for the occurrence of opportunistic behavior in the budgeting process.

Fairness in Delegated Bargaining

Abstract: This article examines whether a principal prefers to hire a fair or a selfish agent. A fair agent cares to some extent for the well-being of other people and thus he also cares for the principal. Therefore, if the agent performs individual work, the principal is always better off to hire a fair agent. However, we show that when a third party with conflicting interests is introduced, it may be advantageous for the principal to hire a selfish agent. The reason is that the selfish agent will be a tough bargainer not only when negotiating his employment contract with the principal but also when dealing with the third party, for example, when selling the principal's product to a buyer.

Prescription and Proscription in Fiduciary Obligations

Abstract: Recent case law and scholarship has reignited the debate about whether fiduciary obligations are purely proscriptive in character. In particular, Rebecca Lee has suggested that fiduciary obligations have a prescriptive and 'directional' dimension. This article argues that the purely proscriptive understanding of fiduciary obligations represents the better understanding of English and Australian law. The argument rests upon three pillars. First, the proscriptive paradigm confines fiduciary obligations to their proper place within the broader complex of legal duties owed by those who undertake to act in the interests of other. Secondly, while it is often stated that fiduciaries have obligations to make full disclosure of relevant facts to their principals, an examination of the structure of fiduciary liability reveals that the disclosure rule functions as a subsidiary rule which removes the relevant activities from the scope of the proscription. Finally, the proscriptive character of fiduciary obligations is reflected in the remedies which are awarded for breach of fiduciary duty. Contrary to the position taken by some advocates of the proscription thesis (such as Matthew Conaglen), the author argues that the remedial rationale in breach of fiduciary duty cases is rescission (or elimination of the effect of the transaction) as between principal and fiduciary rather than deterrence of the fiduciary.

The Law of Return at Sixty Years: History, Ideology, Justification

Abstract: The Law of Return, passed unanimously by the Knesset with much excitement and elation in 1950 on the day commemorating Theodor Herzl, establishes the principle that 'every Jew is entitled to come to this country as an Oleh' and lays the foundation for the preference given to Jews in Aliyah and in the acquisition of citizenship in Israel. The law is considered one of the primary expressions of Israel as a Jewish state. In this position paper the author rejects the principal claim of the law's opponents, that the preference given to Jews in Aliyah to Israel is either unjustified or needs to be limited in time. The author surveys the development of the specific arrangements stipulated by the Law of Return. She points to difficulties arising in three basic areas: the quasi-halachic definition of a 'Jew' established by the 1970 amendment to law, according to which a 'Jew' is one who was born to a Jewish mother or who converted to Judaism and is not a member of another religion; the extension of Aliyah eligibility to include the family members of a Jew up to the third generation even if they themselves have no connection to the Jewish people; the fact that individuals who are eligible for Aliyah acquire citizenship immediately and automatically upon making Aliyah. The author recommends preserving the principle and even raising it to a constitutional level, while re-examining the specific arrangements included in the Law of Return and the level of their regulation. As long as there is no such constitutional change the author does not support any alteration in the Law of Return itself, but rather recommends achieving the desired results through forming appropriate Aliyah and absorption policies.

Economic aspects of personal injury compensation in Ireland

Abstract: Victims of events including road accidents, workplace injuries and medical negligence are compensated in the Irish legal system through once-off lump-sum awards. In cases where victims have suffered incapacitating injuries but have extended life expectancy, these awards include provision for loss of earnings and life-long medical care that can run into millions. Where liability is contested, significant litigation costs also arise, but even where liability is admitted, the determination of quantum is complex, requiring evidence about future medical care costs, loss of earnings, life expectancy and the returns to be expected from the investment of the lump sum award. The once-off lump sum system of compensating successful plaintiffs has been criticised over the years from both legal and economic perspectives, and change was recommended in a Law Reform Commission report in 1996. Mr. Justice Nicholas Kearns, President of the High Court, established recently a working group to consider the issues involved and charged it to report by November 2010. Since 1995, courts in the United Kingdom have been free to award periodic payments, as distinct from once-off lump sums, where the parties agree, and since the passage of the 2003 Courts Act, whether or not they agree. It is opportune to consider whether periodic payments should be introduced in Ireland and this paper reviews the principal economic aspects of the issue. The paper also considers whether a move to periodic payments would require changes to the government bond market, specifically the issuance of long-dated index-linked Exchequer debt.

Liability rules applicable to international air transportation as developed by the courts in the United States : from Warsaw 1929 to Montreal 1999

Abstract: The impact of United States jurisprudence on air carrier liability involving international air transportation has been so great over many decades that it is not unreasonable to conceive of that body of jurisprudence as the principal source for the interpretation and application of the uniform rules relating to air carrier liability in the international transportation by air of passengers, baggage and cargo, as envisioned by the original drafters of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 Hence, an in-depth analysis of this body of jurisprudence, such as is presented in this indispensable book, constitutes, for all practical purposes, the preeminent treatise on international air transportation liability - all the more so, in that the drafters of the 1999 Montreal Convention (MC99) were determined not to erode in any way this established body of Warsaw Convention jurisprudence when interpreting and applying the 1999 successor instrument, MC99 George Tompkins, a leading authority with world wide recognition on the interpretation and application of international private air law agreements, - and himself among the drafters of MC99 - here lays out the rich fruit of his vast personal experience in handling cases and controversies in the Courts of the United States involving the application of the liability rules of the Warsaw Convention and now MC99 The resulting publication is an essential legal guide for determining and resolving claims governed by one or more of the international law instruments that comprise the Warsaw Liability System, which consists of the 1929 Warsaw Convention, the 1955 Hague Protocol, the 1961 Guadalajara Convention, the 1975 Montreal Protocol No 4 and various intercarrier agreements (applicable only to claims involving passenger death or bodily injury governed by the Warsaw Convention) all now superseded and governed by MC99 Among the multitude of topics covered in depth, users of this book will find the following: ‒ When the liability rules of MC99 or one of the predecessor Warsaw Liability System instruments is applicable to a claim; ‒ What triggers liability under the applicable instrument; ‒ Who can make a claim against the air carrier; ‒ Who can file a legal action for damages; ‒ Where the action must be brought--Jurisdiction; ‒ When the action must be brought-Limitations period; ‒ What law applies in determining the recoverable damages; ‒ Limitations on recoverable damages; ‒ The accepted definitions of key terms in the Convention Rules, such as carrierA", accidentA", bodily injuryA", operations of embarking disembarkingA", destinationA"; ‒ The treatment of mental injury claims; ‒ Liability for delay; ‒ Defenses available to the carrier; ‒ Willful misconduct of the carrier The author explains the required particulars for establishing the liability of the air carrier in detail under a wide variety of circumstances, and clearly defines all terms - especially such contentious terms as 'willful misconduct,' 'accident', 'bodily injury', 'embarking', 'disembarking' 'destination' - as their applicability varies under successive conventions and protocols as interpreted and applied in years of court decisions As a thorough summary and critique of the interpretation and application of the 70-year body of Warsaw Convention jurisprudence, this unmatched publication provides a convenient one-volume basis for the development of a body of MC99 jurisprudence It also is an incomparable practical guide for the use and benefit of everyone involved in the practice or study of international private air law, including lawyers, airline in-house counsel, international aviation organizations, aviation liability insurers and re-insurers, aviation insurance brokers, aviation-related departments of national governments, judges, law clerks, students and teachers

The Freedom to Strike in Canada: A Brief Legal History

Abstract: In the B.C. Health Services Subsector case [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, the Supreme Court Canada relied, in part, on the history of Canadian labour law to support the conclusion that collective bargaining was an activity that was protected under the freedom of association guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, it is likely that the Court will consider Canadian labour law history to determine whether or not constitutional protection also extends to the freedom to strike. The two principal purposes of this paper are: 1) to provide an analytic framework for approaching the history of the right to strike; and 2) to sketch out the contours of that history. First, we claim that it is only possible to understand the legal “right” to strike in the labour relations context in relation to the freedom to associate and the freedom to bargain collectively. Second, the paper draws upon W.N. Hohfeld’s typology of jural relations in order to analyze and to evaluate the rules that shape the legal relationships between individuals and social groups. Third, we map the complex and historically evolving legal relations governing the freedom of association, collective bargaining and striking during successive regimes of industrial legality in Canada.

All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment

Abstract: Zhao (2008) presents an interesting "all-or-nothing monitoring" result for a multitask moral hazard agency problem with partial effort observation. We argue that the optimal contract based on the non-verifiable observation of the agent's effort in Zhao (2008) can be regarded as a limitation on the incentive schemes available to the principal. I then propose some arguably more appropriate approaches for analyzing such agency problems. (D82, D86, M54)

Within the State

Abstract: This chapter outlines the role and responsibility of the state for promoting and protecting human rights. The chapter first details the state's obligation to implement and internationally guaranteed human rights and describes the different processes by which customary international law norms and international human rights treaties become part of domestic law. The chapter then discusses the principal domestic legal sources of protection of human rights: constitutional and legislative provisions as well as the common law. Finally, the discussion turns to some of the key institutions within the state that have a role in the protection and promotion of human rights: the courts, the executive, the legislature, ombudsmen, and national human rights institutions.

Textbook on immigration and asylum law. 4th ed.

Abstract: Contribution to the principal textbook used by undergraduate and postgraduate students in this complex and controversial area of law. Book description: The fourth edition of Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law continues to provide students with expert coverage of case law and legislation, along with dynamic analysis of the political context and social impact of the law, and a strong focus on human rights. An essential text for students at all levels, the book expertly guides the reader through this fascinating and constantly developing area of law. Online Resource Centre This book is accompanied by an Online Resource Centre, which contains the following resources designed to support the book: - Twice-yearly updates providing easy access to changes and developments in the law - Problem questions to test knowledge and develop analytical skill - Guidance on how to answer the end-of-chapter questions - A selection of web links to support additional research.