Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).

The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions : a comparative analysis with specific reference to South Africa.

Abstract: The purpose of this work is to examine critically the use of criminal sanctions in the enforcement of environmental law in South Africa. The two principal issues considered are, first, whether criminal sanctions are the best enforcement instrument and, if not, what alternative enforcement tools exist. Second, the thesis considers ways in which the use of criminal sanctions can be made more effective in those cases where it is found that criminal sanctions do have a role to play. In determining the object of criminal law in the context of environmental regulation, it is concluded that the primary aim is deterrence. The question that this raises is whether deterrence can adequately be achieved through use of alternatives to the criminal sanction. A comprehensive analysis of South African environmental legislation reveals an overwhelming reliance on the command and control approach to regulation, with criminal sanctions being used in almost all cases as the primary enforcement mechanism. It is argued that there are several shortcomings of criminal law that militate against its use as the default enforcement mechanism and the conclusion reached is that they should be reserved for the most serious contraventions of the environmental law. The thesis examines several viable alternatives to criminal sanctions, both administrative and civil, and makes recommendations as to how these can be used effectively instead of criminal sanctions. Following this initial conclusion, the focus then shifts onto how the use of criminal sanctions can be improved in those (serious) cases for which they should be reserved. It is agued, first, that the use of strict criminal liability is not necessary. This is followed by an examination of vicarious and corporate liability where recommendations are made for ways in which these aspects can be improved. The issue of sentencing environmental crime is then considered and it is argued that penalties are largely adequate but suggestions are made as to innovative sentencing options. Finally, several procedural improvements are put forward. In conclusion, a model enforcement chapter for environmental legislation is mooted, taking into account the various recommendations made in the course of the thesis.

The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s Place in the Constitutional System of Hungary

Abstract: This paper presents the achievements of the “Rule of Law Revolution” and the role of the Constitutional Court in the different stages of Hungary’s rule of law evolution. Special attention will be placed on the current Hungarian practice of rule of law, the topics of rule of law, constitutionalism and the division of powers within the framework of legal and political constitutionalism will be discussed. The paper also will summarize the views that criticized the activism of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, and those that have laid down the groundwork for the expansion of political constitutionalism after the 2010 Parliamentary elections. Finally, the challenges of rule of law and constitutionalism will be examined, with regard to the role of the Court as the principal organ for the protection of the Fundamental Law in the context of Hungary’s membership in the European Union.

The Regulation and Self-Regulation of a Complex Industry

Abstract: I develop a model of policy making in complex domains where bureaucrats find it very difficult to establish autonomous sources of expertise, so regulators are highly dependent on the regulated industry and its willingness to engage in self-regulation. In the model, a legislative principal decides whether to delegate the power to an agency to regulate the activities of a firm or industry. The policy domain is complex in that knowledge of the implications of different policy choices is concentrated in the firm. The agency can learn about the policy environment only through monitoring the firm’s efforts at self-regulation. The main result is that, as policy becomes more complex, regulatory outcomes are increasingly biased toward those preferred by the firm. Moreover, when the agency has preferences that diverge from the firm’s, the firm invests less in its own self-regulatory efforts for fear that its policy investments will be expropriated.

(Judicial) Love is not a One-Way Street: the EU preliminary reference procedure as a Model for ECtHR advisory opinions under draft Protocol No.16

Abstract: Owing to the overwhelming number of applications before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Draft Protocol No.16 proposes the introduction of a new advisory opinion procedure. This procedure aims at alleviating Strasbourg's judicial workload by enabling the domestic courts of the contracting parties to request advisory opinions on alleged human rights violations, which could in turn serve as precedents for future applications. The principal purpose of this article is to present the most important provisions and legal consequences of the newly proposed advisory opinion procedure; but also, as this procedure draws certain inspirations from the European Union's preliminary reference procedure, the article aims to contrast these provisions with their respective counterparts in EU law (with respect to both the implications and legal effects of art.267 TFEU (ex art.234 EC) and Court of Justice case law); to examine the similarities and differences between those two mechanisms; to show legal difficulties that may arise owing to the proposed advisory opinion procedure; and to explore the extent to which Strasbourg could use Court of Justice case law to develop its advisory opinion jurisdiction further.

Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation

Abstract: We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the principal can make an investment and the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that effort is higher after a success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be "too good" to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be "overqualified."