Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).

Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges

Abstract: It's fashionable to criticize law reviews. In the literature on law reviews, author after author lambastes the journals for their content and their style, and only the rare, obstinate defender attempts to counter the view that the principal medium of legal scholarship does nothing right. The attacks on law reviews are often entertaining, with authors letting loose strings of invectives and snappy prose, elements of style that the critics readily point out are missing from most publications. While this complaint literature may be amusing, and occasionally does ring true, the criticisms inevitably are based on personal views supported solely by anecdotal evidence. No one has systematically asked law review consumers what they think. This survey project attempts to remedy the lack of empirical data. We asked randomly selected attorneys, judges, and law professors a series of

The Future of Law Firms (and Lawyers) in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Abstract: This article explores the future for lawyers and law firms in the light of the changes that Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) is already bringing to the universe of legal services. Part I briefly describes some of the ways AI is already in use in ordinary life - from facial recognition, through medical diagnosis to translation services. Part II describes how AI is transforming what it means to provide legal services in six primary areas: litigation review; expertise automation; legal research; contract analytics; contract and litigation document generation; and predictive analytics. Part III explores who are the providers of these AI driven legal services - often non-lawyer legal service providers - and how these providers are replacing at least some of what clients have traditionally sought from lawyers. Part III also discusses the implications of all these changes both for the future role of lawyers individually, and in particular what services will clients still need lawyers to perform: judgment, empathy, creativity and adaptability. In turn, this Part examines what will these changes mean for the size, shape, composition and economic model of law firms, as well as the implications of these changes for legal education and lawyer training. Part IV identifies the principal legal, ethical, regulatory and risk management issues raised by the use of AI in the provision of legal services. Finally, in Part V the article considers who will be the likely providers of AI based services other than law firms: legal publishers, major accounting firms and venture capital funded businesses.

Shorn-off complicity

Abstract: CRIMINAL complicity has been dramatically changed by the combined decisions of the UK Supreme Court and the Privy Council in Jogee; Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681. At least since the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, it has been settled that a person ( S ) who has intentionally assisted or encouraged another ( P ) to commit a crime has been liable to be tried, convicted, and punished as if S was a principal. For decades, there has also been a much-debated, additional form of complicity where the accomplice was “parasitically” liable for further crimes committed by P beyond the scope of a common criminal purpose shared by S and P . For that kind of liability, the accomplice need not have assisted or encouraged the further crime but need only have foreseen that it was a possible incident of the common purpose. The effect of Jogee and Ruddock is that this further form of complicity, first recognised explicitly in the Privy Council decision of Chan Wing-Siu [1985] A.C. 168 and later endorsed by the House of Lords in Powell; English [1999] 1 A.C. 1, has been shorn off the criminal law. As a result, Chan Wing-Siu directions will no longer be given to juries.

The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability: Supporting Intentions

Abstract: Accomplice liability makes someone guilty of a crime he never committed, so long as he helped or influenced the perpetrator and did so with the required mens rea. Just what that mens rea should be has been contested for more than a century. Here I consider three major approaches and find them all wanting. I propose rejecting their common (but rarely questioned) assumption that what matters is the helper's mental state toward the perpetrator's commission of an offense. I suggest considering instead his stance toward the perpetrator's intention to act: a helper is an accomplice, on this view, if he (a) intends to see to it that the principal form or keep his own plan to commit an offense and (b) does not intend or expect that plan's frustration. This standard better justifies imposing accomplice liability. It more precisely picks out those helpers culpable for the perpetrator's very offense. And this parity of guilt is the best -- perhaps the only good -- basis for imposing the same liability on accomplice and principal, in a system so retribution-driven as to choose to do so at all.

Право собственности в проекте изменений ГК РФ: преемственность и новеллы

Abstract: In the article, some of the issues are viewed associated with the right of property in the context of the proposed changes and amendments to the RF Civil Code. Initially, the thesis is justified about the importance of the civil legislation stability which is supposed to be provided by the forthcoming upgrade of the RF civil Code, and its possible influence onto the Kazakhstan’ and other CIS states’ Civil Codes. In the following chapter, the author analyzes the notion of juridical construction treating it as a definite model of a legal relation expressed in the sources of law. When formulating definite legal instructions, it is proposed to proceed from some principal postulates underlying the legal regulation of the property relations. For this, the author uses the understanding of the right of property as is accepted in the countries of the continental legal system. The evaluation of the property right theoretical model of the Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan is performed by the author using principal elements of the property right theoretical model proposed by A. A. Rubanov. This allowed to come to three conclusions: 1) in the Civil Code of the republic of Kazakhstan, the material up-keeping of the property is mentioned, this being the basis for the modern legal regulation of the corresponding relations; 2) the property model and property category issues caused by it, different legal statuses have their roots in the feudal and soviet past, being an heritage of old economic and political systems; 3) the existing model of the right of property is a complex one as it contains components of different models and epochs. In the forth chapter, some of the disputable regulations of the property right are viewed concerning the RF Civil Code draft changes. They include the issues of the property right contents, its objects, preserving the property categories. In the conclusion, a variant is proposed to eliminate the disadvantages mentioned above, which the author sees in the necessity to settle the general civil legal regime for the property, in establishing a single right of property for the things existing and limited in the civil circulation. The private tasks for the improvement of the civil law concerning the right of property are: 1) creation of the right of property institution as a part of the “right-to-thing” law branch excluding inter-branch character of some of the existing Civil Code provisions; 2) stopping the trinary tradition in defining the right of property and other rights to things. In this case the essence of the civil and legal regulation of the property relations can be expressed in two principal theses: a) developing the Civil Code based on a general permit to the owner to commit any action concerning a thing, and b) introducing prohibitions for the owner to behave regarding definite categories of the things into the Civil Code and other laws.