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Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).


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Journal Article
TL;DR: The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is the most important agency in the United States and has been the subject of a great deal of attention in the last few decades as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: I INTRODUCTION The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which controls the supply of money in the United States, may be the country's most important agency. (1) The chair of the committee is often dubbed the second most powerful person in Washington, only deferring to the President himself. (2) Financial scholars and analysts obsess over the institution, leading to a rich tradition of FOMC Kremlinology, veneration, and second-guessing in business schools and economics departments. (3) But legal scholars have been less entranced by the committee--put off, perhaps, by the fact that the institution has never been checked by the courts or by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). (4) As a result, there has been no effort to come to grips with the administrative law of the FOMC; this article seeks to redress that gap. The FOMC enjoys a legal mandate that shields its discretion to a remarkable degree. The principal claim here is that this shield, combined with the imperatives of bureaucratic organization in an institution whose raison d'etre is stability, has turned the FOMC into an agency governed by internally developed tradition in lieu of externally imposed constraints. The makeup of the committee, the materials that it consults before rendering monetary policy decisions, its voting mechanisms, and the way its decisions are promulgated are products of a melange of evolving tradition and statutory permissiveness. One might argue that some combination of law and tradition explains what happens in most agencies. But the degree of reliance on tradition sets the FOMC apart. No one worries about the customs governing evidence presentation and voting order on multimember boards like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), but they are subjects of scrutiny at the FOMC. By the same token, APA law, rather than traditions such as that of the FOMC's so-called "beige book," governs what goes into the record before, say, the EPA or Commerce Department make their factual findings. (5) And Supreme Court decisions like Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. mean that the decisions rendered by most agencies are substantially lengthier, and strive for substantially less ambiguity, than those of the FOMC. (6) It is possible that this sort of development of routinized custom might be expected for agencies with few legal constraints. If so, the FOMC is a fine example of an institutional tendency, one that might have particular application in other forms of financial regulation. A mix of tradition and legal constraint are a feature of administrative constraint in that field, where litigation providing definitive opinions on required process is rare, and informal--and often nontransparent--oversight a norm. An account of the FOMC that jibes with the way this sort of regulation works might serve as a prod or a comparator for other accounts of the administrative law of financial oversight. Given this theme, the article makes the following additional points: 1. The FOMC enjoys the sorts of broad delegations that other New Deal agencies benefit from, only more so; the orders issued by the committee at the conclusion of each of its eight annual meetings do not fit within the traditional paradigms of administrative rulemaking or adjudication, leading courts to eschew any effort to review those decisions as committed to the agency's discretion. (7) 2. Given its free hand, the FOMC might be expected to be an empire builder. But in reality, it has only expanded its remit with regard to the sort of transactions it takes on, which have moved beyond the purchase and sale of federal government debt to include positions in a broader range of financial assets, as the financial crisis exemplified. 3. The modest problems that the FOMC has endured at the hands of the branches that monitor independent agencies like it--the courts and Congress--have reflected its extraordinary independence and relative opacity. …

5 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In several recent cases the Supreme Court has declared that the principal criterion for assessing whether searches and seizures are "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Constitution is whether they were allowed by eighteenth-century common law as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In several recent cases the Supreme Court has declared that the principal criterion for assessing whether searches and seizures are "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Constitution is whether they were allowed by eighteenth-century common law. This new form of Fourth Amendment originalism breaks dramatically not only with the ahistoric approach of the Warren and Burger Courts to search-and-seizure questions, but also with an older tradition of using the background of the Fourth Amendment to illuminate not its precise demands but its general aims. This Article traces the emergence of the new Fourth Amendment miginalism and argues that the doctrine has little to recommend it. The Court's revised understanding of the Fourth Amendment is faithful neither to the text of the Amendment nor to what we Know of its intent. And anchoring the Fourth Amendment in common law will do little to make it more principled of predictable, in part because common-law limits on searches and seizures were thinner, vaguer, and far more varied than the Court seems to suppose. What the common law has of value to offer Fourth Amendment law is what it has to offer constitutional law more generally: not its rules but its method.

5 citations

Dissertation
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: In the absence of statutory guidance in this regard, both approaches, which derive from domestic law, seem to have their place and their advocates as mentioned in this paper, and both approaches have their advocates.
Abstract: Since the emergence of international and hybrid criminal judicial bodies, the attribution of various modes of liability to perpetrators of the most heinous crimes has occupied a central role. However, the impact of modes of liability on the sentence has parted judges in many instances. While some judges regard the differentiation between principal perpetrators and aiders and abettors as immaterial for sentencing purposes, others have naturally referred to the notion that accessories to a crime are entitled to lower sentences. On first sight, in the absence of statutory guidance in this regard, both approaches, which derive from domestic law, seem to have their place and their advocates

5 citations

01 Jan 2009
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the principal provisions involved and offer some commentary as to their desirability and utility, and state that they can find nothing in the bill that derogates from the body of established common law and therefore the existing case law would remain applicable.
Abstract: Certain provisions of the new Companies Bill (final version, B61D-2008, adopted by the National Assembly on 19 November 2008) seem to create a codification or quasi-codification of this area of the common law The purpose of this note is to examine the principal provisions involved and to offer some commentary as to their desirability and utility I must, at the outset, state my observation that I can find nothing in the bill that derogates from the body of established common law and, therefore, the existing case law would remain applicable

5 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the criminal law has a legitimate function in penalising breach of trust when the breach causes both personal and social harm, and the proposed offence is both a morally justified and practically realistic way of criminalising non-disclosure of HIV-positive status.
Abstract: This article explores the legitimacy of criminalising nondisclosure of HIV-positive status to sexual partners. Its principal aim is to propose a new offence that criminalises such non-disclosure when it constitutes a breach of trust. In defending the proposed offence, the article argues that the criminal law has a legitimate function in penalising breach of trust when the breach causes both personal and social harm. The article also explores whether the existing offences of s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and rape (s. 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003) are suited to criminalising non-disclosure, and concludes that they are not. The article additionally considers the arguments against the criminalisation of non-disclosure advanced by various commentators and argues that its proposed offence avoids the concerns expressed. The article concludes that the proposed offence is both a morally justified and practically realistic way of criminalising non-disclosure of HIV-positive status.

5 citations


Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20222
202130
202037
201953
201839
201755