Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).

The International Law Commission

Abstract: One of the principal achievements of the United Nations is its work in codifying and developing international law. The International Law Commission, created in 1949, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, is the chief agency of the United Nations for achieving these tasks. The Chairman of the Commission at its sixteenth session, Professor Roberto Ago of Italy, stated in the Commission on July 16, 1964, that if the codification work which was now taking place in that body could be completed and accepted by states, progress would have been made without precedent since the time of Grotius. So well-established has the International Law Commission become on the international scene that it is almost surprising to recall that the existence of this body rests, not on any specific wording of the United Nations Charter calling for the creation of such a body of experts, but on the general phraseology of Article 13 of the Charter which provides that “the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: (a) promoting … and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification.” In the space of seventeen years the International Law Commission has achieved widespread recognition for the high quality of its work; it would be no exaggeration to say that it has come to be regarded as rivaling in importance the work of the International Court of Justice. As “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,” as successor to the Permanent Court of Justice — a new feature of international institutions in the modern era — and as the highest international judicial tribunal, the International Court of Justice is regarded, in the general scheme of the Charter, as an exceptionally prestigious body.

Legal Friction of State Civil Apparatus Neutrality in Indonesia

Abstract: The State Civil Apparatus (ASN) is the executor of governmental and development duties. Therefore, ASN must be neutral. According to Law No. 5 of 2014, the neutrality of ASN must be free from the influence and intervention of all groups and political parties. In order to maintain the neutrality of the State Civil Apparatus from the influence of political parties and to ensure the integrity, cohesiveness and unity of the State Civil Apparatus, and to focus all attention, mind and energy on assigned duties, ASN is prohibited from becoming a member and / or political party official. Historically, the arrangement of ASN neutrality began during the Old Order period, which the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 2 of 1959 on the Prohibition of Civil Servants and State Officials in Political Parties in that time. Furthermore, this Presidential Regulation is followed up and extended by Circular Letter of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 2 of 1959 concerning on Prohibition of Political Party Membership for State Civil Apparatus that implement state obligation outside his position. Furthermore, in the New Order era, Law No. 8 of 1974 on the Principal of Employee Affairs, while in the Reform Order was issued Law No. 43 of 1999, Civil Servants should be neutral from the influence of all groups and parties and not discriminatory in providing services to the community.

Active agents, passive principals: the role of the chief executive in corporate strategy formulation and implementation ∗

Abstract: In this paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the chief executive in the formulation of corporate strategy. Unlike traditional applications of agency theory, we allow the agent (CEO) to play ar ole in defining the parameters of the agency problem. We argue that CEOs will have an incentive to propose difficult, ambitious and opaque strategies. The effect arises because in equilibrium, the agent may be overcompensated in the sense that the participation constraint is not binding in determining his compensation. The agent can exploit this by proposing ambitious corporate strategies, thereby influencing the parameters of the constraints in the agency problem. The principal (the owners of the company) can mitigate this by precommitting to pay high compensation regardless of the manager’s chosen strategy, but may optimally prefer not to do so. JEL numbers: G30, G34, J33, D82. Keywords: agency theory, executive compensation, free-cashflow theory, strategic complexity

Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung

Abstract: We analyze the law regarding the adequacy of executive directors’ compensation in Germany. First we provide an overview of the law’s contents clustered in four different fields. We also introduce economic theories to analyze the principal-agent relationship with one principal (shareholders) and two agents (supervisory board, board of directors) as well as the D & O insurance in the context of two contradicting theories. We debate whether regulation can be viewed as justified and go into detail analyzing each new aspect of the law and possible economic consequences on the compensation level. We also provide a short overview and discuss the implication of the law by German firms.