Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).

Is There a Case for Strict Liability

Abstract: In this short paper, I shall answer the title’s question first in the context of criminal law and then in the context of tort law. In that latter section, I shall also mention in passing contractual and other forms of civil liability that are strict, although they will not be my principal focus. My conclusions will be that strict liability is never proper as the basis for retributive punishment; that it is a very crude device for achieving deterrence through nonretributive penalties; and that with respect to tort liability, it is best justified as a means of defining insurance categories.

DOES LABOUR LAW ACTUALLY PRODUCE EQUALITY AMONG WORKERS? A tentative law and economics approach to the question of coherence between the protective rule's egalitarian ratio and its effective consequences

Abstract: Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to deal with the problem of labour law effectiveness, i.e. the comparison between the protective rules’ reasons for existence and their practical effects.Design/methodology/approach – The paper briefly reviews the most important economic models from which arguments can be drawn in support of (or against) the coherence between labour law aims and effects, particularly focusing on the principal/agent model, which considers the work contract as partially functioning as a sort of insurance policy aimed to guarantee a certain degree of equality among workers notwithstanding their different ability and luck. The paper then assumes the traditional labour law commitment to building equality among workers as a test‐bench of the labour law effectiveness. It then proposes a crucial test for the equalization principle's practical functioning: when is it fair to dismiss an inefficient worker? The paper analyses the current mechanism of judicial application of just cause for dismi...

El riesgo moral en la revisoría fiscal

Abstract: The asymmetry of information is a condition of any contractual relationship, since the contractor (principal) is not completely aware of the work that he is assigning, nor verifies what the contract (agent) does. Then several problems arise: one of these is the moral hazard, which generates harmful situations for the principal, being the principal as responsible for the risk as the agent. The tax audit, as a contractual relationship is not exempt from this asymmetry and, therefore, it is possible that moral hazard arises in the development of the audit carried out by the professional contracted for this purpose. Examples of this are actions for which tax reviewers were sanctioned during the past five years, and failures to the rules discussed in the presentation of reports; these examples allow to assert the existence of moral hazard in the development of the fiscal audit.

The Law and Economics of the NCAA’s Claim to Monopsony Rights

Abstract: This article considers the legal and economic implications of the NCAA monopsony power with respect to players in the two most financially lucrative college sports - football and basketball. The principal means of doing so is through the evaluation of three recent legal challenges to the NCAA. Those challenges are to limits on payments to players, limits on the number of players receiving payment, and the rights of players under scholarship with respect to payments for commercial use of their images. The focus is on two questions. First, under current interpretations of the antitrust laws, what would the likely results of these cases be if they reached a final substantive resolution based on the strict application of these interpretations? More generally, what are the limits to the NCAA’s use of monopsony power? The second question is whether there should be liability under the antitrust laws. This is a more complex question with the answer depending, in part, on whether the antitrust laws are to be applied to affect allocative or distributive outcomes.