Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).

The principle of self submission in divorces cases from the perspective of legal certainty

Abstract: The problem of the principle of submission in the divorce law in the Religious Court by a non-Muslim couple occurs because the couple's marriage is based on Islamic law. What cannot be separated from Islamic law is Islamic family law because it is related to the faith of a Muslim. Islamic family law can only apply to Muslims and cannot apply to non-Muslims. The problem of the principle of submission to the divorce law was incomplete (incomplete norm) or the existence of a legal vacuum (vacuum of norm) in marriage law in Indonesia. This research is a legal research and is normative in nature. The approach used is statutory, case, and conceptual. The legal materials used are primary, secondary and tertiary. The method of collecting legal materials is first to qualify the facts and then to qualify the law. The analytical tool used is legal interpretation in the form of principal, systematic and grammatical interpretation.

The Advisory Functions of the Attorney-General

Abstract: Her Majesty’s Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, jointly known as the Law Officers of the Crown for England and Wales (‘the Law Officers’), have been described as “sui generis: not quite like other lawyers; not quite like other politicians; not quite like other ministers.” Although any function of the Attorney-General may be exercised by the Solicitor-General in accordance with the Law Officers Act 1997, the Attorney-General has long been regarded as the Principal Law Officer. As such, the Attorney-General performs a number of functions, which have been depicted as falling within “four broad categories”:

How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

Abstract: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act gives the Securities and Exchange Commission the authority to deal with two issues especially important to retail investors. First, section 913 requires the SEC to conduct a six-month study on the effectiveness of existing standards of care for broker-dealers and investment advisers and specifically authorizes the SEC to establish a fiduciary duty for brokers and dealers. Second, section 921 grants the SEC the authority to prohibit the use of predispute arbitration agreements that would require investors to arbitrate future disputes arising under the federal securities laws and regulations or the rules of a selfregulatory organization. What has been overlooked in the debate over retail investor protection is the interconnectedness of these two provisions. Debate over retail investor protection after Dodd-Frank must consider these two issues together in order to achieve the goal of better retail investor protection. I make three principal arguments: First, I argue that broker-dealers and investment advisers should be held to standards of care and competence based on professionalism, rather than fiduciary duty. Second, I propose, for adoption by the SEC, federal professional standards of competence and care for broker-dealers and investment advisers. Third, I argue that SEC adoption of standards of care will not create any additional federal remedies for investors because it is unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court will create a private damages remedy for their breach. If the SEC prohibits mandatory securities arbitration of claims based on federal securities law and SEC and SRO rules, the ability of retail investors, particularly those with small claims, to recover damages for careless and incompetent investment advice may be substantially reduced.

Franchisor Liability for Franchisee Conduct

Abstract: Franchisors and franchisees are legally and financially independent parties responsible for their own torts, contracts and other legal obligations. From the perspective of the general public however the independent contractor nature of the relationship is obscured by system standardisation and uniformity which conveys the appearance of a single entity. Although in law there is a fundamental difference between a system outlet operated by a franchisee and a system outlet operated by the franchisor through a manager, the outlets are otherwise identical and the legal subtleties are imperceptible to customers and the public generally. The legal ramifi cations are nevertheless signifi cant. In general terms a franchisor is liable under the principle of vicarious liability for the torts committed by employee managers but not for the torts committed by franchisees who are independent contractors. Franchisors may also be liable under agency principles — for contracts made by those agents who have the actual or apparent authority to make contracts on behalf of the franchisor principal — which may be the case for employed outlet managers but rarely for franchisees. This article reviews the law relating to franchisor liability for franchisee conduct in Australia and concludes that legal principle and commercial practice have been largely effective in insulating franchisors from liability under vicarious liability and agency principles. Such actions are nevertheless not the exclusive sources of potential franchisor liability and franchisors and their legal advisors need to be aware of the potential consequences beyond unwelcome system publicity which might arise from franchisee conduct.

Decentralization, Incentive Contracts and the Effect of Distortions in Performance Measures

Abstract: A model endogenizing authority over decisions and incentive contracts is developed. In addition to motivating the agent to exert effort, the principal is concerned about some non-contractible decision that is chosen simultaneously with the agent's effort. The choice of this decision affects both the performance measure and the principal's objective. We consider two allocations of authority to make this decision; principal and agent authority. The choice of authority structure affects the incentive contract, which together with authority structure, affects the agent's effort. We determine the optimal authority structure and incentive contract and how they are affected by different factors.