Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).

Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees

Abstract: Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. This paper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior. Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with those of the client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We show that the choice of hourly fees is a solution to an agency problem with multiple principals, where the interests of one principal (law firm)collide with the interests of the other principal (client).

Lawyer Investigation in the Context of the Subjective Right to Qualified Legal Aid

Abstract: In article the content of criminal procedure norms of the certain states of Anglo-Saxon and Roman-German legal systems approaches to legislative regulation of lawyer investigation institute on the basis of the comparative and legal analysis of the international legal acts is presented. Arguments in favor of the fact that the lawyer investigation institute needs to be considered as a substantial component of the subjective right for the qualified legal aid and criterion of the legal aid efficiency rendered to the principal are given. Need of a detailed legislative regulation of the minimum standards of the qualified legal aid for the international regulations and the national legislation is proved by authors.

Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?

Abstract: In this paper, we modelize a criminal organization as an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability.

On the Optimality of One-size-fits-all Contracts: The Limited Liability Case

Abstract: In this paper I study a multi-task principal agent model with a risk-neutral principal and a risk neutral agent subject to limited liability in an environment with adverse selection and moral hazard. The main results are as follows: (1) the optimal contracts in each possible case is a bonus-type contract that pays a bonus only when the highest signal is realized; (2) the informational rent as well as the limited liability rent are not independent; and (3) under moral and adverse selection the bonus contract exhibits a one-size-fits-all property; that is, in equilibrium all agents are offered the same contract. Under this contract more talented agents work harder and have a higher expected payoff and are on average more productive than less talented agents. This provides a rationale for the absence of menu of contracts in many different settings such as sales contracts, debt contracts, farming workers and optimal regulation. JEL-Classification: D82, D86, J33. Key words: Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, Multiple Tasks, Limited Liability.

Brexit: legal consequences for the EU

Abstract: The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union will have the most profound effect on legal relationships between the EU and the United Kingdom. The purpose of this paper is to address the consequences in two principal respects: