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Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).


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Qisheng He1
TL;DR: In 2010, China's Legislature adopted a reconstructed new private international law which made habitual residence the principal connecting factor of lex personalis as mentioned in this paper, which improved China's opportunities for accession to international conventions and for the adoption of common international measures to better protect the interests of Chinese citizens, especially children.
Abstract: In 2010, China's Legislature adopted a reconstructed new private international law which makes habitual residence the principal connecting factor of lex personalis. Prior to the new law, lex personalis had followed a mixed model that included the law of domicile, the law of nationality, the law of the country where a Chinese person resides, and the law of the place of an act. The reconstruction of lex personalis improves China's opportunities for accession to international conventions and for the adoption of common international measures to better protect the interests of Chinese citizens, especially children. However, China's legislature and its courts still have much to do in order to decrease and eliminate many conflicts among the previous and current provisions regarding lex personalis. Among other things, criteria need to be established for application in defining, judging and establishing habitual residence, especially with regard to appreciable period of time and settled intention.

2 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the way in which the two kinds of contracts are combined in constrained efficient equilibria of the agency supergame, where the agent's compensation is comprised of both guaranteed payments and voluntary bonuses from the principal.
Abstract: Traditional agency theory assumes that the principal has no more information about the agent's actions than the enforcement authorities have. This is unrealistic in many settings, and in repeated models, additional information possessed by the principal changes the nature of the problem. Such information can be used in implicit, self-enforcing contracts between principal and agent, that supplement the usual explicit contracts. This paper studies the way in which the two kinds of contracts are combined in constrained efficient equilibria of the agency supergame. The agent's compensation is comprised of both guaranteed payments and voluntary bonuses from the principal. We give a simple characterization of the composition of remuneration in the optimal dynamic scheme.

2 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: The authors provides an historical overview of attempts to enact mergers law in Australia and finds that there has always been business opposition to the imposition of such laws and that such concerns are lacking in evidence.
Abstract: This paper provides an historical overview of attempts to enact mergers law in Australia and finds that there has always been business opposition to the imposition of such laws. Such opposition has traditionally been based around the proposition that in a small economy such as Australia, firms need to rationalise in order to achieve efficiency and drive domestic and international competitiveness. The present policy debate over mergers law has witnessed a revival of industry rationalisation arguments in addition to concerns that mergers law was turning Australia into a branch office economy. The paper finds that such concerns are lacking in evidence. Introduction The regulation of mergers for competition purposes in Australia is governed by section 50 of the Trade Practices Act (TPA) that generally prohibits mergers or acquisitions which would have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a substantial market for goods or services within Australia. Responsibility for the administration and enforcement of section 50 resides with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), formerly the Trade Practices Commission (TPC), which is an independent statutory authority. Mergers law is an attempt to preserve competitive market structures. This is predicated on the belief that market competition is the principal means for achieving an efficient allocation of scarce resources throughout society. The principal objective of mergers law is to prevent the accumulation of market power ultimately resulting in higher prices and/or lower quality goods and services for consumers, and thus ensuring economic efficiency. The present policy debate over the appropriate setting for mergers law in Australia has resulted in the Government establishing a major inquiry into the TPA. However, this debate appears to be merely the latest instalment in a saga spanning over 80 years since Australia's first competition statute was effectively stymied through judicial

2 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA based on the traditional scope of employment approach, where a non-fiduciary corporate principal would not be subject to damages claims under the ERISA for the rogue fiduciaries activities of its employees or agents, but would subject to restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the principal.
Abstract: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), the federal law that regulates employer-sponsored benefit plans, has a rich history of judicially-created federal common law. This Article explores the theoretical, policy, statutory, and stare decisis grounds for the development of another area of federal common law under ERISA – the incorporation of respondeat superior liability principles to impose ERISA fiduciary liability (“vicarious fiduciary liability”) upon a corporation for the fiduciary activities of its employees or agents. The Article proposes that the federal courts should adopt a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA based on the traditional scope of employment approach. Under such a rule, a corporate principal whose own internal employees or agents perform fiduciary functions during the course and within the scope of their employment or agency relationship would be strictly liable under ERISA for any breach of fiduciary duty by the employee or agent. Vicarious fiduciary liability should be limited, however, so that a nonfiduciary corporate principal would not be subject to damages claims under ERISA for the rogue fiduciary activities of its employees or agents, but would be subject to restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the principal. A federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability under ERISA is necessary for two reasons. First, a rule of vicarious fiduciary liability is essential to maintaining and enforcing ERISA’s comprehensive system of fiduciary regulation. Second, vicarious fiduciary liability is needed to prevent employer overreaching under the judicially-created settlor function defense to breach of fiduciary duty claims. Absent a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability, a corporate employer, in its nonfiduciary capacity as the settlor of its ERISA plan, may design the documents that govern the employer’s plan as a shield against fiduciary responsibility for the actions of the employer’s own internal fiduciary employees. This misuse of nonfiduciary settlor powers, which is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of ERISA, would be prevented by a federal common law rule of vicarious fiduciary liability.

2 citations

01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: The principal competition rules of the European Union (EU) (other than the rules relating to merger control) are set forth in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The principal competition rules of the European Union (EU) (other than the rules relating to merger control) are set forth in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.1 Article 85, broadly analogous to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, prohibits restrictive agreements. Article 86, broadly analogous to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, prohibits the abuse, but not the existence, of a dominant position. Unlike the U.S. provisions, EU competition law is civil in nature: there are no criminal sanctions nor any individual as distinct from company liability for administrative fines. That said, however, there are a number of significant adverse consequences for companies that infringe the EU competition rules.

2 citations


Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20222
202130
202037
201953
201839
201755