Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).

Disobedience and Authority

Abstract: This article presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We extend the concept of real authority by observing that not only does the principal have to be informed to give an order but also the worker must be willing to follow the order. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they have no better information than the principal. The allocation of authority thus depends on external market conditions as well as the information and agency problems emphasized in the literature. We explore the implications of this insight for hiring policies and managerial styles. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

The Comparative Efficacy of Tort Law and Regulation for Environmental Protection

Abstract: During the last two decades those interested in environmental improvement have turned to regulatory agencies, particularly in the U.S. to the federal Environmental Protection Agency, as the principal instrument for achieving their ends. Certainly these regulatory institutions play an important role in deterring the considerable damage done by environmental pollution. But long before the creation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the many state EPA's, and before the principal pollution control statutes were enacted, the common law of tort provided a seemingly powerful set of rights to pollution victims that might also deter damaging pollution discharge. A person was entitled to the enjoyment of his property free from unreasonable interference from pollution, and riparian property owners were entitled to the flow of water undiminished in quantity and quality. This paper considers whether the focus on government regulation by the public and by economists has ignored an important and effective private tool for improving environmental management, and what role tort might play in the future. The paper will review what we know about the performance of the tort system and the regulatory system with regard to their ability to control pollution discharge and to limit the harm that such discharge causes. The review concentrates on the United States, with some consideration of Canada, and on the effectiveness of policy rather than on its economic efficiency.

Causeless complicity

Abstract: I argue, contrary to standard claims, that accomplice liability need not be a causal relation. One can be an accomplice to another’s crime without causally contributing to the criminal act of the principal. This is because the acts of aid and encouragement that constitute the basis for accomplice liability typically occur in contexts of under- and over-determination, where causal analysis is confounded. While causation is relevant to justifying accomplice liability in general, only potential causation is necessary in particular cases. I develop this argument through the example of the role of U.S. legal officials in abetting the acts of unlawful interrogation that have taken place since 2001. I also suggest that there may be a limited justification for ex post ratificatory accomplice liability.

Consumers and agency problems

Abstract: Consumers solve many agency problems, by pointing out when they believe that agents have made mistakes. I consider the role that consumers play in inducing efficient behaviour by agents. I distinguish cases where consumers have similar preferences to the principal, from those where they diverge. In the former case, allowing consumer feedback improves allocations, and increasing consumer information is unambiguously beneficial. Where consumers disagree with principals over desired outcomes, which characterises many public sector benefits, consumers' feedback about the performance of agents can reduce welfare. This may result in efficiently restricting the ability of consumers to complain about agent performance.