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Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).


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01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the setting of optimal legal standards to simultaneously induce parties to invest in care and to motivate law enforcers to detect violators of the law.
Abstract: In this paper we examine the setting of optimal legal standards to simultaneously induce parties to invest in care and to motivate law enforcers to detect violators of the law. The strategic interaction between care providers and law enforcers determines the degree of efficiency achieved by the standards. Our principal finding is that some divergence between the marginal benefits and marginal costs of providing care is required to control enforcement costs. Further, the setting of standards may effectively substitute for the setting of fines when penalties for violation are fixed. In particular, maximal fines may be welfare reducing when standards are set optimally.

21 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a theory of the role of discretion in agency and show that an optimal response to complex information in agency relationships is for the contracting parties to choose exceedingly simple contracts -a fixed wage plus a discretionary bonus, for instance.
Abstract: We provide a theory of the role of discretion in agency We do so by extending the standard principal-agent framework to include complex information and trust With these two new ingredients we find that: optimal agency contracts may be incomplete; they do not necessarily use all available, payoff-relevant information (the sufficient statistic result fails); and inefficiencies may persist even though inference about the agent's action choice is perfect We show that an optimal response to complex information in agency relationships is for the contracting parties to choose exceedingly simple contracts - a fixed wage plus a discretionary bonus, for instance In our model, a main function of agency contracts (in addition to the provision of incentives) is to protect the agent from possible opportunistic behavior of the principal

21 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that incompletely theorized agreements play a large role in interpretation of both statutes and the Constitution itself; many of our basic rights are a product of such agreements, and they defend a form of casuistry and describe the potentially democratic foundations of the casuistical enterprise in law.
Abstract: How is law possible in a heterogeneous society, composed of people who sharply disagree about basic values? Such disagreements involve the most important issues of social life: the distribution of wealth, the role of race and gender, the nature of free speech and private property. Much of the answer to this puzzle lies in an appreciation of how people who disagree on fundamental issues can achieve incompletely theorized agreements on particular cases.Lecture I sets out the basic idea of incompletely theorized agreements and argues that such agreements have many virtues. It offers analogical thinking as a case in point - this is the way that ordinary lawyers and indeed ordinary people often try to solve legal and ethical problems. For a system of law, analogical thinking, as a basis for incompletely theorized agreements, can be desirable because it is so much less sectarian, hubristic, and demanding than deep theories about (for example) equality, or liberty, or economic efficiency. Society is sometimes too sharply divided or confused about such theories to permit them to be foundations for judge-made law, which requires agreements among people who have little time and limited capacities, who must find a way to live together, who believe that values are plural and diverse, and who should show respect to one another’s most defining commitments.Hence incompletely theorized agreements play a large role in interpretation of both statutes and the Constitution itself; many of our basic rights are a product of such agreements.Lecture II opposes rules to rulelessness. Its principal goal is to point the way toward a more refined understanding of the ideal of the rule of law, one that sees a degree of particularity, and a degree of lawmaking at the point of application, as an important part of that ideal. It defends a form of casuistry and describes the potentially democratic foundations of the casuistical enterprise in law. The lecture begins by describing the distinctive advantages of rules and law via rules, especially as a means for providing a consensus on what the law is from people who disagree on so much else. It also discusses two attacks on decisions according to rule: the view that controversial political and moral claims always play a role in the interpretation of rules, and thus that rules are not what they appear to be; and the view that rules are obtuse, because they are too crude to cover diverse human affairs, and because people should not decide cases without closely inspecting the details of disputes. Giving special attention to the death penalty and broadcasting regulation, it offers two ways out of the dilemmas posed by rules and rulelessness: (a) a presumption in favor of privately adaptable rules, that is, rules that allocate entitlements without specifying outcomes, in an effort to promote goals associated with free markets; and (b) highly contextualized assessments of the virtues and pathologies of both options, in an effort to promote democratic goals of responsiveness and open participation.The lectures end with the suggestion that incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes play a large role not only in law, but also in many other sectors of social life, prominently including democratic discussion.

21 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the deployment of closed circuit TV systems (CCTVs) in Israeli schools, which is now proceeding at an accelerated pace, despite the absence of clear legal or administrative guidance.
Abstract: "Privacy was not raised [in the decision-making process] because we followed the law."(P1, Principal of a secondary school)"I have a law that instructs me to install cameras for security... We do not let parents participate in the discussion because it is a law!... The Parents Association will not oppose a law that is meant to protect their children."(M11, Municipal Chief Security Officer)How do organizations apply ambiguous law? Scholars point to exogenous and endogenous resources to which organizations turn when the law is too vague, does not provide guidance, and requires elaboration or specification (Edelman 2004; Edelman and Suchman 1997; Edelman, Uggen and Erlanger 1999). But what do organizations do when there is no law? The current study provides a surprising answer: Some organizations wrongly assume that there is a law that applies to them. This is imagined law.We explored the deployment of Closed Circuit TV systems (CCTVs) in Israeli schools, which is now proceeding at an accelerated pace, despite the absence of clear legal or administrative guidance. We documented the practice in its early stages, examined the sociolegal implications of the decision-making processes, and explored the justifications asserted to legitimize them.We found that most of the school principals reached their decisions as to whether to install CCTVs by turning to endogenous resources-namely, they took into account their own considerations-rather than turning to exogenous sources, such as official guidelines, practices of other organizations, professional advice, or data analysis. The endogenous sources to which the principals turned were their own perceptions of security, privacy, and education, as well as practical considerations. However, the findings indicate yet another source of private ordering within organizations acting under circumstances of legal ambiguity, which we call imagined law. Some of the decision makers explained and legitimized their decisions by pointing to the law. However, they did not turn to the law itself. Instead, they assumed that there is a legal rule that regulates school CCTVs. They also assumed its content. Thus, the decision makers acted under the shadow of imagined law: They did not merely hold a mistaken impression of a law's content. They were wrong about the law's very existence.Examining the interplay of the endogenous processes and the imagined law sheds light on the legal consciousness of agents who have positions of power to mobilize the rights of others. Our inquiry contributes to the sparse body of literature that has explored such agents and provides a unique contextual perspective that focuses on agents who have the obligation to educate for rights.Theoretical FrameworkInstitutional theory has examined organizational responses to ambiguous law, focusing on exogenous and endogenous organizational decision-making processes. Theories of legal consciousness have explored the perceptions and practices of people who are responsible for the mobilization of the rights of others. We draw on these theoretical frameworks, situate our findings within them, examine their interconnections, and offer new theoretical insights as to the role of imagined law in shaping decisionmaking processes within organizations.Institutional TheoryInstitutional theory is a field of organizational sociology, which focuses on cultural factors, such as values, beliefs, symbols, and rituals, in shaping organizational life (Suchman and Edelman 1996). It shows that organizations adopt many practices and structures not for efficiency reasons, but rather because the cultural environment constructs these practices and structures as being the proper, legitimate, or natural thing to do (Suchman and Edelman 1996: 919). Law and society scholars have turned to institutional theory to understand the role of law in shaping organizations' response to their institutional environments (see review in Edelman 2004). …

21 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In 2000, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000 (PAJSA) was passed in South Africa as discussed by the authors, highlighting key similarities and differences to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.
Abstract: Major constitutional reform was undertaken in South Africa in the mid-1990s. As part of this reform, rights to administrative justice were included in a Bill of Rights. In 2000 national legislation was passed to give effect to these rights. This article reviews one of the principal pieces of such legislation, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2000, highlighting key similarities and differences to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.

21 citations


Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20222
202130
202037
201953
201839
201755