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Principal (commercial law)

About: Principal (commercial law) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1579 publications have been published within this topic receiving 35379 citations. The topic is also known as: Principal (commercial law).


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Journal Article
TL;DR: Charity law is in a state of flux: the basic rules, many with roots in earliest common law, are being reconsidered and revised by legislators, scholars, and practitioners as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Charity law is in a state of flux: The basic rules, many with roots in earliest common law, are being reconsidered and revised by legislators, scholars, and practitioners Among these are rules prohibiting donors from bringing legal suits to enforce the terms of their gifts; laws limiting the ability of donors to agree with charitable donees to modify the terms of their gifts; the doctrines of cy pres and deviation under which charitable purposes and methods for administering them may be altered due to changed circumstances; the statutory provisions imposing on all directors of charitable corporations a duty to participate in the affairs of the corporation; and the rules setting forth the extent to which charitable fiduciaries can be held liable for breach of their duties of loyalty and care In the realm of enforcement of these rules, Congress has been asked to consider measures to enhance the existing regulatory scheme which relies on the Internal Revenue Code to define the duties and obligations of charitable fiduciaries and looks to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as the agency to enforce these obligations At the same time, some scholars are suggesting that all regulation be removed from the IRS or that some of its powers be transferred to an agency more suited to regulate tax-exempt entities, as the IRS’s principal focus is tax collection This essay contains a survey of the most recently adopted changes and pending proposals for change in both state and federal law applicable to nonprofit charitable organizations It focuses on developments in substantive state laws expanding the rights of donors and the doctrines of cy pres and deviation It also describes August 2006 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code and other proposals by the staff of the Senate

12 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors model the shareholders-manager relationship as a principal-agent game in which the agent (the manager) alone observes the economic outcome and show that the limited liability (LL) of the agent, defined as the agent's feasible minimum payment, might explain the demand for earnings management by the principal.
Abstract: Consider the following puzzle: If earnings management is harmful to shareholders, why don’t they design contracts that induce managers to reveal the truth? To answer this question, we model the shareholders–manager relationship as a principal–agent game in which the agent (the manager) alone observes the economic outcome. We show that the limited liability (LL) of the agent, defined as the agent’s feasible minimum payment, might explain the demand for earnings management by the principal. Specifically, when the LL level is high (low), a contract that induces earnings management may be less (more) costly than a truth-revealing contract. This finding offers a new explanation of the demand for earnings management.

12 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2015
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss several policy justifications for copyright limitations and exceptions and consider the relative utilities of specific and open-ended L&E provisions, concluding that the optimal policy for L&Es may well be to have specific exceptions for categories of justified uses that are relatively stable over time.
Abstract: S | 121 Justifications for Copyright Limitations & Exceptions Pamela Samuelson Professor of Law, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Berkeley, CA Modern copyright laws grant authors a broad set of rights to control exploitations of their works. Typically tempering the reach of these broad rights are a series of limitations and exceptions (L&Es) adopted by legislatures or sometimes by courts through common law adjudication. L&E provisions in national copyright laws often seem a hodgepodge of special purpose provisions whose policy justifications are sometimes difficult to discern. This essay discusses several policy justifications for L&Es and considers the relative utilities of specific and open-ended L&Es. Its principal focus will be on U.S. law, although it will feature examples of L&Es embodied in other national copyright laws and authorized by international treaties. Part II traces the historical development of L&Es in U.S. copyright law. For the first hundred years of the nation's existence, there were no L&Es in U.S. copyright law, in part because rights were fewer in number and narrower in scope than they became over time. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, courts invented the exhaustion of rights and fair use doctrines as limits on copyright's scope. These doctrines were codified in the Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act"), although they have continued to evolve in the nearly four decades after their enactment. Less visible, although quite important, are the dozens of other L&Es codified in the 1976 Act. Part III offers eight principled justifications for the existence of these L&Es. One set promotes ongoing authorship. A second recognizes both authorial and broader public interests in news dissemination, freedom of expression, and access to information. A third protects privacy, personal autonomy, and ownership interests of consumers. A fourth aims to fulfill certain cultural and social policy goals. A fifth enables public institutions, such as courts and legislatures, to function more effectively. A sixth fosters competition and ongoing innovation. A seventh exempts incidental uses that lack economic significance. An eighth addresses market failure problems. This Part also discusses some politically expedient exceptions. Part III considers justifications for adopting a flexible and open-ended rule such as the U.S. fair use doctrine. Open-ended rules such as fair use enable copyright law to remain flexible and adaptable over time. Especially in an era of rapid technological change, flexible exceptions such as fair use have some advantages over specific L&Es. The chapter concludes that the optimal policy for L&Es may well be to have specific exceptions for categories of justified uses that are relatively stable over time and for which predictability is more important than flexibility and to have an open-ended exception such as fair use to allow the law to adapt to new uses not contemplated by the legislature. Email: psamuelson@law.berkeley.edu

11 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
30 Sep 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, the relationship between principal/agent theory and citizen relationship management is examined and a positive step in improving accountability is taken in public management of state structures that distinguishes private structures, although the Principal/Agent theory does not provide a complete solution for administration accountability.
Abstract: Principal/Agent Theory economic that makes clear accountability relationship management (Agent) to shareholders (Principal), �Have the effect of creating new public management . This theory highlights important issues regarding the accountability of state structures that distinguishes private structures. �This theory of public administration causes agents to act and be accountable to their citizens' interests. � Although the Principal/Agent theory does not provide a complete solution for administration accountable, but accountability relationships which reveal a positive step in improving accountability. � This theory is one of the factors citizen relationship management. In this article we will examine the relationship between Principal/Agent theory and citizen relationship management.

11 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is established that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton extend to a larger class of games, in which each principal's gross monetary payoff does not depend exclusively on the quantities she receives.

11 citations


Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20222
202130
202037
201953
201839
201755