Procurement

Abstract: More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average graduate student, while offering insights into the theoretical ideas and stratagems not available elsewhere. Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities. The book's clear and logical organization begins with an introduction that summarizes regulatory practices, recounts the history of thought that led to the emergence of the new regulatory economics, sets up the basic structure of the model, and previews the economic questions tackled in the next seventeen chapters. The structure of the model developed in the introductory chapter remains the same throughout subsequent chapters, ensuring both stability and consistency. The concluding chapter discusses important areas for future work in regulatory economics. Each chapter opens with a discussion of the economic issues, an informal description of the applicable model, and an overview of the results and intuition. It then develops the formal analysis, including sufficient explanations for those with little training in information economics or game theory. Bibliographic notes provide a historical perspective of developments in the area and a description of complementary research. Detailed proofs are given of all major conclusions, making the book valuable as a source of modern research techniques. There is a large set of review problems at the end of the book.

Abstract: More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average graduate student, while offering insights into the theoretical ideas and stratagems not available elsewhere. Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities. The book's clear and logical organization begins with an introduction that summarizes regulatory practices, recounts the history of thought that led to the emergence of the new regulatory economics, sets up the basic structure of the model, and previews the economic questions tackled in the next seventeen chapters. The structure of the model developed in the introductory chapter remains the same throughout subsequent chapters, ensuring both stability and consistency. The concluding chapter discusses important areas for future work in regulatory economics. Each chapter opens with a discussion of the economic issues, an informal description of the applicable model, and an overview of the results and intuition. It then develops the formal analysis, including sufficient explanations for those with little training in information economics or game theory. Bibliographic notes provide a historical perspective of developments in the area and a description of complementary research. Detailed proofs are given of all major conclusions, making the book valuable as a source of modern research techniques. There is a large set of review problems at the end of the book.

Abstract: Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Inventory Management and Risk Pooling Chapter 3: Network planning Chapter 4: Supply contracts Chapter 5: The Value of information Chapter 6: Supply Chain integration Chapter 7: Distribution strategies Chapter 8: Strategic alliances Chapter 9: Procurement and Outsourcing Strategies Chapter 10: Global Logistics and Risk Management Chapter 11: Coordinated product and supply chain design Chapter 12: Customer Value Chapter 13: Smart Pricing Chapter 14: Information Technology and Business Processes Chapter 15: Technology standards Appendix A: Computerized Beer Game Appendix B: Risk Pool Game Appendix C: Supply Contract Spreadsheet Appendix D: Bidding Game

Abstract: Natural disasters, labor disputes, terrorism and more mundane risks can seriously disrupt or delay the flow of material, information and cash through an organization's supply chain The authors assert that how well a company fares against such threats will depend on its level of preparedness, and the type of disruption Each supply-chain risk to forecasts, information systems, intellectual property, procurement, inventory and capacity has its own drivers and effective mitigation strategies To avoid lost sales, increased costs or both, managers need to tailor proven risk-reduction strategies to their organizations Managing supply-chain risk is difficult, however Dell, Toyota, Motorola and other leading manufacturers excel at identifying and neutralizing supply-chain risks through a delicate balancing act: keeping inventory, capacity and related elements at appropriate levels across the entire supply chain in a rapidly changing environment Organizations can prepare for or avoid delays by "smart sizing" their capacity and inventory The manager serves as a kind of financial portfolio manager, seeking to achieve the highest achievable profits (reward) for varying levels of supply-chain risk The authors recommend a powerful "what if?" team exercise called "stress testing" to identify potentially weak links in the supply chain Armed with this shared understanding, companies can then select the best mitigation strategy: holding "reserves," pooling inventory, using redundant suppliers, balancing capacity and inventory, implementing robust backup and recovery systems, adjusting pricing and incentives, bringing or keeping production in-house, and using Continuous Replenishment Programs (CRP), Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) and other supply-chain initiatives

Abstract: this paper we present a review of decision methods reported in the literature for supporting the supplier selection process. The review is based on an extensive search in the academic literature. We position the contributions in a framework that takes the diversity of procurement situations in terms of complexity and importance into account and covers all phases in the supplier selection process from initial problem definition, over the formulation of criteria, the qualification of potential suppliers, to the final choice among the qualified suppliers. Moreover, we propose decision methods and techniques that previously have not been suggested in a purchasing context. The proposed methods specifically accommodate for buying situations for which few or no decision models were published so far. This paper extends previous reviews by Weber et al. (Eur. J. Oper. Res. 50 (1991) 2), Holt (Int. J. Project Mange. 16 (1998) 153) and Degraeve et al. (Eur. J. Oper. Res. 125 (1) (2000a) 34) in that it classifies the models in a framework developed by De Boer (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands, 1998) which recognises more steps in the buying process than only the final among qualified suppliers and accommodates for the diversity of procurement situations.