Procurement

About: Procurement is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 25669 publications have been published within this topic receiving 334145 citations.

E-commerce bid and project management system and method for the construction industry

Abstract: An integrated electronic commerce (e-commerce) based construction industry bidding and project management system and methods, including document distribution, supply chain automation and on-line auctioning. In a pre-construction setting, the e-commerce based bidding and project management system and method provides for a user the means for participating and competing in the bidding and construction project management tasks using on-line computerized telecommunications technologies. The on-line system and methodologies help the participants to achieve cost efficiencies and performance enhancements that traditional prior art manual bidding and construction management systems and methods have not achieved. In a global system setting the present invention facilitates management of real estate, development, building and construction industries, including architecture, engineering and construction (AEC) project phases, including design, specification, research, bidding, financing, procurement, construction, and maintenance.

Antiretroviral drug supply challenges in the era of scaling up ART in Malawi

Abstract: The number of people receiving antiretroviral treatment (ART) has increased considerably in recent years and is expected to continue to grow in the coming years. A major challenge is to maintain uninterrupted supplies of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs and prevent stock outs. This article discusses issues around the management of ARVs and prevention of stock outs in Malawi, a low-income country with a high HIV/AIDS burden, and a weak procurement and supply chain management system. This system for ARVs, paid for by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and bypassing the government Central Medical Stores, is in place, using the United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF’s) procurement services. The system, managed by a handful of people who spend limited time on supply management, is characterized by a centrally coordinated quantification based on verified data from all national ART clinics, parallel procurement through UNICEF, and direct distribution to ART clinics. The model worked well in the first years of the ART programme with a single first-line ARV regimen, but with more regimens becoming available (e.g., alternative first-line, second-line and paediatric regimens), it has become more difficult to administer. Managing supplies through a parallel system has the advantage that weaknesses in the national system have limited influence on the ARV procurement and supply chain management system. However, as the current system operates without a central warehouse and national buffer stock capacity, it diminishes the ability to prevent ARV stock outs. The process of ordering ARVs, from the time that estimates are made to the arrival of supplies in health facilities, takes approximately one year. Addressing the challenges involved in maintaining ARVs through an efficient procurement and supply chain management system that prevents ARV stock outs through the establishment of a dedicated procurement team, a central warehouse and/or national buffer stock is a priority.

Using Laboratory Experiments to Build Better Operations Management Models

Abstract: 1. Introduction. 2. A Short History of Laboratory Experiments in Economics. 3. Established Good Practices for Experimental Design. 4. Inventory Ordering with Stochastic Demand: The Newsvendor Problem. 5. Supply Chain Coordination. 6. Procurement. 7. Future Trends. References.

Discriminatory Public Procurement Policy and Cost Reduction Incentives, with Florence NAEGELEN, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 67, n° 3, 1998, 349-367

Abstract: Abstract Discriminating in favor of domestic suppliers in the award of government procurement contracts is a widespread practice. In this paper, we extend the previous analysis of McAfee and McMillan (1989) [Government procurement and international trade. Journal of International Economics 26, 291–308] and Branco (1994) [Favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts. Journal of International Economics 37, 65–80] by considering in the same model the bidding competition stimulation effect and the favoritism effect. We prove that the optimal policy can be implemented by a modified Vickrey auction or by a complex modified first price auction. We also consider that firms can reduce their cost by a nonobservable effort. We show that taking moral hazard into account does not modify the awarding rule, but that the government must use the payment rule to require a greater level of effort from the favored firm.