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Showing papers on "Proxy (statistics) published in 1982"


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Dec 1982
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the relationship between dimensions of voting (e.g., composites of votes on several issues) and measures of general district opinion such as referendum results (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Erickson, 1978, Kuklinski, 1977, 1978; Kuklininski and McCrone, 1980; and Markus, 1974).
Abstract: -M W fANY MEMBERS of the press and the public apparently believe that interest groups "buy" influence by contributing to political campaigns. This belief has been cited as reason for Congress either publicly to finance congressional campaigns or to place a limit on the amount of monies that a candidate may receive from political action committees. In spite of this public discussion, few scholars have investigated systematically whether campaign contributions directly affect public policy or, more specifically, whether the likelihood that a legislator will vote for a bill favored by an interest group increases upon receiving a contribution from the group. Empirical research on legislative voting can be categorized into two groups. The first group of studies has investigated the relationship between dimensions of voting (e.g. composites of votes on several issues) and measures of general district opinion such as referendum results (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Erickson, 1978; Kuklinski, 1977, 1978; Kuklinski and McCrone, 1980; and Markus, 1974). The second group has focused on the relationship between a congressman's vote on specific bills and the opinions (or self-interest) of sections of his constituency (Bernstein and Anthony, 1974; Danielson and Rubin, 1977; Kau and Rubin, 1978, 1979; and Abrams, 1977). Opinion is usually measured by socioeconomic characteristics. To elaborate on Kuklinski's (1979) criticism, the presumption is that legislative voting is influenced by constituents' opinions but socioeconomic characteristics are no more than proxy variables for such opinions. Most of those used are poor proxies because a priori it is not clear which of many characteristics will predict voting and because the ability of a characteristic to predict voting presumably varies over issues. To be an adequate proxy, a socioeconomic characteristic must be sufficiently refined so that it is related to opinion on a specific bill. In the case of a vote on a specific piece of legislation, the size of a group for whom the issue is salient may be a convincing measure of its influence; and the more precisely the group is defined, the better the variable as a proxy. For instance, in this study dairy industry characteristics arguably are better measures of opinion on dairy price supports than general district characteristics such as percentage of the population which is rural. Furthermore, dairy industry characteristics presumably are poor measures of the relevant dimensions of district opinion on issues such as civil rights. For issues involving specific subgroups of votes, the relationship between a proxy variable and voting is not necessarily a black box. However, district level measures of

126 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A repeat of the study using an electronic balance ought to lead to a slope appreciably nearer unity, and the fact that the slope is rather shallow, although not significant, is of interest.
Abstract: is unfounded and, on average, test weighing gives a result insignificantly different from the true value. The fact that the slope is rather shallow, although not significant, is of interest; however, it may well be related to the poor accuracy of the scales used. A repeat of the study using an electronic balance ought to lead to a slope appreciably nearer unity. T J COLE Dunn Nutritional Laboratory, Milton Road, Cambridge CB4 IXJ

15 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the subsequently realized spot rate is a poor proxy for the prior expectations of rational agents, and that using this proxy creates a serious errors-in-variables problem in tests for a risk premium, and this makes it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of zero risk premium.
Abstract: Conventional tests for a risk premium in the price of forward exchange use the subsequently realized spot rate as a proxy for prior expectations. Use of this proxy creates a serious errors-in-variables problem which makes it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of zero risk premium. Use of a better proxy for expectations indicates the presence of a risk premium in the forward exchange rate of all countries analyzed. IF THERE IS ZERO risk premium in the price of forward exchange, the forward rate will equal agents' expectations of the future spot rate. Since the expected future spot rate is not observed, investigators have had to construct an expectations proxy in order to test for a risk premium. The standard approach has been to use the subsequently realized spot rate as a proxy for prior expectations. This approach is justified by invoking the theory of rational expectations. If agents efficiently process all information, then the realized spot rate will differ from prior expectations by a zero mean, serially uncorrelated random variable. Given this expectations proxy, the presence of a risk premium is tested by regressing the future realized spot rate on the forward rate. Intercept and slope regression coefficients which are not significantly different from zero and unity respectively imply a zero risk premium. Such tests have generally been unable to reject the hypothesis of zero risk premium.1 It is the contention of this paper that the subsequently realized spot rate is a poor proxy for the prior expectations of rational agents. Use of this proxy creates a serious errors-in-variables problem in tests for a risk premium, and this makes it difficult to reject the null hypothesis. When a better proxy for expectations is employed, we find evidence of a risk premium in the price of forward exchange. As a result, the forward rate, uncorrected for the risk premium, does not provide unbiased market-implicit forecasts of the future spot rate.2

12 citations


ReportDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an intermediate measure is defined as a measure that is "exogenous" or causally prior to the goal variable, and it should have the feature of having minimal feedback from the goal measure and also should respond predictably to changes in the direction of policy.
Abstract: The purpose of monetary policy is to influence the evolution of the economy. This influence may be expressed in the oft heard phrases of reducing inflation, promoting real economic growth and lowering unemployment. These are the goals of policy action. How are these goals to be achieved? The Federal Reserve is limited in its power in that there are only a few policy vehicles over which it exercises dominance. Although the main policy instrument of the Fed has differed over time, during the past few decades Fed policy has been exerted primarily through its control of the banking system's reserves via open market operations. The difficulty faced by the policymaker is to know just what effect the changes in the instruments are having on the economy. Since data on the goal variables generally are received with a lag, it is useful to find an intermediate variable that is more timely in its availability and that acts as a good proxy for the goal variable. In other words, changes in the intermediate variable should reliably predict changes in the goal measure. If, however, a measure is unduly influenced by the goal variable, then its usefulness in policy decisions is diminished greatly. This is because movements in the intermediate measure might emanate from policy actions, from changes in the goal measure, or both. For a measure to be useful as an intermediate target, therefore, it should have the feature of being "exogenous" or causally prior to the goal variable. In addition to having minimal feedback from the goal measure, the intermediate target measure also should respond predictably to changes in the direction of policy. For example, an intermediate target that responds randomly to changes in the policy instrument

10 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used a proxy variable for income distribution, in order to test in what degree the amount demanded of public goods reflects the existence of different income concentrations, and an adjustment in the tax share for spatial tax incidence is also used.
Abstract: This paper can be integrated in the set of studies that following the first work by Borcheding and Deacon have tested different specifications of Median Voter Models. The main innovation in this paper results from the use of a proxy variable for income distribution, in order to test in what degree the amount demanded of public goods reflects the existence of different income concentrations. An adjustment in the tax share for spatial tax incidence is also used. Finally, the fit of the model for counties above and under median population is analyzed allowing us to make some inference about the relationship between the adequacy of the analysis and “distance” between voters and representatives.

1 citations