Showing papers on "Quality (business) published in 1977"

Behavioral Models of Risk Taking in Business Decisions: A Survey and Evaluation

Abstract: Many business decisions involve comparative evaluation of alternatives that can be described by probability distributions over future returns. Examples include long-term contract evaluation, production planning, employee selection, capital budgeting, quality control, and audit planning. Numerous normative models for comparing probability distributions over future returns have been proposed for such situations. The model most often cited in the literature is the mean-variance model. It is based on three preference assumptions (Sharpe [1970]). (1) The value of an investment can be completely described by its expected return (,u) and standard deviation (a-). (2) u is good: other things being equal, more is preferred to less. (3) ais bad: other things being equal, less is preferred to more. While the applicability of this and other normative models to aggregate market behavior has been studied extensively, the degree to which these models describe individual managers' actual risk preferences has received little attention in the business literature, even though the individual level of analysis is relevant to many decisions made within the firm. This paper will evaluate alternative descriptive

The Effects of Price, Store Image, and Product and Respondent Characteristics on Perceptions of Quality

Abstract: Perceived quality appears to be associated consistently with high prestige stores, high prices, and physical attributes of products such as color. Consumer income and educational level also affect ...

Convenience Food Packaging and the Perception of Product Quality

Abstract: PACKAGING often plays a critical role in a firm's marketing mix. A negative packaging attribute can sometimes enhance product quality. As part of the product and distribution mix, it performs the functions of protection and containment. Perhaps more importantly, packaging serves as a vehicle for promotion. In today's self-service economy, packaging provides the manufacturer with the final opportunity to persuade prospective buyers prior to brand selection. Shoppers, as they pass down the aisles, are "exposed" to packages just as they are to print media or other forms of promotion.

Guarantees and Risk-Sharing

Abstract: The fact that a consumer is frequently uncertain about the quality of a product that he purchases, and is therefore also unsure of the extent to which it will render him the services he might expect of it, is one that is gaining increasing recognition. In an earlier paper [5] I examined in a simple framework the effects of changes in the uncertainty about a product's quality on the consumer's demand, and also touched briefly on the effect of a guarantee. In this paper I want to examine in more detail some of the economic issues posed by the existence of guarantees. There are several useful distinctions that can be drawn as a preliminary to more detailed study. One is a distinction between situations where buyers and sellers have equal access to information, and a situation where sellers have superior access. The first situation is exemplified by a market where trade is in a product whose quality is genuinely random, with the distribution known to both buyers and sellers. Thus if a certain fraction p of the cars from a given factory are generally known to be faulty, then a transaction in which a retailer sells a car to a buyer comes into this category: each knows that the chance of the car being faulty is p, but, because the car is unused, neither knows whether it is actually faulty. Contrast this with a situation where the first owner of the car is reselling it: now there is an important asymmetry, in that the seller is much better informed about the quality of the product than the buyer. This is the case with which Akerlof's very interesting analysis [1] is largely concerned, and which I have also discussed in [4]. My main concern here, however, is with a situation of equal information. Thinking casually about such a situation, it is clear that one can distinguish between the incentive effects and the risk-sharing effects of a guarantee. Incentive effects arise because the existence of a guarantee provides the producer with an incentive to improve the quality of his product, at least to the extent of reducing the chances of its falling below the guaranteed level. If the compensation in the event of failure is less than complete, then the consumer also has an incentive to maintain the product. For example, a used car guarantee, under which the buyer and seller will each pay half of any repair bills, provides both parties with incentives to minimize these bills. Of course, if the guarantee is valid for only a limited period of time, then there is the further effect of providing the buyer with an incentive to ensure that if there is to be a failure, it occurs early in the product's life. This may act in opposition to the other effect, and reduce his eagerness to maintain the product. In addition to creating the incentive effects mentioned, a guarantee also acts as a way of sharing the risk associated with uncertainty about the quality of a product: to be efficient in this sense, it will apportion this risk in accordance with the risk-aversion of the participants. My main concern here is with the risk-sharing aspects of guarantees. This is partly because these seem to be the most tractable aspects of the problem, but also stems from a belief that these are the most important aspects. Casual empiricism suggests that except in rather unique cases, a product is usually designed and produced before any attention is given to the choice of guarantee terms: these are then chosen as part of a marketing package. In such situations, the reliability of the product will clearly be independent of the

New Evidence on Price and Product Quality

Abstract: A variety of investigations have indicated that consumers subjectively perceive a positive relation between price and product quality. However it is also necessary to consider the objective analysis of actual price-quality relations which exist among competing products available for consumer choice. This investigation reviews findings from some subjective and objective evaluations of the price-quality relationship, followed by an objective analysis of price versus quality among 135 recently marketed groups of products in five product categories. Findings indicate that for 51 percent of the products a positive price-produce quality relation may be inferred, and dramatic differences in this relation are evident from one product category to another. Implications of these findings for the efficiency of consumer decision-making, the performance of consumer markets and future research on objective price-quality relations are discussed.

Food quality assurance

Abstract: Six basic fundamentals ensure a successful quality control program: 1. organization; 2. trained personnel; 3. adequate sampling; 4. standards and specifications; 5. measurement; 6. interpretation. Standards are set by government, the company, industry, or the consumer. Methods for determining quality are both subjective and objective. Subjective control is based on the opinion of the investigators. Objective methods include physical, chemical, and microsopic measurements. A variety of equipment and procedures used result in data to support reports of examination of processed food. Quality can be effected by cultivar, maturity of the food, cultural practices, harvesting and handling, processing, handling, processing, shelf life, and use. A food technologist must be able to discriminate flavor attributes and color sensitivity, be familiar with packaging evaluation techniques, and know various scientific methods for grading and or quality evaluation. methodology and evaluation techniques are included

Estimation of flows and temperatures in process networks

Abstract: In the course of daily operation of a petroleum refinery or chemical complex, many thousands of items of infor-mation are generated, gathered, and recorded. These data are, in turn, used to plan, schedule, control, and evaluate process operations. Because of the highly integrated nature of modern processes, inaccurate data taken from one part of the process can easily lead to poor decisions that affect other parts of the processes. For instance, if inventory and production data on one product are inaccurate, the manufacturer may be forced to substitute a premium grade product to meet his delivery, thereby incurring a quality giveaway and creating an additional demand for the substitute product. Or, he may have to procure the supply from some other sources at additional costs. Or, he may accumulate unnecessarily large inventory, thereby tying up production and storage facilities needed for other products. Because of the immense scale of operations, even a small percentage change in inventory or flow may make a substantial difference in revenues or profits. The availability of accurate and consistent process data is therefore crucial to all process analyses.

Equity in Local Service Distribution

Abstract: Equity is difficult to define and to analyze, but we believe a simplied version of it can become a useful conceptual tool for local administrators. The way to begin is to analyze local service distribution patterns. Officials in the larger local governments should, indeed, make the analysis of service distribution part of their operating routines. In this article we will suggest a framework for administrators to use in analyzing service distribution and offer suggestions for making judgments about the equity of service distribution patterns. We will relate the analytic framework and the equity judgment suggestions to four different categories of local services. We will then discuss how an operating official may use these ideas, and end by examining some of the limitations of the methods we propose. For the sake of brevity, we will devote only passing attention to dollar measures. That subject has received lengthy attention in recent productivity research. Public services are a subset of social, economic, and political activities resulting in the distribution of benefits in society. Local public service expenditures constitute a substantial portion of total domestic public service expenditures. In addition, nearly every domestic service includes transactions at the local level, by local governments or officials of other governments. To the extent that the quantity or quality of water supply, police protection, education, or other services vary among neighborhoods, wards, or other localities within a city or a metropolitan area, the question of the appropriateness of variation in service distribution may be raised. Politicians often are concerned about trade-offs between services e.g., shall police services or solid waste services be increased

Quality Aspects of Mass-Reared Insects

Abstract: Control of the quality of mass-produced industrial goods is a matter of survival for any industrial enterprise that has to compete on the market. A constant survey of the market situation provides feedback to the factory where quality, design, or price levels have to be adjusted in order for the company to remain in business. The impression that quality control of mass-produced insects has received only scant attention until recently indicates that these basic rules of the marketplace apparently do not apply to this special category of mass production. That those in charge of insect rearing may lack this concern of industrial product management may be caused by several factors. First, in most cases there is no market and there is no producer-competitor-customer situation enforcing a constant improvement of the end product, because mass-reared insects are usually produced and used by the same institution—often by the same individuals. Secondly, the definition, monitoring, and manipulation of quality in mass-reared insects is a relatively difficult matter; and it is heavily influenced by personal judgment and not least by a general lack of knowledge with regard to the characteristics that enable the insect to perform its intended role in pest control.

Quality-can we measure it.

Abstract: Assuring the quality of care is rapidly becoming a big business. Considering both the PSRO program with its Medical Care Evaluation studies and the Joint Commission of Hospital Accreditation with i...

A Critical Appraisal of “Significance” in Contract Archaeology

Abstract: discriminate time periods even as short as 500 years. The limits on useful applications of seriational techniques are in the nature and quality of the field data. Drennan's real contribution is in finding a better quality of data to sequence than conventional ceramic frequencies. Sometimes the quality of the data can be improved merely by improving the definition of the ceramic types, however, so that the types more closely reflect chronological change.

Can consumer dissatisfaction and complaints guide public consumer policy

Abstract: In this paper an account is given of some subjective indicators of consumer satisfaction with the quality of products and other aspects of purchasing and consumption. The indicators discussed are “problems”, “complaints”, and “reported satisfaction.” The difficulties inherent in interpreting such data are stressed. The author's conclusion is that measures of satisfaction and dissatisfaction are almost unusable as a basis for setting priorities in public consumer policy, albeit concrete descriptions of consumer problems can give some guidance. In the main, however, the ambition must be to develop objective indicators of consumer welfare.

The Local Consumer Information System: An Institution‐To‐Be?

Abstract: This paper makes the case for the creation, testing and perfection of a new economic institution–a local consumer information system The heart of the system would be a data bank to which the consumer could address questions and receive answers repeatedly regarding the local market The purpose of the system would be to deliver relevant consumer information more efficiently For the individual consumer this new institution would help identify his best buy variety of a product, quickly and at low cost It would also tell him, again quickly and at low cost, from what local retailers and at what local prices this best buy variety might be purchased This new institution would serve all consumers in a given community by lowering many prices, quality constant By reproducing itself in different locales, as the product testing organizations have, it might be expected to multiply and serve consumers in many communities The paper discusses the types of information to be provided, methods of information collection and dissemination, means of insuring accuracy and fairness and how it might be financed

Basic Quality Control in Diagnostic Radiology

Abstract: FOREWORD This document, " Basic Quality Control in Diagnostic Radiology " , is the fourth in a series of AAPM reports. This document is designed to enable technologists working with the guidance and supervision of a medical physicist to set up a viable quality assurance program in diagnostic radiology with minimal expense. The AAPM, through its Diagnostic Radiology Committee, plans to issue additional documents detailing physicist/engineer level test methods which utilize more sophisticated equipment. These additional tests will be suitable for installation and acceptance testing and for determining compliance with requirements of the Bureau of Radiological Health and state and local radiation control agencies. The American Association of Physicists in Medicine is organized, as one of its declared purposes, to prepare and to disseminate technical information in medical physics and related fields. In fulfillment of this purpose, the AAPM through a structure of Task Forces, Committees, and Councils prepares recommendations, policy and state-of-the art reviews in the form of reports. These reports cover topics which may be scientific, educational or professional in nature, and final approval of them is given by that Council of the Association charged with responsibility for the particular concerns of the report. The Publications Committee of the AAPM hopes that this report will effectively continue the record of published work previously reported by other scientific committees and so ably inaugurated by the previous Publications Committee. Copies of a related monograph, Medical Physics Monograph No. 4: Quality Assurance in Diagnostic Radiology, are also available from the Office of the Executive Secretary at $10.00 prepaid for AAPM Members ($20.00 prepaid for non-members).