Showing papers on "Rationality published in 1969"

Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives*

Abstract: In recent years the welter of data accumulated on American voting behavior has been continually reanalyzed by social scientists interested in building theories of electoral choice. Most of the original data-gathering enterprises were guided by general theoretical frameworks which, for the most part, were not developed to a point where the ensuing analyses addressed themselves unambiguously to the overall conceptions by which they were guided. As a result much of our knowledge about voting behavior is in the form of generalizations about what social and psychological variables account for voting choices while we lack conceptual frameworks which systematically interrelate these generalizations and provide comprehensive and parsimonious explanation. If any one unifying conception has emerged from the original large scale studies it is that the average voter is irrational. This inference has been derived from a variety of empirical relationships coupled with varying conceptions of rationality.The more recent reanalyses of these data sets have been characterized by a theoretical sophistication that was lacking heretofore. One of these, a theory of the calculus of voting, has applied some formal rigor to the question of the rationality of the decision to vote, selected empirical equivalents of theoretical entities from survey data on national elections, and conducted a successful test of the theory. Unlike traditional approaches to the rationality question which infer the degree of rationality from quantities of information possessed or from correlates of decisions (background, party affiliation, group memberships, etc.), this investigation conceived of rationality in terms of the kind of calculus employed by the individual in deciding among alternatives (in this case whether or not to vote).

American Rings and English Mules: The Role of Economic Rationality

Abstract: Introduction, 25. — Observed investment behavior, 27. — The relative advantages of rings or mules in the United States and Great Britain, 29. — The role of cotton prices, 34. — Relative factor costs as a function of counts spun, 39. — Costs and benefits, 42.

Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification

Abstract: In The Responsible Electorate, V. O. Key urged upon us “the perverse and unorthodox argument … that voters are not fools.” He challenged the notion that the voting act is the deterministic resultant of psychological and sociological vectors. He believed that the evidence supported the view of the voter as a reasonably rational fellow. The present article offers a corollary to Key's “unorthodox argument.” It suggests that certain sociological determinants, secifically group norms regarding party identification, may, upon examination, prove to be rational guides to action. For the voter who is a reasonably rational fellow, it will be argued, these group norms may seem rather sensible.Before proceeding to the analysis of data, some discussion of the notion of rationality seems in order. The usage subscribed to in the present analysis derives from contemporary game theory. Put most simply, being rational in a decision situation consists in examining the alternatives with which one is confronted, estimating and evaluating the likely consequences of each, and selecting that alternative which yields the most attractive set of expectations. Formally, this process entails making calculations of the following type as a basis for the decision:where:E(Vai) = expected value of alternative i.P(oj∣ai) = probability of outcome j given that V(oi) = value of outcome j to the decision maker.

The Empirical Content of Economic Rationality: A Test for a Less Developed Economy

Abstract: A substantial body of economic theory involves the hypothesis of economic rationality, that is, the hypothesis which assumes that firms have knowledge of their production, cost, and return functions and which implies certain behavior relating to the profit-maximization conditions. The hypothesis of economic rationality has been defended on the basis of a priori theoretical considerations, and it has been supported by casual empirical observations. It has also been challenged (and with special vehemence in the case of less developed countries [LDC]) on the grounds of deductive reasoning and casual empiricism. The profit-maximization conditions of the hypothesis of economic rationality have been tested rigorously. The validity of these tests has in turn been questioned. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a new test for the hypothesis of economic rationality. The hypothesis is then tested in the specific context of an underdeveloped area of Greece with data from a random sample of 430 subsistence farms. It is well known that all firms would have the same quantities of inputs and outputs under some limiting assumptions, namely, if: (a) all firms had the same production function, that is, the same technical knowledge and identical fixed factors; (b) all firms faced the same prices in the product and factor markets; and (c) all firms maximized profits perfectly and instantaneously. The data we utilize for testing the rationality hypothesis are the observable differences in input mixes for firms that produce (roughly) homogeneous outputs. Since we make none of the assumptions above, but instead explicitly assume them not to be fulfilled, we are able to explain, and indeed to measure quantitatively, the extent to which each of assumptions (a), (b), and (c) is violated.

Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Some Implications of a Mathematical Approach

Abstract: This paper seeks to open for exploration the field of decentralization in politics and organizational design. As a first approach, it examines conditions under which decentralization is preferable from the viewpoint of rationality or cost-effectiveness. Our normative statements as to what would be best, or what should be done, are formulated first from the viewpoint of the subjects or clients, but they are expected to include the interest of the community in ensuring adequate service at low cost, and they also include the interest of the rulers, insofar as their power in the long run depends on their capacity to respond to the demands made upon them quickly enough and adequately enough to retain their political support.The political theory underlying our study assumes that modern governments retain “their just powers by the consent of the governed,” and hence that both their legitimacy and their power will depend at least in significant part on their ability to respond adequately to the popular demands made upon them. We do not deal in this study with other important criteria of preference, such as the psychological value which some of those who take the role of powerholders may put upon centralized control, or the contrary value which some of those who identify with their subjects may put upon power sharing and decentralization.

On the Design of Inductive Systems: Some Philosophical Problems

Abstract: HUME'S PROBLEM of induction often appears to be the fundamental issue in philosophical discussions of hypothesis formation and testing. As a question about a working inductive system, for example, one embodied in a practising scientist, this is a fundamental issue. But still more basic questions can be asked about designing the best system for performing inductive tasks. Thus we wish to discuss a "systems approach" to the design of inductive systems. In this we shall be guided by the methods of rationalising or "optimising" systems that have been developed in recent years in system science and operations research. Our basic question, then, is whether the method of induction from experience can be described as rational, or, what issues need to be resolved in order to make it rational, where rationality is a property of a system. The philosophical base of this question goes back at least as far as the Republic. In order to bring some reality into our discussion, we have chosen a very specific task from analytic organic chemistry. We were guided here by the principle of the mean: we wished to avoid an oversimplified example of no real concern to anyone (are all swans white?), and on the other hand an example so complex that no one really understands it. Since we will ourselves be making some inductions from our single example, we may rightfully be accused of being a defective inductive system that operates in an ad hoc manner. But our aim is to raise questions rather than answer them.

Unity and Diversity in Science

Abstract: The idea of the unity of science is the historically very important idea of total rationality and objectivity.

Professional values in medical practice.

Abstract: Appropriate medical attitudes and behavior emerge from and in turn contribute to the development of an inter-related core of professional values. Distinct from economic considerations, these values can be identified historically and sociologically, and the independent status of a practicing physician in America is uniquely high. Foremost is the value of service to individual and community institutionalized in the doctor–patient relation. The commitment to rationality, science and learning forms a foundation for technical skill creatively applied to practical ends. Individualism, innovation and self-discipline are expressed in a system of ethical principles. In broad social relations and responsibilities, as well as functionally specific technical competence, the physician is blessed with a unique validation of his authority by the public.

Morality and purpose

Abstract: I was fortunate enough to be introduced to J. L. Stocks’s writings on moral philosophy when I was an undergraduate. Ever since I have been puzzled by the lack of attention given to his work by contemporary moral philosophers. Stocks was interested in the difference moral considerations make to human action. How do moral questions enter into our assessment of actions? Stocks could say at the time he wrote these papers, and the same could be said today, that ‘From the time of Aristotle to the present day it has been more or less common form among philosophers to regard purposive action as the summit of human achievement on the practical side. Man was the rational animal, and in the field of conduct he proved his rationality so far as he made his action a well-conceived step towards a clearly-defined end’.1 Stocks argued, however, that the importance of moral considerations, or of artistic and religious considerations for that matter, cannot be understood or accounted for in terms of purposive action. The distinction between means and ends is central in purposive action. The means are the ‘well-conceived step towards a clearly-defined end’. In themselves the means are relatively unimportant. They are important only insofar as they lead to the proposed end. A purposive view of action, then, involves taking an abstract view of action: one element in the situation is abstracted from it, namely, the end in view, and all else is made subordinate to it.

Technology and humanistic values

Abstract: What I should like to talk about today is the relationship between technology and the humanities. In doing so, I shall be construing both terms very broadly. I will mean by "technology" the totality of the tools that men make and use to make and do things with. Our technology, then, is our society's toolbox, which includes, not only hand tools and machines, but also the spectrum of intellectual tools, from language, to ideas, to science, and to such latter-day techniques as computer programs, systems analysis, and program planning and budgeting systems. It is with this toolbox that our society and the people in it do their work; the nature of work cannot be understood apart from the concept of tools. When construed in this broad way, of course, the concept of technology begins to shade into the wider concept of knowledge, which is why we often hear our time referred to as a "knowledge" society. There are a number of important issues, in fact, that have very little connection with technology as such, but that are nevertheless relevant to technology by virtue of illuminating the social role of knowledge in general. Knowledge in this general sense also includes information of all sorts, intellectual methodologies of all sorts-such as the use of computers by the arts and humanistic disciplines, for example-and extends further to a commitment to the value of rationality, and to the multiplication and growth in influence of a host of knowledge institutions, from universities, to research and development institutes, to analysis and planning staffs in public and private organizations. It is through enhancing the status, office, and importance of knowledge in one or another of its forms, in other words, that science and technology may be affecting society most significantly. In that sense, understanding technology in the broader sense of knowledge-as the ancient sense of scientia, if you will-may be a precondition of understanding the relationship between technology and the humanities or any other aspect of society that we may be interested in. I construe the word "humanities" equally broadly, as naming the concern with the expressive, moral, and contemplative aspects of living, as distinct from the instrumental ones. The arts are the concern of the humanities in this sense, as are history, and philosophy-at least in its original sense-and our aesthetic, ethical, and religious values. It is to this side of life that we appeal when we speak of the value of leisure-but leisure in the best sense, not in the potentially self-defeating sense of time off from work.

I. ‘Strong’ self‐deception

Abstract: Even if many instances of reflexive, and even of interpersonal, deception do not involve knowledge or belief of the deceiver to the contrary of the belief he fosters, it is conceivable that some instances could. This is obscured in Stanley Paluch's treatment of self‐deception by the dubious contention that one couldn't be self‐deceived if one could affirm that one knew (was aware) that P and believed not‐P, and that one couldn't be described as knowing P and believing not‐P unless one could affirm this (Inquiry, Vol. 10, 1967). The former claim would actually render the affirmation absurd, which it is not; and if it is not, the latter claim is harmless. Whatever can be said of ‘self‐deception’ involving deviant uses of ‘know’, the question remains how ‘X knows P and believes not‐P’ could be true given a standard use. The standards of rationality permit one to sustain rival beliefs so long as one does not reflect on all the facts alleged in one of the beliefs. Self‐deceit relies on withholding attention no...

Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of Contract Law

Abstract: The question of damage measures presented by the conscious decision of a promisor to breach a losing contract raises one of the most perplexing conceptual problems in contract law. Recognizing the present inability of the courts rationally to resolve the problem, as illustrated by the opposing decisions in Groves v. John Wunder Company and Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Company, the author undertakes to examine the premises of contract law with a fresh perspective-economic analysis.

Fallibilism as a Theory of Instruction

Abstract: Often when we make a claim, state a proposition, or express a belief, someone will ask, "How do you know?" The questioner wants us to justify our claims. He is "justificationist"-someone who will accept a statement only if it can be justified or verified. Justificationists are not a rare species. Most people, especially academic people, are, or try to be, justificationists. In this paper I want to argue against the notion that we should try to justify our claims, our ideas, our beliefs. I realize that this sounds shocking. But it sounds so only because most people, including most academics, hold to a specific theory of rationality. According to this theory, to be rational means to accept only those claims or ideas that can be justified and to reject all that cannot be justified. So, to attack the notion of justification is tantamount to attacking a widely accepted theory of rationality. I want to do just that. My criticism is that according to this theory of rationality it is not possible to be rational.

The New Rationality in Art Education: Promise or Pitfall?.

Abstract: (1969). The New Rationality in Art Education: Promise or Pitfall? Art Education: Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 6-10.

The Study of Compliance Maintenance as a Strategy for Comparative Research

Abstract: THE focus of this article is upon the compliance-inducing mechanisms present in any political system. The notion of compliance relationships is central to all conceptualizations of the political system and its functions, as it is related to all political "primitives" such as power, influence, authority, etc. Political systems exist above all for the purpose of establishing compliance with some set of norms or values. The primary institutional form reflecting the performance of this function is government. Members of governmental institutions attempt to maintain the compliance system (a) because of the security of habits, and (b) because they share the same set of norms or values. For a number of reasons the efforts of these actors to maintain the compliance system may not be coordinated: they may or may not act "rationally" according to the criteria of rationality applied, but the end product of their activity is a stream of demands for compliance that is oriented toward the enhancement of a desired normative system. In general we can speak of a continuum of compliance-inducement mechanisms around which more or less stable interactive situations can be structured. At the one end of the continuum are what might be referred to as "voluntary compliance mechanisms"-mechanisms that do little more than provide information about the situation for the recipient of a demand, which information in turn evokes a voluntary inducement to comply with the specific request, demand, or order. The other end of the continuum is identified by the instruments of coercion, including force and violence. Clearly, there is a similar continuum of responses from the recipient of demands, ranging from immediate obedience to armed resistance. It is obvious that compliance is not costless. Even "voluntary compliance mechanisms" impose some costs, such as the "objective" cost of printing up and distributing billboards, law books, or whatever is needed to communicate the demand. "Involuntary cost mechanisms" are still more expensive, and resistance from the populace raises these costs. Politicians are aware that resources are limited, and it is safe to assume that they will desire to minimize compliance costs. Logically,

Soviet ideology: The necessity of Marxism

Abstract: Czechoslovakia was much the most significant act yet undertaken by the rather cautious post-Khrushchev leadership. It abruptly altered the climate of Eastern Europe and the perspectives of the world communist movement. Together with the concurrent and subsequent ideological hardening of the Soviet Union, it cast doubts on many optimistic expectations of Western observers of the Soviet political scene who, like this author,1 saw reasons to expect that the overall tendency of the Soviet system towards rationality and openness could be expected to continue.2

Planning for Bellak's third revolution.

Abstract: Traditional planning models which aim for comprehensiveness are examined and found to be misleading. Comprehensive planning is limited by the planner's knowledge and information sources, the influence of value premises, and the multiplicity of decision centers. Citizen participation is viewed as a further limitation upon rationality in the decision-making process. But citizen participation is also suggested as a means for adjudicating value conflicts and also as a purposeful method for overcoming the “politics” of community decision-making.

Santayanan—Weberian Reason in Administration

Abstract: The major purpose is to provide a philosophic basis for the study and practice of educational administration. An explicit assumption is that logical, propositional thought is a desirable prelude to action. Reason, which is defined as an organic harmony of impulses, is related to administration via three levels of discourse: 1) philosophic values (WHY), 2) hypothetico‐deductive theory (HOW), and 3) observed behavior (WHAT). The first level is defined by the discursive thought of the moral philosopher Santayana. His definition of rational ethics provides a foundation for administrative‐organizational theory in general, and the concept of bureaucracy in particular. The second level includes Weber's pure‐type structural model that has rationality as its dominant characteristic. The third level, administrative practice, or praxeology, is portrayed as a derivative of rational thought. Current approaches, including systems analysis and program budgeting, are rooted in the union of the logic of Santayana's ethics and Weber's structural model for human groupings.

On Methods of Refutation in Metaphysics

Abstract: What I wish to open up is a sub-problem of the problem of rationality. Most of us who think of ourselves as rational men would like to be able to give reasonable reasons for the things we believe. What is much less explored is the opposite problem, regarding the things we do not believe, of being able to find reasonable reasons against the things we disbelieve. This problem, arises because so many systems of philosophy are put on the shelf without being firmly refuted. Consider, for example, the system of Spinoza or of Berkeley or of Kant. It is the dominant outlook in the Anglo-American philosophical world, to regard most of these philosophies as outdated, and as saying very little that can be taken seriously. There may be justice in this view: quite possibly there are very few living issues in many of these philosophers. But one must take them, seriously if for no other reason than that there is no standard refutation of them. But if you look back on attempts to discuss historical philosophies, it is extraordinary how little agreement there is to be found on what is wrong with them. We all know that there is no agreement about positive contributions to philosophy, but there is equally little agreement on what shall be rejected and how. It seems to me very curious that there should, be no way of settling these matters. In view of this I have cast around for various methods by which metaphysical views, if they should be false, might be rejected.

Politics, economics and rationality

Abstract: The growing division of labour in the social sciences has tended to separate the study of economic from that of political things and, in doing so, has created separate bodies of theory and data of such sophistication and extent that almost no-one can hope to maintain an adequate grasp of both. The development of these sciences is an important achievement, but one attained at considerable cost. Specialization has produced a division between them which is now so deep that communication across it has become very difficult. We have created separate sciences and departments for the study of political, economic and moral questions; in the world, political, economic and moral issues are inextricably connected at the base of every important issue of our time. The disturbances in France arose out of experiences in factories and universities; they produced a debate about the morality of the social order, they were directed, as action, against the institutions of the

Bio)Ética e (Bio)Tecnologia

Abstract: In the same way as occurs in other fields of knowledge, not only can biotechnology generate large benefits, but also, at the same time, it can equally generate large risks. In some cases, the condition that distinguishes what is legitimate from what is not is so tenuous that a practice that is questionable from a moral point of view may easily be accepted by a significant portion of the players involved. In the light of this scenario of special interest for society, the present study seeks to investigate the relationship between bioethics and biotechnology, based on contributions from reflections on the harmlessness of knowledge, neutrality of science, convergence of epistemic rationality and progress.

Schachtel's metamorphosis: i. on the confounding of creativity contexts

Abstract: -In its more specific aspect, this paper is a critical analysis of the concept of allocentric perception, advanced by E . G. Schachtel in his book Metamorphosis. It claims that Schachtel's presentation confounds the novelty and personal-subiectiue meaning contexts of creativity. That is, it claims that although the perceptions of the allocentric perceiver make his personal-subjecrive world more meaningful for him and may lead to his making the personalsubjective world of other individuals more meaningful for them, these perceptions are not a cause or condition of his producing anything that historians call innovative. In its more general aspect, the paper is a further effort to clarify the narure of creativity, the meaning of Rorschachian rationality and inner creation, and the nature and meaning of the contemporary "conformity" protest.