Showing papers on "Rationality published in 1972"
TL;DR: The authors found that less than 2% of the variance in voting choices between Nixon and Humphrey could be accounted for by opinions on Vietnam, and that the absence of issue voting could not be fully explained by voters' failings.
Abstract: The infrequency of issue voting in American presidential elections is usually attributed to a lack of policy rationality among voters. An examination of the Vietnam war issue in 1968 suggests, however, that much of the explanation may lie instead with the electoral process itself, and with the kinds of choices which are offered to citizens.Policy preferences concerning Vietnam were only weakly related to the two-party vote. Less than 2 per cent of the variance in voting choices between Nixon and Humphrey could be accounted for by opinions on Vietnam. Yet the absence of issue voting could not be fully explained by voters' failings. Most people had strong opinions about Vietnam. The public was generally able to perceive where prenomination candidates stood on the issue. People were able and willing to take account of Vietnam in evaluating other candidates.Voters did not bring their Vietnam preferences to bear upon the choice between Nixon and Humphrey because they saw little difference between the positions of the two, and because they were not certain precisely where either one stood. These perceptions, in turn, were rooted in reality. Humphrey's and Nixon's campaign speeches show that they did differ rather little on specific proposals about Vietnam. Further, both candidates indulged in so much ambiguity about Vietnam that public confusion over their positions was understandable.There are theoretical reasons for believing that candidates in a two-party system often have an incentive to converge at similar policy positions, and to be vague. If they generally do so, their behavior may contribute significantly to the apparent nonrationality of voters. In addition, it may have important implications for questions of collective rationality and social choice.
278 citations
01 Apr 1972
276 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the differences among rational DMPs, but the underlying similarities: what is common to all rational decision-making principles and what can we reasonably demand of any DMP?
Abstract: It is the business of all normative inquiry-ethics, decision theory, welfare economics and the like-to formulate rational decision-making principles. This is sometimes the business of the social sciences too. Now and then a social scientist seeking to explain someone's behavior will look for a rational principle behind his decisions-a reasonable decision-making rule that might have led the subject to act as he did. Rational decision-making principles (DMPs) may be as different as the various decision-making problems for which they are designed. An acceptable method of picking political leaders and a reasonable rule for budgeting household expenses may bear little resemblance to one another. What I want to discuss, though, is not the differences among rational DMPs, but the underlying similarities: What is common to all rational DMPs ? What can we reasonably demand of any DMP? The traditional answer is the Maximization Thesis: a rational DMP specifies something to be maximized. On this view, every decision-making problem is a maximization problem; to optimize is to maximize something; a rational agent (one who is motivated by a rational DMP) is perforce a maximizer. I've argued before that the Maximization Thesis, even when trimmed to its bare bones, is untenable.2 This time the target of my critical fire is not so much the Maximization Thesis itself as
226 citations
TL;DR: The resilience of this approach lies in its being imbedded in a more general and unquestionably accepted definition of the slum population as culturally primitive and, hence, most frequently irrational.
Abstract: The peripheral slum population in urban Latin America is still characterized, despite much research to the contrary, as a focus of discontent and political disruptiveness. The resilience of this approach lies in its being imbedded in a more general and unquestionably accepted definition of the slum population as culturally primitive and, hence, most frequently irrational.
112 citations
90 citations
31 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an examination of the Contemporary Crises in Statistical Theory from a Behaviourist Viewpoint is presented, with a focus on single-case probabilities and the Foundations of Probability.
Abstract: GIERE, R. [1971]: 'Objective Single Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics', forthcoming in P. Suppes (ed.): Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science. HACKING, I. [1965]: Logic of Statistical Inference. HAYS, W. H. [1963]: Statistics for Psychologists. HEMPEL, C. G. [1962]: 'Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation', in G. Maxwell and H. Feigl (eds.): Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3, pp. 98-169. HODGES, J. L. and LEHMAN, E. L. [1954]: 'Testing the Approximate Validity of Statistical Hypotheses', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (B), pp. 261-8. HODGES, J. L. and LEHMAN, E. L. [1964]: Basic Concepts of Probability and Statistics. HOGBEN, L. T. [1957]: Statistical Theory: The Relationship of Probability, Credibility, and Error. An Examination of the Contemporary Crises in Statistical Theory from a Behaviourist Viewpoint. LAPLACE, S. [1814]: Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. LEHMAN, E. L. [1959]: Testing Statistical Hypotheses. LEVI, I. [1967]: Gambling with Truth. NEYMAN, J. [1950]: First Course in Probability and Statistics. NEYMAN, J. [1952]: Lectures and Conferences on Mathematical Statistics and Probability. NEYMAN, J. and PEARSON, E. S. [1967]: Joint Statistical Papers. POPPER, K. R. [1967]: 'Quantum Mechanics without the Observer', in M. Bunge Quantum Theory and Reality, pp. 7-44. SAVAGE, L. J. [1954]: The Foundations of Statistics. SMITH, C. A. B. [1969]: Biomathematics. TUKEY, J. [i960]: 'Conclusions versus Decisions', Technometrics, 2, pp. 423-433.
30 citations
01 Jan 1972
TL;DR: The question of what makes an idea true or false was first raised by as discussed by the authors, who argued that concepts could be true-or-false, in the way propositions are, and the consequences of this distinction as far as they will take us.
Abstract: Philosophers of Science have long paid lip service to the desirability of distinguishing the questions that arise about the propositions (statements, hypotheses) of a science from those that arise about its concepts (terms, ideas); but hitherto there has been a curious hesitation on their part to explore the consequences of this distinction as far as they will take us. This hesitation is understandable in those writers whose primary commitment is to the methods of mathematical logic, with its formal analysis of propositional systems and relations. But it extends also to those who have no such commitment: e.g. the pragmatists. (Recall William James’s confused question, “What makes an idea true?” — as though concepts could be true-or-false, in the way propositions are!)
23 citations
01 Jan 1972
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors refer to such bodies of related items as domains, and find that more is involved than the mere relatedness of items, though they will find that, in the sense in which this concept will prove helpful in understanding the enterprise of science.
Abstract: If we examine some relatively sophisticated area of science at a particular stage of its development, we find that a certain body of information is, at that stage, taken to be an object for investigation. On a general level, we need only think of the subject-matters called ‘electricity’, ‘magnetism’, ‘light’, or ‘chemistry’; but both within and outside such standard fields, there are more specific examples — such as, for instance, what are taken to be subfields of the preceding subjects. Further, those general subjects themselves are, in many cases, considered to be related in certain ways. (For example, in the nineteenth century, reasons accumulated for believing that electricity, magnetism, chemistry, and light were related, and in such a manner that it was reasonable to search for a common account of all these subjects.) I will refer to such bodies of related items as domains, though we will find that, in the sense in which this concept will prove helpful in understanding the enterprise of science, more is involved than the mere relatedness of items.
19 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it gradually becomes clear that Eastern European sociologists are now joining the majority of their colleagues here in seeking to develop the behavioral sciences in such a way as to gain a better understanding of people's problems in order to better control their seemingly irrational behavior.
Abstract: our doings. Indicatively enough, Alvin Gouldner has recently published a voluminous statement on The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. But this crisis is neither a coming one nor a specifically Western problem. It gradually becomes clear that Eastern European sociologists are now joining the majority of their colleagues here in seeking to develop the behavioral sciences in such a way as to gain a better understanding of people’s problems in order to better control their seemingly irrational behavior. Furthermore, more and
TL;DR: The publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice is an event to be celebrated by philosophers as discussed by the authors, which is not often we get a book like this one, not a mere sketch or collection of essays but a thoroughly elaborated theory, similar in scope and ambition to the great books of Spinoza, Locke, and Kant.
Abstract: The publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice is an event to be celebrated by philosophers. It is not often we get a book like this one, not a mere sketch or collection of essays but a thoroughly elaborated theory, similar in scope and ambition to the great books of Spinoza, Locke, and Kant. Rawls' book is reminiscent of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in other respects too. It is unremittingly rationalistic in spirit. \"Moral philosophy,\" he tells us, \"[is a] part of the theory of rational choice,\"' and in the theory of justice \"'we should strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the rigor which this name connotes.\" 2 Indeed, Rawls is reluctant to allow that equally well informed reasonable men can disagree about anything that is important. Rawls' book is also similar to seventeenth and eighteenth century prototypes in substance, for it is a \"social contract theory,\" he tells us, in the tradition of Rousseau and Kant. In this review I cannot, of course, hope to cover very thoroughly matters that will no doubt be debated in the literature for many years to come. I shall, however, take up a number of points that seem to me to merit special attention. The section immediately following considers Rawls' view of the relation between justice and other social values and so attempts to outline the framework within which his theory operates. In subsequent portions of the review I shall try to m,,ke clear the nature of his contractarian theory of justification and to show how Rawls argues for his description of what he calls the \"initial position\" of his rational contractors. I then discuss two of the basic principles in his conception of justice-the \"equal liberty prin.
TL;DR: Boulding as mentioned in this paper argued that rational values and their bureaucratic embodiment as defined by Weber are declining in the United States and that non-rational mass movements may emerge to fill the vacuum.
Abstract: Rational values and their bureaucratic embodiment as defined by Weber are declining in the United States. The rational production economy freed resources to support new groups with nonrational qualitative values. These groups adopted activism as a technique and appeared to threaten the bureaucractic system. Then activism was institutionalized, with elites representing activist movements incorporated into the system. These elites' qualitative values and outputs were unmeasurable, so that bureaucratic decisionmaking became a nonrational political process of appeal to outside publics for bargaining power. The institutionalization of activism has stabilized social integration, but new and ephemeral values arise in rapid succession, weakening what is left of the sense of moral direction formerly provided by rational values. Nonrational mass movements may emerge to fill the vacuum. Modern society grew up around an economy devoted to the production and distribution of standardized material goods. This society embodied values of rationality: the application of the calculus of efficiency to adapt means to specific, limited, and measurable ends. Rational values were well suited to increase production in a context of limited resources and technology. Many analysts of the modern world have emphasized its rationality. Max Weber (1925) saw rationality in the Protestant Ethic, in modern law, in "disenchantment," in bureaucracy, and in other elements of society and culture. Parsons' (1951) pattern-variables specify dimensions of rationality. His (1961) theory of structural differentiation together with the pattern-variables views society as a sort of machine, with specialized parts chosen and arranged in accordance with rational specifications and dismantled and reassembled from time to time to improve its efficiency. Coleman (1970) has epitomized the modernization of life as a change from person-based to role-based social organization. A structure built of separate roles rather than of whole persons allows the individual and the system to behave more rationally. Ellul (1964) feels that the emphasis on technical efficiency has come to dominate not only economic and social organization, but all facets of culture and man's inner thought processes as well, driving out all considerations that interfere with rationality. These analyses, and similar ones by other authors, stress not only the pervasiveness of rationality but also its imbeddedness in organizations. Modern rationality was originally that of the individual entrepreneur, but after the Industrial Revolution the locus of rationality shifted from the individual to the structure of bureaucracy, a system of social action set up rationally like a machine. The growth of rational bureaucracy with its routinized procedures and its hierarchical decisions based on calculations of efficiency has been attributed to the effectiveness of such a system in producing a limited and stable range of measurable outputs such as standardized material goods (Woodward, 1965). STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND THE CHALLENGE TO BUREAUCRATIC RATIONALITY It is our contention that this rational bureaucratic system is, in fact, declining. Bureaucracy keeps growing, as the main form of organization to accomplish a growing variety of functions and to represent a growing variety of groups, and in complex networks linking different functions and groups (Boulding, 1953; Turk, 1970; Warner and Low, 1947; Warren, * Revision of the presidential address delivered at the annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 1972.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors claim that the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from psychology to sociology, from how do I know? to how do we know? and that as a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral.
Abstract: In a nutshell, the present chapter claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know? — from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, (Why) should I act, believe, etc., this or that way? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, (Why) should we — rather than I — act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening.
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of international trade is studied in which there are two equilibria, one of which is a state of permanent trade imbalance, in which one country exports commodities to the other in every period, and the object of this note is to explore this equilibrium further and to ask whether such a seemingly irrational action by the net exporter might be avoidable by the use of certain policy measures.
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31 Dec 1972
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the notion of "probability" in the context of belief in the existence of a being and its existence as a property, and present a set of criteria for belief in such a property.
Abstract: I. Faith-and Faith in Hypotheses.- I. Falsifiable Theism: Sketch of a Position.- II. Hypothetical Faith: Criteria of Rationality.- II. Two Sides to a Theist's Coin.- I. The Two Sides Distinguished.- I.1. Sartre.- I.2. Norman Malcolm and Peter Geach.- II. The Two Sides and the PROSLOGION.- III. Miracles: Nowell-Smith's Analysis and Tillich's Phenomenology.- I. The Matter Briskly Introduced.- II. The Matter Reintroduced.- II.1. Hume's Critique.- II.2. Nowell-Smith's Critique.- II.3. Possible Criteria for Miracles.- II.4. Tillich's Phenomenology of Miracles.- II.5. Comments on Tillich's Account.- IL.6. Towards a Philosophically Respectable Belief in Miracles.- IV. From "God" to "Is" and from "Is" to "Ought".- I. Convention and Wisdom About "Meaning" and "Necessity".- II. Looking Back Without Anger: a Cry from the Fifties.- III. From "God" to "Is": Good Reasons and Justifying Explanations.- IV. From "God" to "Is" -Some Fallacies about Being A Being.- V. From "God" to "Is": The Muddled Fear of Calling God A Being.- VI. From "God" to "Is" -Current Confusions about Existence as Necessary and Existence as Predicate.- VII. Existence as Necessary and Existence as Predicate: the Confusions Probed.- VII.1. Existence and Tautologies.- VII.2. Existence CAN be a Property.- VIII. Does "X is a Necessary Being" Entail "X is Timeless"?.- VIII.1. Omniscience.- VIII.2. God as Supreme Purposer.- VIII.3. God as Omnipotent Purposer.- V. From "Is" to "Ought" and from "Ought" to "God".- I. Some Steps Retraced: "God Exists" as a Necessary Truth.- II. The Necessary Truth Contested: Persons Without Bodies.- III. The Necessary Truth Contested: Appeals to Evil.- III.1. Must Gods Madden Madden?.- III.2. Evil and Other Worlds.- IV. The Necessary Truth Reaffirmed: "No 'is' Without 'OUGHT' in the Offing".- V. The Necessary Truth Reaffirmed: "For an 'OUGHT' is as Hard as an 'is'".- VI. Probability and 'The Will to Believe' Introduction.- I. Metaphysics and Probability.- 1.1. Probability and Father Dwyer's Blending of Aquinas with Wittgenstein.- 1.2. Some Possible Objections on Metaphysics and Probability.- II. 'Probability' and Semantic Theories.- II.1. "Probability", "Meaning" and Semantic Theories.- II.2. Some Golden Eggs Among Toulmin's Obiter Dicta.- II.3. Some Lexicographical and Etymological Factors.- II.4. Some Senses of "Probability" ?.- II.5. The Contexts of Many Subjective Theories of Probability.- III. Rational Commitment and 'The Will to Believe'.- III.1. Some Assumptions About James Redivivus.- III.2. James' Crucial Section I.- III.3. Beard's Pessimism About 'The Will to Believe'.- III.4. Some Neo-Jamesian Tools to Clarify Rational Commitment.- VII. Gambling on other Minds- Human and Divine.- I. "Evil", "Ought" and "Can" as Springboards for the Will to Believe.- I.1. Madhare Back on the March.- I.2. Madhare's Premises and Bare Presuppositions.- I.3. Possible Consequences from a 'Normatively Logical Point of View'.- II. 'Theodicy and Rational Commitment' or 'Uber Formal ent-scheidbare Satzenkonjunktionen der Principia Theologica und verwandter Systeme'.- III. Gambling on Deity and Fraternity.- IV. Gambling on Reference and Sense.- VIII. Rational Action, Aquinas and War.- I. An Introduction to Some Confused Modern Thinking About War.- II. 'A Just War is One Declared by the Duly Constituted Authority'.- III. 'A Just War Uses Means Proportional to the Ends'.- IV. Farewell to Anti-Martial Muddles?.
TL;DR: In the context of the relation of man to nature, however, technology actually plays a somewhat different role than does science, because the former is far more directly connected with the realm of human wants and thus to the social conflicts arising out of them.
Abstract: One of the most influential notions in modern social theorv is the idea that science and technology function as the twin foundations of human mastery over nature. In the context of the relation of man to nature, however, technology actually plays a somewhat different role than does science, because the former is far more directly connected with the realm of human wants and thus to the social conflicts arising out of them. This is what Marx means in referring zo the ’immediate’ process of production in which tech-
TL;DR: It is not with any Utopian optimism that this work proposes a universal search formulation language, but it hopes to give some impetus to the forces of constructiveness and rationality.
Abstract: It is not with any Utopian optimism that we propose a universal search formulation language. Nevertheless, a serious problem exists, and we hope to give some impetus to the forces of constructiveness and rationality.
01 Sep 1972
TL;DR: This article argued that Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions represents them as subjective and irrational processes, in which mystical conversions and community pressures rather than good reasons determine choices between theories, and argued that there is partial communication among proponents of competing paradigm candidates and their arguments are rational though not coercive.
Abstract: Critics have said that Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions represents them as subjective and irrational processes, in which mystical conversions and community pressures rather than good reasons determine choices between theories. Kuhn rejects the charge, insisting that there is partial communication among proponents of competing paradigm candidates and their arguments are rational though not coercive. The critics reply that in fact Kuhn's position entails total non-communication and irrationality. A Kuhnian account of “partial communication” is thus necessary. Kuhn's attempt to give one, based on the notion that the “good reasons” advanced in paradigm debates function asvalues, fails. But a more satisfactory account can be given if it is recognized that paradigm-debaters will, in one or both of two ways, share paradigmsother than the ones at issue. Further, Kuhn's position both should and can accommodate a notion of theory reduction; his unqualified rejection of reduction is an unnecessary weakness, even apart from questions about the rationality of revolutions. The paper concludes with a brief examination of the contrast between Kuhn's and Feyerabend's strategies for the advancement of science.
TL;DR: This investigation of normal legal reasoning clarifies changing conceptions of roles vis-à-vis rule systems and assesses the products and potential of legal socialization.
Abstract: Focused on children's developing ideas of rule, justice, and compliance, interview data from 115 subjects in kindergarten through college are used to reconstruct the jurisprudence—or legal value system—of youth. This investigation of normal legal reasoning (1) clarifies changing conceptions of roles vis-a-vis rule systems and (2) assesses the products and potential of legal socialization. Developmentally, youth see rules guarding against disorder and functioning as more prospective than coercive, prescriptive than prohibitive, beneficial than punitive, and dynamic than sacred. Parallel changes emerge in defining role relationships. By their own assessment, youth's perceptions are guided by a law-and-order frame, although they recognize that purpose and principle should determine compliance. For most, neither absolutist positions nor authoritative fiats insure justice. Optimally, justice is guaranteed through equality, rationality, consensus, and human rights. Only a modest number, however, accept that they can internalize these principles and, in judging the system by them, not be obligated to obey an unfair rule. While youth have the capacity for legal reasoning consistent with principles of major jurisprudents, to attain such ethical legality, socializing agents must define new goals, appraise old values, and create conducive contexts.
TL;DR: In this paper, the student is given no opportunity to become acquainted with Anselm and Descartes and is deprived of the necessity of wrestling with certain crucial issues for himself.
Abstract: have to supplement this text with other readings. The second reservation is related to the first. In producing a personal constructive statement in philosophy of religion, Penelhum has deprived the student of the necessity of wrestling with certain crucial issues for himself. For example, Penelhum’s own biases lead him to do less than justice to the ontological argument. The student is given no opportunity to become acquainted with Anselm and Descartes
TL;DR: The assumption that equality problems are either absent or relatively trivial and easy is seen particularly in connection with issues related to the environment, national resources, knowledge and technology, and population growth as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: An assumption that equality problems are either absent or relatively trivial and easy is seen particularly in connection with issues related to the environment, national resources, knowledge and technology, and population growth. This chapter examines that assumption and systematically shows how a concern with rationality that ignores questions of ethics or justice is self-deluding if not self-serving. The entire basis of major national resource allocations is rarely probed in any depth. If national interest and prestige are to be useful in determining national goals, they must be defined by reference to other values whose independent validity is clear. In the case of military security, of course, there must be a national policy—it cannot be left up to the individual. Admittedly, many people submit in a docile fashion to paternalism in military affairs, although fewer are docile about less important but more personal matters such as pornography and marijuana.